Very good post from @Olga Onuch. She has been carrying out a wide-ranging research program on protest mobilization and political participation in Ukraine, including a continuous on-site survey (the Ukrainian Protest Participant Survey), interviews and focus groups discussions with protesters, activist leaders and politicians, and most recently a new three wave Electoral Survey in Ukraine. [...] So myths and legends are simply not true, such as 1. The EuroMaidan protesters were not only from central and western Ukraine, and were certainly not only Ukrainian speakers. Although data show that the majority were from central Ukraine, interview and focus group data also demonstrate that some of the most radical protesters were Russian speakers from the east. 2. Before 2014, violent repertoires had not been typically employed by Ukrainian activists. The violent protest tactics we observed in 2014 are a significant departure from a non-violent trend dating back to the dissidents of the 1960s and need further investigation. 3. Protests did not only take place in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. The truly ‘revolutionary’ aspect of the EuroMaidan was that from the very beginning protests were diffused throughout the whole of Ukraine including in the south and in the east of the country. Moreover, when protests turned violent the spread of direct action (i.e.: building takeovers) took place throughout central and eastern Ukraine. This may help explain why the conflict in the Donbas has not in-fact spread to other parts of eastern Ukraine. 4. Social media (Facebook, Twitter, VKontakte etc.) was an important tool in the #EuroMaidan mobilization process. It sped up the pace at which information travels and aided in participant coordination. Recent analyses by researchers at the SMaPP Lab at NYU are helping us to better understand how these tools were used. But at the same time, social media was not exclusively a tool of the opposition: it also exposed activists to repression and facilitated the spread of false anti-protester propaganda. 5. Importantly, when the EuroMaidan protesters left the streets and went home, they did not stop being engaged. Furthermore, their engagement spread to the eastern and southern parts of the country. Based on interviews it is clear that civic and neighborhood organizations have continued their work and have become institutionalized as an increasingly strong and coordinated civil society sector. They provide aid to the military, act as watchdogs of the government, and have set up professionalized networks and civil assemblies, all allowing ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians to contribute to the reform process. 6. There is a problem with the way western academics understand what Ukrainians call ‘small n’ (“nationalism”) and ‘large N’ (“Nationalism”). Focus group and survey data show that Ukrainians understand and use the terms ‘patriotic’ (small n) and ‘nationalist’ (large N) interchangeably. Moreover, our survey data is also pointing out that civic identity remains very strong in Ukraine and that regional, rather than ethno-linguistic, identities are central to understanding political preferences. We also find that ethnically Russian, Jewish and Polish public figures have appropriated phrases such as ‘Slava Ukraini’ [Glory to Ukraine] and ‘Zhydo Banderivets’ [Jewish Banderite*], previously understood by foreigners as markers of nationalist ideology. Thus, earlier reports about what is and should be considered as ‘nationalist’ symbols or rhetoric may in-fact be misleading or misunderstood in the Ukrainian context. 7. The rush to identify the Right Sector, and other right wing groups, as the central force behind the latter stages of the EuroMaidan has unfortunately resulted in analysts not only misinterpreting the ideology of the typical protester, but also the broader political mood in Ukraine. Most importantly, these much discussed right-wing groups have not been able to win over many voters, and recent parliamentary election results point out that such groups have actually even lost much of their own electoral support. washingtonpost/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/11/26/what-have-we-learned-in-the-year-since-ukraines-euromaidan/
Posted on: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 20:37:05 +0000
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