This collection, moreover, occurs only in a context in which the Government’s acquisition, use, and dissemination of the information are subject to strict judicial oversight and rigorous protections to prevent its misuse. A. Statutory Requirements Section 215 authorizes the FISC to issue an order for the “production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism,” except that it prohibits an “investigation of a United States person” that is “conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.” 50 U.S.C. § l861(a)(1). The Government’s application for an order must include “a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to [such] an authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment)” and that the investigation is being conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney General. Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(A). Because Section 215 does not authorize the FISC to issue an order for the collection of records in connection with FBI threat assessments,1 to obtain records under Section 215 the investigation must be “predicated” (e.g., based on facts or circumstances indicative of terrorism, consistent with FBI guidelines approved by the Attorney General). Finally, Section 215 authorizes the collection of records only if they are of a type that could be obtained either “with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued by a court of the United States directing the production of records or tangible things.” Id. § 1861(c)(2)(D).2 The telephony metadata collection program complies with each of these requirements. 1. Authorized Investigation. The telephony metadata records are sought for properly predicated FBI investigations into specific international terrorist organizations and suspected terrorists. The FBI conducts the investigations consistent with the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (2008), which direct the FBI “to protect the United States and its people from . . . threats to the national security” and to “further the foreign intelligence objectives of the United States,” a mandate that extends beyond traditional criminal law enforcement. See id. at 12. The guidelines authorize a full investigation into an international terrorist organization if there is an “articulable factual basis for the investigation that reasonably indicates that the group or organization may have engaged . . . in . . . international terrorism or other threat to the national security,” or may be planning or 1 “Threat assessments” refer to investigative activity that does not require any particular factual predication (but does require an authorized purpose and cannot be based on the exercise of First Amendment protected activity or on race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion of the subject). FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, § 5.1 (2011). 2 Indeed, Section 215 was enacted because the FBI lacked the ability, in national security investigations, to seek business records in a way similar to its ability to seek records using a grand jury subpoena in a criminal case or an administrative subpoena in civil investigations. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 109-85, at 20 (2005) (“[A] federal prosecutor need only sign and issue a grand jury subpoena to obtain similar documents in criminal investigations, yet national security investigations have no similar investigative tool.”). -6- supporting such conduct. See id. at 23. FBI investigations into the international terrorist organizations identified to the Court readily meet that standard, and there have been numerous FBI investigations in the last several years to which the telephony metadata records are relevant. The guidelines provide that investigations of a terrorist organization “may include a general examination of the structure, scope, and nature of the group or organization including: its relationship, if any, to a foreign power; [and] the identity and relationship of its members, employees, or other persons who may be acting in furtherance of its objectives.” Id. And in investigating international terrorism, the FBI is required to “fully utilize the authorities and the methods authorized” in the guidelines, which include “[a]ll lawful . . . methods,” including the use of intelligence tools such as Section 215. Id. at 12 and 31. 2. Tangible Things. The telephony metadata records are among the types of materials that can be obtained under Section 215. The statute broadly provides for the production of “any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items).” See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1). There is little question that in enacting Section 215 in 2001 and then amending it in 2006, Congress understood that among the things that the FBI would need to acquire to conduct terrorism investigations were documents and records stored in electronic form. Congress may have used the term “tangible things” to make clear that this authority covers the production of items as opposed to oral testimony, which is another type of subpoena beyond the scope of Section 215. Thus, as Congress has made clear in other statutes involving production of records, “tangible things” include electronically stored information. See 7 U.S.C. § 7733(a) (“The Secretary shall have the power to subpoena . . . the production of all evidence (including books, papers, documents, electronically stored information, and other tangible things that constitute or contain evidence).”) (emphasis added); 7 U.S.C. § 8314 (a)(2)(A) (containing the same language).3 The non-exhaustive list of “tangible things” in Section 215, moreover, includes the terms “documents” and “records,” both of which are commonly used in reference to information stored in electronic form. The telephony metadata information is an electronically stored “record” of, among other information, the date, time, and duration of a call between two telephone numbers. And in the analogous context of civil discovery, the term “documents” has for decades been interpreted to include electronically stored information. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1970 to make that understanding of the term “documents” explicit, see Nat’l. Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1261-62 (E.D. Pa. 1980), and again in 2006 to expressly add the term “electronically stored information.” See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 34 (governing production of “documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things”).4 Moreover, a judge may grant an order for production of records under 3 The word “tangible” can be used in some contexts to connote not only tactile objects like pieces of paper, but also any other things that are “capable of being perceived” by the senses. See Merriam Webster Online Dictionary (2013) (defining “tangible” as “capable of being perceived especially by the sense of touch”) (emphasis added). 4 The notes of the Advisory Committee on the 2006 amendments to Rule 34 explain that: Lawyers and judges interpreted the term “documents” to include electronically stored information because it was obviously improper to allow a party to evade discovery obligations on the basis that the label had not kept pace with changes in information technology. But it has become increasingly difficult to say that all -7- Section 215 only if the records could “be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued by a court of the United States directing the production of records or tangible things,” and grand jury subpoenas can be and frequently are used to seek electronically stored telephony metadata records such as those sought under Section 215 or other electronically stored records. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D) (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i). That further confirms that Section 215 applies to electronically stored information.5 3. Relevance to an Authorized Investigation. The telephony metadata program also satisfies the statutory requirement that there be “reasonable grounds to believe” that the records collected are “relevant to an authorized investigation . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information . . . or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A). The text of Section 215, considered in light of the well-developed understanding of “relevance” in the context of civil discovery and criminal and administrative subpoenas, as well as the broader purposes of this statute, indicates that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the records at issue here are “relevant to an authorized investigation.” Specifically, in the circumstance where the Government has reason to believe that conducting a search of a broad collection of telephony metadata records will produce counterterrorism information—and that it is necessary to collect a large volume of data in order forms of electronically stored information, many dynamic in nature, fit within the traditional concept of a ‘document.’ Electronically stored information may exist in dynamic databases and other forms far different from fixed expression on paper. Rule 34(a) is amended to confirm that discovery of electronically stored information stands on equal footing with discovery of paper documents. The change clarifies that Rule 34 applies to information that is fixed in a tangible form and to information that is stored in a medium from which it can be retrieved and examined. At the same time, a Rule 34 request for production of ‘documents’ should be understood to encompass, and the response should include, electronically stored information unless discovery in the action has clearly distinguished between electronically stored information and ‘documents.’ Fed. R. Civ. Pro 34, Notes of Advisory Committee on 2006 Amendments (emphasis added). 5 The legislative history of Section 215 also supports this reading of the provision to include electronic data. In its discussion of Section 215, the House Report accompanying the USA PATRIOT Reauthorization Act of 2006 notes that there were electronic records in a Florida public library that might have been used to help prevent the September 11, 2001, attacks had the FBI obtained them. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-174(I), at 17-18 (2005). Specifically, the report describes “records indicat[ing] that a person using [the hijacker] Alhazmi’s account used the library’s computer to review September 11th reservations that had been previously booked.” Id. at 18. Congress used this example to illustrate the types of “tangible things” that Section 215 authorizes the FBI to obtain through a FISC order. Moreover, the House Report cites testimony in 2005 by the Attorney General before the House Committee on the Judiciary, where the Attorney General explained that Section 215 had been used “to obtain driver’s license records, public accommodation records, apartment leasing records, credit card records, and subscriber information, such as names and addresses, for telephone numbers captured through court-authorized pen-register devices.” Id. (emphasis added). Telecommunications service providers store such subscriber information electronically. Accordingly, the House Report suggests that Congress understood that Section 215 had been used to capture electronically stored records held by telecommunications service providers and reauthorized Section 215 based on that understanding. -8- to employ the analytic tools needed to identify that information—the standard of relevance under Section 215 is satisfied. Standing alone, “relevant” is a broad term that connotes anything “[b]earing upon, connected with, [or] pertinent to” a specified subject matter. 13 Oxford English Dictionary 561 (2d ed. 1989). The concept of relevance, however, has developed a particularized legal meaning in the context of the production of documents and other things in conjunction with official investigations and legal proceedings. Congress legislated against that legal background in enacting Section 215 and thus “presumably kn[e]w and adopt[ed] the cluster of ideas that were attached to [the] word in the body of learning from which it was taken.” See FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 (2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Indeed, as discussed above, in identifying the sort of items that may be the subject of a Section 215 order, Congress expressly referred to items obtainable with “a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation” or “any other order issued by a court of the United States directing the production of records or tangible things,” 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D), indicating that it was well aware of this legal context when it added the relevance requirement. That understanding is also reflected in the statute’s legislative history. See 152 Cong. Rec. 2426 (2006) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“Relevance is a simple and well established standard of law. Indeed, it is the standard for obtaining every other kind of subpoena, including administrative subpoenas, grand jury subpoenas, and civil discovery orders.”). It is well-settled in the context of other forms of legal process for the production of documents that a document is “relevant” to a particular subject matter not only where it directly bears on that subject matter, but also where it is reasonable to believe that it could lead to other information that directly bears on that subject matter. In civil discovery, for example, the Supreme Court has construed the phrase “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action” “broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (emphasis added); see also Condit v. Dunne, 225 F.R.D. 100, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Although not unlimited, relevance, for purposes of discovery, is an extremely broad concept.”). A similar standard applies to grand jury subpoenas, which will be upheld unless “there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury’s investigation.” United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991).6 And the Supreme Court has explained that a statutory “relevance” limitation on administrative subpoenas, even for investigations into matters not involving national security threats, is “not especially constraining” and affords an agency “access to virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations” at issue in an investigation. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1984). See also United 6 One court has noted that the Court’s reference to “category of materials,” rather than to specific documents, “contemplates that the district court will assess relevancy based on the broad types of material sought by the Government,” not by “engaging in a document-by-document [or] line-by-line assessment of relevancy.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1186, 1202 (10th Cir. 2010). The court explained that “[i]ncidental production of irrelevant documents . . . is simply a necessary consequence of the grand jury’s broad investigative powers and the categorical approach to relevancy adopted in R. Enterprises.” Id. at 1205. -9- States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 814 (1984) (stating that IRS’s statutory power to subpoena any records that may be relevant to a particular tax inquiry allows IRS to obtain items “of even potential relevance to an ongoing investigation”) (emphasis in original). Relevance in that context is not evaluated in a vacuum but rather through consideration of the nature, purpose, and scope of the investigation, see, e.g., Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946), and courts generally defer to an agency’s appraisal of what is relevant. See, e.g., EEOC v. Randstad, 685 F.3d 433, 451 (4th Cir. 2012). In light of that basic understanding of relevance, courts have held that the relevance standard permits requests for the production of entire repositories of records, even when any particular record is unlikely to directly bear on the matter being investigated, because searching the entire repository is the only feasible means to locate the critical documents.7 More generally, courts have concluded that the relevance standard permits discovery of large volumes of information in circumstances where the requester seeks to identify much smaller amounts of information within the data that directly bears on the matter.8 Federal agencies exercise broad subpoena powers or other authorities to collect and analyze large data sets in order to identify information that directly pertains to the particular subject of an investigation.9 Finally, in the analogous field of search warrants for data stored on computers, courts permit Government agents to copy entire computer hard drives and then later review the entire drive for the specific evidence described in the warrant. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B) (“A warrant … may 7 See, e.g., Carrillo Huettel, LLP v. SEC, 2011 WL 601369, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011) (holding that there is reason to believe that law firm’s trust account information for all of its clients is relevant to SEC investigation, where the Government asserted the trust account information “may reveal concealed connections between unidentified entities and persons and those identified in the investigation thus far . . . [and] the transfer of funds cannot effectively be traced without access to all the records.”); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Am. Viatical Servs., LLC, 2007 WL 3492762 at *1 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 2007) (compelling production of business’s entire underwriting database, despite business’s assertion that it contained a significant amount of irrelevant data); see also Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that production of multiple databases could be ordered as a “data dump” if necessary for plaintiffs’ statistical analysis of business’s employment practices). 8 See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 350-51 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that subpoena to doctor to produce 15,000 patient files was relevant to investigation of doctor for healthcare fraud); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 827 F.2d 301, 305 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding grand jury subpoenas for all wire money transfer records of business’s primary wire service agent in the Kansas City area that exceeded $1000 for a one year period despite claim that “the subpoena may make available to the grand jury records involving hundreds of innocent people”); In re Adelphia Comm. Corp., 338 B.R. 546, 549 and 553 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (permitting inspection of “approximately 20,000 large bankers boxes of business records,” and holding that “[i]t is well-settled . . . that sheer volume alone is an insufficient reason to deny discovery of documents”); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 552 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (concerning discovery request for “approximately 996 network backup tapes, containing, among other things, electronic mail, plus an estimated 300 gigabytes of other electronic data that is not in a backed-up format, all of which contains items potentially responsive to discovery requests”). 9 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding broad subpoena for financial information in FTC investigation of unfair or deceptive trade practices because it “could facilitate the Commission’s investigation . . . in different ways, not all of which may yet be apparent”); see also Associated Container Transp. (Aus.) Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 58 (2nd Cir. 1983) (“recognizing the broad investigatory powers granted to the Justice Department by the Antitrust Civil Process Act,” which are broad in scope due to the “‘less precise nature of investigations’”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1343, at 11 (1976)). -10- authorize the seizure of electronic storage media … [and] authorize[] a later review of the media or information consistent with the warrant.”).10 These longstanding practices in a variety of legal arenas demonstrate a broad understanding of the requirement of relevance developed in the context of investigatory information collection. It is reasonable to conclude that Congress had that broad concept of relevance in mind when it incorporated this standard into Section 215. The statutory relevance standard in Section 215, therefore, should be interpreted to be at least as broad as the standard of relevance that has long governed ordinary civil discovery and criminal and administrative investigations, which allows the broad collection of records when necessary to identify the directly pertinent documents. To be sure, the cases that have been decided in these contexts do not involve collection of data on the scale at issue in the telephony metadata collection program, and the purpose for which information was sought in these cases was not as expansive in scope as a nationwide intelligence collection effort designed to identify terrorist threats. While these cases do not demonstrate that bulk collection of the type at issue here would routinely be permitted in civil discovery or a criminal or administrative investigation, they do show that the “relevance” standard affords considerable latitude, where necessary, and depending on the context, to collect a large volume of data in order to find the key bits of information contained within. Moreover, there are a number of textual and contextual indications that Congress intended Section 215 to embody an even more flexible standard that takes into account the uniquely important purposes of the statute, the factual environment in which national security investigations take place, and the special facets of the statutory scheme in which Section 215 is embedded. First, Section 215’s standard on its face is particularly broad, because the Government need only show that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the records sought are relevant to an authorized investigation. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A). That phrase reflects Congress’s understanding that Section 215 permits a particularly broad scope for production of records in connection with an authorized national security investigation.11 Second, unlike, for example, civil discovery rules, which limit discovery to those matters “relevant to the subject matter involved in the action,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), Section 215 requires only that the documents be relevant to an “authorized investigation.” 50 U.S.C. 10 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that “blanket seizure” of the defendant’s entire computer system, followed by subsequent review, may be permissible if explanation as to why it is necessary is provided); United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that “the seizure and subsequent off-premises search of the computer and all available disks was about the narrowest definable search and seizure reasonably likely to obtain the images” and that “[a] sufficient chance of finding some needles in the computer haystack was established by the probable-cause showing in the warrant application”). 11 Some Members of Congress opposed Section 215 because in their view it afforded too broad a standard for collection of information. See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec. 2422 (2006) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (“[T]he deal would allow subpoenas in instances when there are reasonable grounds for simply believing that information is relevant to a terrorism investigation. That is an extremely low bar.”); 156 Cong. Rec. S2108-01 (2010) (statement of Sen. Wyden) (“‘Relevant’ is an incredibly broad standard. In fact, it could potentially permit the Government to collect the personal information of large numbers of law-abiding Americans who have no connection to terrorism whatsoever.”) -11- § 1861(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). This includes not only information directly relevant to the authorized object of the investigation—i.e., “foreign intelligence information” or “international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities”—but also information relevant to the investigative process or methods employed in reasonable furtherance of such national security investigations. In the particular circumstance in which the collection of communications metadata in bulk is necessary to enable discovery of otherwise hidden connections between individuals suspected of engaging in terrorist activity, the metadata records are relevant to the FBI’s “investigation[s]” to which those connections relate. Notably, Congress specifically rejected proposals to limit the relevance standard so that it would encompass only records pertaining to individuals suspected of terrorist activity.12 Third, unlike most civil or criminal discovery or administrative inquiries, these investigations often focus on preventing threats to national security from causing harm, not on the retrospective determination of liability or guilt for prior activities. The basic purpose of Section 215, after all, is to provide a tool for discovering and thwarting terrorist plots and other national security threats that may not be known to the Government at the outset. For that reason, Congress recognized that in collecting records potentially “relevant to an authorized investigation” under Section 215, the FBI would not be limited to records known with certainty, or even with a particular level of statistical probability, to contain information that directly bears on a terrorist plot or national security threat. Rather, for Section 215 to be effective in advancing its core objective, the FBI must have the authority to collect records that, when subjected to reasonable and proven investigatory techniques, can produce information that will help the Government to identify previously unknown operatives and thus to prevent terrorist attacks before they succeed. Fourth, and relatedly, unlike ordinary criminal investigations, the sort of national security investigations with which Section 215 is concerned often have a remarkable breadth—spanning long periods of time, multiple geographic regions, and numerous individuals, whose identities are often unknown to the intelligence community at the outset. The investigative tools needed to combat those threats must be deployed on a correspondingly broad scale. In this context, it is not surprising that Congress enacted a statute with a standard that enables the FBI to seek certain 12 See S. 2369, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006) (requiring Government to demonstrate relevance of records sought to agents of foreign powers, including terrorist organizations, or their activities or contacts); 152 Cong. Rec. S1598-03 (2006) (statement of Sen. Levin) (“The Senate bill required a showing that the records sought were not only relevant to an investigation but also either pertained to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, which term includes terrorist organizations, or were relevant to the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of an authorized investigation or pertained to an individual in contact with or known to be a suspected agent. In other words, the order had to be linked to some suspected individual or foreign power. Those important protections are omitted in the bill before us.”); 152 Cong. Rec. H581-02 (2006) (statement of Rep. Nadler) (“The conference report does not restore the section 505 previous standard of specific and articulable facts connecting the records sought to a suspected terrorist. It should.”); 151 Cong. Rec. S14275-01 (2005) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (“Unfortunately, the conference report differs from the Senate version as it maintains the minimal standard of relevance without a requirement of fact connecting the records sought, or the individual, suspected of terrorist activity. Additionally, the conference report does not impose any limit on the breadth of the records that can be requested or how long these records can be kept by the Government.”). -12- records in bulk where necessary to identify connections between individuals suspected to be involved in terrorism. Fifth, Congress built into the statutory scheme protections not found in the other legal contexts to help ensure that even an appropriately broad construction of the “relevance” requirement will not lead to misuse of the authority. Section 215, unlike the rules governing civil discovery or grand jury subpoenas, always requires prior judicial approval of the Government’s assertion that particular records meet the relevance requirement and the other legal prerequisites. Once the information is produced, the Government can retain and disseminate the information only in accordance with minimization procedures reported to and approved by the Court. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g). The entire process is subject to active congressional oversight. See, e.g., id. § 1862. Although Congress certainly intended the Government to make a threshold showing of relevance before obtaining information under Section 215, these more robust protections regarding collection, retention, dissemination, and oversight provide additional mechanisms for promoting responsible use of the authority. In light of these features of Section 215, and the broad understanding of “relevance,” the telephony metadata collection program meets the Section 215 “relevance” standard. There clearly are “reasonable grounds to believe” that this category of data, when queried and analyzed by the NSA consistent with the Court-imposed standards, will produce information pertinent to FBI investigations of international terrorism, and it is equally clear that NSA’s analytic tools require the collection and storage of a large volume of metadata in order to accomplish this objective. As noted above, NSA employs a multi-tiered process of analyzing the data in an effort to identify otherwise unknown connections between telephone numbers associated with known or suspected terrorists and other telephone numbers, and to analyze those connections in a way that can help identify terrorist operatives or networks. That process is not feasible unless NSA analysts have access to telephony metadata in bulk, because they cannot know which of the many phone numbers might be connected until they conduct the analysis. The results of the analysis ultimately can assist in discovering whether known or suspected terrorists have been in contact with other persons who may be engaged in terrorist activities, including persons and activities inside the United States. If not collected and held by the NSA, telephony metadata may not continue to be available for the period of time (currently five years) deemed appropriate for national security purposes because telecommunications service providers are not typically required to retain it for this length of time. Unless the data is aggregated, it may not be feasible to identify chains of communications that cross different telecommunications networks. Although NSA is exploring whether certain functions could be performed by the telecommunications service providers, doing so may not be possible without significant additional investment and new statutes or regulations requiring providers to preserve and format the records and render necessary technical assistance. The national security objectives advanced by the telephony metadata program would therefore be frustrated if the NSA were limited to collection of a narrower set of records. In particular, a more restrictive collection of telephony metadata would impede the ability to identify a chain of contacts between telephone numbers, including numbers served by different telecommunications service providers, significantly curtailing the usefulness of the tool. This is therefore not a case in which a broad collection of records provides only a marginal increase in -13-
Posted on: Sat, 10 Aug 2013 17:15:48 +0000
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