There is always a limit to power dynamics at work in changing political contexts, most notably in situations where strategic recalibrations demand new thinking. Iranian-Saudi relations are the quintessential battleground of a regional competition that can no longer be understood through old lenses. The conditions that have prompted the hostile relationship between the two countries—both domestically and from a foreign policy standpoint—have fundamentally altered. Surrounded by colossal difficulties, both Iran and Saudi Arabia now face several unrelenting challenges. Some of these challenges have the potential to paradoxically—but understandably—bring the longtime adversaries closer together. Iran’s new President, Hassan Rouhani, supported by the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, faces fierce economic sanctions by the West, a tough negotiating road ahead within the context of 5+1 talks, and a strong domestic opposition at home. There is a better than even chance that if the Rouhani administration fails in the course of the nuclear talks, his presidency is likely to collapse into irrelevance, reminiscent of the last years of the Khatami presidency. Still, Rouhani’s strong suit could be other foreign policy areas, such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, where he could act as a formidable regional balancing agent. Saudi Arabia finds itself in the middle of a different conundrum. On the one hand, it is intolerant of any religion other than its own fundamentalist brand of orthodox Islam—known as Wahabi and Salafi Islam, and on the other hand, promoting its strategic interests in a region that has often relied on stability, security, and the status quo. Yet, two events in recent years have created a shift in Saudis’ strategic thinking: 1) democratic movements resulting from the 2011 Arab uprisings and 2) the common threat of ISIS (or “Daesh” as it is locally known) throughout the region, both of which are compelling Saudi Arabia and its biggest regional rival, Iran, to resort to increasing level of long-term strategic thinking at a time when Riyadh recognizes that playing the sectarian card vis-à-vis Tehran has proved to be politically costly and counterproductive, with broadly negative consequences for its own power projection in the region. Saudi leaders, in the midst of a succession crisis, have turned their attention to Iraq, realizing that their competition with Iran over Syria has been perilously destabilizing and divisive, propelling radical and extremist groups such as ISIS. Thus the Saudis’ decision to open their embassy in Iraq after a quarter century-long absence of diplomatic relations with Baghdad, indicates a new thinking on the part of its leaders. The Saudis have begun their move toward rapprochement after the appointment in August of Haider Al Abadi as Iraq’s new prime minister. Finally, future plans by the Saudis to set up a general consulate in Erbil, capital of Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan region, also is emblematic of their interest to spread their influence throughout the country. This move has sparked several speculations. One such conjecture is that Saudis are keen to work toward some kind of rapprochement with Iran by creating a situation whereby they have to work with Iranians in order to bring some semblance of order to the region, while at the same time containing the ISIS influence and expansion in Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq and the eastern parts of Syria. The other speculation suggests that the strategic calculation of the Saudis is premised on the thinking that by establishing ties with Iraq, they can potentially curtail Iranian influence. Still others opine that cooperation between these rival powers in Iraq could have more stabilizing effect on Syria and Lebanon—an assumption that remains uncertain at best. In the face of new developments in the region, most experts concur, the rapprochement between Iran and the United States has become not only inevitable but also a preferred policy option under the current circumstances. The Saudis consider this rapprochement detrimental to the balance of power in the region. The question persists: what is the most logical outcome of such a rapprochement for Saudi Arabia? An empowered but cooperative Iran or a belligerent Republic bent on intensifying its ideological competition with a monarchical regime in Saudi Arabia? Acutely aware of these possible outcomes, Saudi leaders have decided to remain in the game by simply cutting their losses and readjusting their policies toward Iran. Time for adopting a cooperative, diplomatic approach toward Iran has never been more prudent. If this scenario unfolds, it could bode well for the region at large. Mahmood Monshipouri teaches Middle Eastern Politics at San Francisco State University and University of California, Berkeley. He is currently editing a volume entitled, Inside the Islamic Republic: Social Change in Post-Khomeini Iran (New York: The Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
Posted on: Fri, 16 Jan 2015 09:41:52 +0000
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