This past April, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service published a report entitled “The Future of Al-Qaeda.” The report examines several options of what AQ might look like in 2018. To do that, it explored how AQ might evolve along any of three models—gradual decline, incremental growth, and rapid growth—in four regions. The paper is not predictive, but it did conclude that “incremental growth represents the most expected or likeliest” scenario. Below are portions of it that are very interesting. P. 8, Ideology/Goals. “AQ holds that the West is waging a crusade against Islam and that it is the religious duty of every Muslim to join in what AW ideologues term a defensive jihad (‘struggle’). Self-appointed as the vanguard of this jihad, AQ’s goal is to drive the West out of ancient Muslim lands so as to establish a community of states based on Islamic law and restore the Islamic caliphate. To this end, AQ aims to exploit conflicts between the ummah (worldwide Muslim community) on the one hand, and the West and regional ‘apostate’ governments on the other (i.e., Muslims vs. the far and near enemies).” P. 9. Structure. “”The AQ network comprises core made up of senior leaders and a collection of affiliated groups. It is generally accepted that AQ Core provides ideological guidance to the affiliates, but that the affiliates, borne out of local political realities, control their own logistics and operations. Today’s main affiliates already existed when their relationship with AQ Core was established.” P.22. Pakistan. “The fact that the Al-Qaeda Core seems to enjoy an unmolested existence from authorities in Pakistan, coupled with the forthcoming withdrawal of US forces and ISAF troops from Afghanistan by 2014, further suggests that Core Al-Qaeda may well regain the breathing space and cross-border physical sanctuary needed to ensure its continued existence for at least the next five years.” P. 69. AQ in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).”The Yemen-based AQAP is frequently identified as the most potent threat. This threat is characterized by three distinct elements. The first is the organization’s declared intention to strike the US and its allies, evidenced by the attempted bombing of a US-bound airliner in December 2009, the UPS parcel bomb threat of October 2010 and a further failed airline plot in 2012 timed to coincide with the second anniversary of bin Laden’s death. The second is the enduring radicalizing effect of AQAP’s former principal English-language propagandist and inciter, Yemini-American Anwar Al-Awlaqi, who was killed on 30 September 2011. From the shooting spree undertaken by. . .Hasan in Fort Hood in November 2009 to the attempted Times Square bombing in May 2010 and the March 2011 conviction of former British Airways employee Rajib Karim on Awlaqi-inspire terrorism charges, AQAP’s English-language output is alleged to have inspired numerous actual or attempted acts of ‘lone wolf’ or individual terrorism. The third element is the very real threat that AQAP will continue to exploit the current security lacuna in Yemen by increasing its attacks on domestic and international targets, enhancing its recruitment efforts and expanding its geographical reach.” P. 77. “Today is not 2002 and the organization cannot be decapitated; indeed, in the absence of effective government control on the ground, the threat from AQAP cannot be contained from the air alone. By expanding the target set to include non-AQAP Islamist militants opposed to the government, the government and the US risk inadvertently broadening the appeal of AQAP in Yemen by providing a common cause around which both AQAP and non-AQAP militants can rally.” csis.org/program/future-al-qaeda-and-associated-movements-aqam
Posted on: Wed, 05 Jun 2013 16:35:10 +0000
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