World War II - Part 7 (continued) Military history of the United States during World War II - continued. Allies re-group, 1942–43 (Back to the Pacific- continued) Battle of Midway The Battle of Midway in the Pacific Theater of Operations was one of the most important naval battles of World War II. Between 4 and 7 June 1942, only six months after Japans attack on Pearl Harbor, and one month after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the United States Navy (USN), under Admirals Chester W. Nimitz, Frank Jack Fletcher, and Raymond A. Spruance decisively defeated an attack by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), under Admirals Isoroku Yamamoto, Chuichi Nagumo, and Nobutake Kondo on Midway Atoll, inflicting irreparable damage on the Japanese fleet. Military historian John Keegan called it the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare. It was Japans first naval defeat since the Battle of Shimonoseki Straits in 1863. The Japanese operation, like the earlier attack on Pearl Harbor, sought to eliminate the United States as a strategic power in the Pacific, thereby giving Japan a free hand in establishing its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese hoped that another demoralizing defeat would force the U.S. to capitulate in the Pacific War and thus ensure Japanese dominance in the Pacific. The Japanese plan was to lure the United States aircraft carriers into a trap. The Japanese also intended to occupy Midway as part of an overall plan to extend their defensive perimeter in response to the Doolittle air raid on Tokyo. This operation was also considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji, Samoa, and Hawaii itself. The plan was handicapped by faulty Japanese assumptions of the American reaction and poor initial dispositions. Most significantly, American codebreakers were able to determine the date and location of the attack, enabling the forewarned U.S. Navy to set up an ambush of its own. Four Japanese aircraft carriers—Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu, all part of the six-carrier force that had attacked Pearl Harbor six months earlier—and a heavy cruiser were sunk at a cost of one American aircraft carrier and a destroyer. After Midway and the exhausting attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign, Japans shipbuilding and pilot training programs were unable to keep pace in replacing their losses, while the U.S. steadily increased its output in both areas. Background Japan had attained its initial strategic goals quickly, taking the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia); the latter, with its vital oil resources, was particularly important to Japan. Because of this, preliminary planning for a second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942. However, there were strategic disagreements between the Imperial Army and Imperial Navy, and infighting between the Navys GHQ and Admiral Isoroku Yamamotos Combined Fleet, such that a follow-up strategy was not formed until April 1942. Admiral Yamamoto finally succeeded in winning the bureaucratic struggle with a thinly veiled threat to resign, after which his plan for the Central Pacific was adopted. Yamamotos primary strategic goal was the elimination of Americas carrier forces, which he regarded as the principal threat to the overall Pacific campaign. This concern was acutely heightened by the Doolittle Raid on 18 April 1942, in which 16 US Army Air Forces B-25 Mitchell bombers launched from USS Hornet bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a severe psychological shock to the Japanese and showed the existence of a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands as well as the accessibility of Japanese territory to American bombers. This, and other successful hit-and-run raids by American carriers in the South Pacific, showed that they were still a threat, although seemingly reluctant to be drawn into an all-out battle. Yamamoto reasoned that another attack on the main U.S Naval base at Pearl Harbor would induce all of the American fleet to sail out to fight, including the carriers. However, due to the strength of American land-based air power on the Hawaiian Islands, he judged that it was too risky to attack Pearl Harbor directly. Instead, Yamamoto selected Midway, a tiny atoll at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain, approximately 1,300 miles (1,100 nautical miles; 2,100 kilometres) from Oahu. [nb 3] Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japans intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore be compelled to defend it vigorously. The U.S. did consider Midway vital; after the battle, establishment of a U.S. submarine base on Midway allowed submarines operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and reprovision, extending their radius of operations by 1,200 miles (1,900 kilometres). In addition to serving as a seaplane base, Midways airstrips also served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island. Yamamotos plan: Operation MI Typical of Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamotos battle plan was exceedingly complex, requiring the careful and timely coordination of multiple battle groups over hundreds of miles of open sea. Additionally, his design was predicated on optimistic intelligence suggesting that USS Enterprise and USS Hornet, forming Task Force 16, were the only carriers available to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier, USS Lexington had been sunk and USS Yorktown damaged so severely that the Japanese believed she too had been lost. In actuality, Yorktown would be deployed also, after being hastily repaired at Pearl Harbor and would later play a critical role in the discovery and eventual destruction of the Japanese fleet carriers at Midway. Perhaps most critically, much of Yamamotos planning, coinciding with the general feeling among the Japanese leadership at the time, was based on a gross misjudgement of American morale which was believed to be debilitated from the string of Japanese victories in the preceding months. Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U.S. fleet into a fatally compromised situation. To this end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent (particularly his battleships) would be unlikely to be discovered by the Americans prior to battle. Critically, Yamamotos supporting battleships and cruisers would trail Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumos carrier striking force by several hundred miles. Japans heavy surface forces were intended to destroy whatever elements of the U.S. fleet might come to Midways defense once Nagumos carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun duel; this was typical of the battle doctrine of most major navies. What Yamamoto did not know was that the U.S. had broken the main Japanese naval code (dubbed JN-25 by the Americans). His emphasis on dispersal also meant that none of his formations could support each other. For instance, the only warships larger than the 12 destroyers that screened Nagumos fleet were two battleships, two heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser, despite his carriers being expected to carry out the strikes and bear the brunt of American counterattacks. By contrast, the flotillas of Yamamoto and Kondo had between them two light carriers, five battleships, four heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers, none of which would see any action at Midway. Their distance from Nagumos carriers would also have grave implications during the battle, because the larger warships in Yamamoto and Kondos forces carried scout planes, an invaluable reconnaissance capability denied to Nagumo. Aleutian invasion The Aleutian Islands Campaign was a struggle over the Aleutian Islands, part of the Alaska Territory, in the American theater and the Pacific theater of World War II starting on 3 June 1942. A small Japanese force occupied the islands of Attu and Kiska, but the remoteness of the islands and the difficulties of weather and terrain meant that it took nearly a year for a far larger U.S./Canadian force to eject them. The islands strategic value was their ability to control Pacific Great Circle routes. This control of the Pacific transportation routes is why U.S. General Billy Mitchell stated to the U.S. Congress in 1935, I believe that in the future, whoever holds Alaska will hold the world. I think it is the most important strategic place in the world. The Japanese reasoned that control of the Aleutians would prevent a possible U.S. attack across the Northern Pacific. Similarly, the U.S. feared that the islands would be used as bases from which to launch aerial assaults against the West Coast. The battle is known as the Forgotten Battle, due to being overshadowed by the simultaneous Guadalcanal Campaign. In the past, many western military historians believed it was a diversionary or feint attack during the Battle of Midway meant to draw out the U.S. Pacific Fleet from Midway Atoll, and was in fact launched simultaneously under the same overall commander, Isoroku Yamamoto. However, historians Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully have made an argument against this interpretation, stating that the Japanese invaded the Aleutians to protect the northern flank of their empire and did not intend it as a diversion. Japanese attack Before Japan entered World War II, its Navy had gathered extensive information about the Aleutians, but it had no up-to-date information regarding military developments on the islands. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto provided the Japanese Northern Area Fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral Boshiro Hosogaya, with a force of two small aircraft carriers, five cruisers, twelve destroyers, six submarines, and four troop transports, along with supporting auxiliary ships. With that force, Hosogaya was first to launch an air attack against Dutch Harbor, then follow with an amphibious attack upon the island of Adak, 480 miles to the west. Hosogaya was instructed to destroy whatever American forces and facilities were found on Adak—the Japanese did not know the island was undefended. Hosogayas troops were to return to their ships and become a reserve for two additional landings: the first on Kiska, 240 miles west of Adak, the other on the Aleutians westernmost island, Attu, 180 miles west from Kiska. Because United States Naval Intelligence had broken the Japanese naval codes, Admiral Chester Nimitz had learned by May 21 of Yamamotos plans, including the Aleutian diversion, the strength of both Yamamotos and Hosogayas fleets, and that Hosogaya would open the fight on 1 June or shortly thereafter. As of June 1, 1942, United States military strength in Alaska stood at 45,000 men, with about 13,000 at Cold Bay (Fort Randall) on the tip of the Alaskan Peninsula and at two Aleutian bases: the naval facility at Dutch Harbor on Unalaska Island, 200 miles west of Cold Bay, and the recently built Fort Glenn Army Airfield 70 miles west of the naval station on Umnak Island. Army strength, less air force personnel, at those three bases totaled no more than 2,300, composed mainly of infantry, field and antiaircraft artillery troops, and a large construction engineer contingent, which was used in the construction of bases. The Army Air Forces Eleventh Air Force consisted of 10 B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bombers and 34 B-18 Bolo medium bombers at Elmendorf Airfield, and 95 P-40 Warhawk fighters divided between Fort Randall AAF at Cold Bay and Fort Glenn AAF on Umnak. The naval commander was Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald, commanding Task Force 8 afloat, who as Commander North Pacific Force (ComNorPac) reported to Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii. Task Force 8 consisted of five cruisers, thirteen destroyers, three tankers, six submarines, as well as naval aviation elements of Fleet Air Wing Four. When the first signs of a possible Japanese attack on the Aleutians were known, the Eleventh Air Force was ordered to send out reconnaissance aircraft to locate the Japanese fleet reported heading toward Dutch Harbor and attack it with bombers, concentrating on sinking Hosogayas 2 aircraft carriers. Once the enemy planes were removed, Naval Task Force 8 would engage the enemy fleet and destroy it. On the afternoon of 2 June, a naval patrol plane spotted the approaching Japanese fleet, reporting its location as 800 miles southwest of Dutch Harbor. Eleventh Air Force was placed on full alert. Shortly thereafter bad weather set in, and no further sightings of the fleet were made that day. Attack on Dutch Harbor According to Japanese intelligence, the nearest field for land-based American aircraft was at Fort Morrow AAF on Kodiak, more than 600 miles away, and Dutch Harbor was a sitting duck for the strong Japanese fleet, carrying out a coordinated operation with a fleet that was to capture Midway Island. Making use of weather cover, the Japanese first raided the naval base at Dutch Harbor on June 3, 1942. The striking force was composed of Nakajima B5N2 Kate torpedo bombers from the carriers Junyo and Ryujo. However, only half of the striking force reached their objective. The rest either became lost in the fog and darkness and crashed into the sea or returned to their carriers. Seventeen Japanese planes found the naval base, the first arriving at 05:45. As the Japanese pilots looked for targets to engage, they came under intense anti-aircraft fire and soon found themselves confronted by Eleventh Air Force fighters sent from Fort Glenn Army Air Field on Umnak. Startled by the American response, the Japanese quickly released their bombs, made a cursory strafing run, and left to return to their carriers. As a result, they did little damage to the base. On June 4 the Japanese returned to Dutch Harbor. This time the pilots were better organized and better prepared. When the attack finally ended that afternoon, the oil storage tanks were left burning, the hospital was partly demolished, and a beached barracks ship was damaged. Although American pilots finally located the Japanese carriers, attempts to sink them proved fruitless. Bad weather again set in, and all contact with the enemy fleet was lost. Foul weather forced the cancellation of Japanese plans to invade Adak with 1,200 men. The Japanese invasions of Kiska on June 6, and Attu on June 7 initially met little resistance from the local Aleuts. Much of the native population of the islands had been forcibly evacuated by the US military before the invasion and interned in camps in the Alaska Panhandle. Allied response In August 1942, the U.S. Army established an air base on Adak Island and began bombing Japanese positions on Kiska. U.S. Navy submarines and surface ships also began patrolling the area. Kiska Harbor was the main base for Japanese ships in the campaign and several were sunk there, some by warships but mostly in air raids. On 5 July, the submarine Growler, under command of Lieutenant Commander Howard Gilmore, attacked three Japanese destroyers off Kiska. He sank one and heavily damaged the others, killing or wounding 200 Japanese sailors. Ten days later, the Grunion was attacked by three Japanese submarine chasers in Kiska Harbor, with two of the patrol craft sunk and one other damaged. On 12 May 1943, the Japanese submarine I-31 was sunk in a surface action with the destroyer Edwards 5 mi (4.3 nmi; 8.0 km) northeast of Chichagof Harbor. Action of 5 July 1942 The Action of 5 July 1942 was a naval engagement fought during the Aleutian Islands Campaign of World War II. During the action, the American submarine USS Growler attacked three Japanese warships anchored off Kiska island. It was the first action of Growler??s career and ended with the loss of dozens of Japanese sailors. Background Over the course of the Pacific War, Growler—under various commanders—sank 17 enemy vessels, including many armed ships. She was a Gato-class submarine and had a complement of 60 officers and men. Her armament included ten 21 in (530 mm) torpedo tubes and one 3 in (76 mm)/50-caliber deck gun. On her first patrol from Pearl Harbor to Alaska, she was commanded by Lieutenant Commander Howard Gilmore. Japanese forces included the 2,490 long tons (2,530 t) Kagero-class destroyer Shiranui with 240 crewmen and six 5 in (130 mm) guns, several anti-aircraft guns, eight large torpedo tubes and 36 depth charges. There were also the two 2,370 long tons (2,410 t) Asashio-class destroyers Arare and Kasumi, each with about 200 men and mounting the same armament as Shiranui. The three vessels were assigned to the occupation of Kiska and had participated in the Battle of Pearl Harbor. Action Imperial Japanese Navy and Imperial Japanese Army troops had occupied the island since 6 June 1942 and had met little resistance. The following action proved to be the deadliest encounter between the opposing forces in the Kiska area. Growler was cruising 7 mi (6.1 nmi; 11 km) east of Kiska Harbor naval base when she came across the three Japanese destroyers at anchor a fair distance away. Submerged, the submarine closed on the enemy and launched a spread of torpedoes from her six forward torpedo tubes at a position in which the enemy vessels appeared to be overlapping one another. Growler then surfaced. The Japanese were completely unaware of Lieutenant Commander Gilmores attack, of the six torpedoes fired, at least three struck their targets. Two of the destroyers were hit amidship almost simultaneously and were severely damaged. Just before the third destroyer was hit in the bow, it maneuvered and fired two torpedoes of her own. Growler was almost destroyed when one of the torpedoes swished by just off her port side and the other off her starboard. Both missed their target though so the Americans dived deep to avoid depth charges and escaped. Japanese forces did not continue the battle however, Arare exploded, so Shiranui moved to rescue the survivors while Kasumi was out of action. Over 200 Japanese naval personnel were killed or wounded. Of Arares 200 man complement, only 42 men were saved by Shiranui, while the Americans sustained no damage or casualties. Aftermath Finding no more enemy ships in Aleutian waters, Growler returned to Hawaii and ended her first patrol. For his distinguished leadership, Howard Gilmore was promoted to the rank of commander and received the Navy Cross. Gilmore was later killed off the Philippines during the Action of 7 February 1943 when he rammed Growler into a Japanese gunboat. In a quick surface action, Commander Gilmore was wounded by machine gun fire and ordered his ship to submerge while he was still on deck. The commander became one of the seven American submariners to be awarded the Medal of Honor for duty in World War II. Growler went on the engage in nine more successful patrols in the Pacific. Komandorski Islands A cruiser and destroyer force under Rear Admiral Charles Soc McMorris was assigned to eliminate the Japanese supply convoys. They met the Japanese fleet in the naval Battle of the Komandorski Islands in March 1943. One American cruiser and two destroyers were damaged, with seven U.S. sailors killed. Two Japanese cruisers were damaged, with 14 men killed and 26 wounded. Japan thereafter abandoned all attempts to resupply the Aleutian garrisons by surface vessels, and only submarines would be used. Attu Island The Battle of Attu, which took place from 11–30 May 1943, was fought between forces of the United States and the Empire of Japan on Attu Island off the coast of the Territory of Alaska as part of the Aleutian Islands Campaign during the American Theater and the Pacific Theater and was the only land battle of World War II fought on incorporated territory of the United States. It is also the only land battle in which Japanese and American forces fought in Arctic conditions. The more than two week battle ended when most of the Japanese defenders were killed in brutal hand-to-hand combat after a final banzai charge broke through American lines. Background The strategic position of the islands of Attu and Kiska off Alaskas coast meant their location could control the sea lanes across the Northern Pacific Ocean. Japanese planners believed control of the Aleutians would therefore prevent any possible U.S. attacks from Alaska. This assessment had already been inferred by U.S. General Billy Mitchell who told the U.S. Congress in 1935, I believe that in the future, whoever holds Alaska will hold the world. I think it is the most important strategic place in the world. On 7 June 1942, six months after the United States entered World War II, the 301st Independent Infantry Battalion from the Japanese Northern Army landed unopposed on Attu. The landings occurred one day after the invasion of nearby Kiska. The U.S military now feared both islands could be turned into strategic Japanese airbases from which aerial attacks could be launched against the West Coast of North America. In Walt Disneys 1943 film Victory Through Air Power, the use of the Aleutian Islands for American long-range bombers to bomb Japan from American territory was postulated. Recapture On 11 May 1943, units from 17th Infantry, of the U.S. 7th Infantry Division made amphibious landings on Attu (Operation Landcrab) to retake the island from Japanese Imperial Army forces led by Colonel Yasuyo Yamasaki. Despite heavy naval bombardments of Japanese positions, the American troops encountered strong entrenched defenses that made combat conditions tough. Arctic weather conditions and exposure-related injuries also caused numerous casualties among U.S. forces. But after two weeks of relentless fighting, American units managed to push the Japanese defenders back to a pocket around Chichagof Harbor. On 21 & 22 May, a powerful Japanese fleet assembled in Tokyo Bay in preparation for a sortie to repel the American attempt to recapture Attu. The fleet included the carriers Zuikaku, Shokaku, Junyo, Hiyo, the battleships Musashi, Kongo, Haruna, and the cruisers Mogami, Kumano, Suzuya, Tone, Chikuma, Agano, Oyodo, and eleven destroyers. However, the Americans succeeded in recapturing Attu before the fleet could depart. On 29 May, without hope of rescue, Yamasaki led his remaining troops in a banzai charge. The momentum of the surprise attack broke through the American front line positions. Shocked American rear-echelon troops were soon fighting hand-to-hand combat with Japanese soldiers. The battle continued until almost all of the Japanese were killed. The charge effectively ended the battle for the island, although U.S. Navy reports indicate that small groups of Japanese continued to fight until early July. In 19 days of battle, 549 soldiers of the 7th Division were killed and more than 1,000 injured. The Japanese lost over 2,850 men; only 29 prisoners were taken alive. Aftermath Attu was to be the last action of the Aleutian campaign. The Japanese Northern Army secretly evacuated their remaining garrison from nearby Kiska, ending the Japanese occupation in the Aleutian Islands on 28 July 1943. The loss of Attu and the evacuation of Kiska came shortly after the death of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who was killed by an American plane in Operation Vengeance. These defeats compounded the demoralizing effect of losing Yamamoto on the Japanese High Command. Despite the losses, Japanese propaganda attempted to present the Aleutian Island campaign as an inspirational epic. Kiska Island On 15 August 1943, an invasion force of 34,426 Canadian and American troops landed on Kiska. Castners Cutthroats were part of the force, but the invasion consisted mainly of units from the U.S. 7th Infantry Division. The force also included about 5,300 Canadians, mostly from the 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade of the 6th Canadian Infantry Division, and the 1st Special Service Force, later known as the Devils Brigade, a 2,000 man Canadian-American commando unit formed in 1942 in Montana and trained in winter warfare techniques. The Brigade included three regiments: the 1st was to go ashore in the first wave at Kiska Harbor, the 2nd was in be held in reserve to parachute where needed, and the 3rd was to land on the north side of Kiska on the second day of the assault. Royal Canadian Air Force No. 111 and No. 14 Squadrons saw active service in the Aleutian skies and scored at least one aerial kill on a Japanese aircraft. Additionally, three Canadian armed merchant cruisers and two corvettes served in the Aleutian campaign but did not encounter enemy forces. The invaders landed to find the island abandoned. Under the cover of fog, the Japanese had successfully removed their troops on 28 July. The Army Air Force had bombed abandoned positions for almost three weeks without suspecting the Japanese were no longer there. The day before the withdrawal, the U.S. Navy fought an inconclusive and possibly meaningless Battle of the Pips 80 mi (70 nmi; 130 km) to the west. The Japanese may have been gone, but Allied casualties on Kiska nevertheless numbered 313. All were the result of friendly fire, booby traps, disease, or frostbite. As with Attu, Kiska offered an extremely hostile environment. Aftermath Although plans were drawn up for attacking northern Japan, they were not executed. Over 1,500 sorties were flown against the Kuriles before the end of the war, including the Japanese base of Paramushiro, diverting 500 Japanese planes and 41,000 ground troops. The battle also marked the first time Canadian conscripts were sent to a combat zone in World War II. The government had pledged not to send draftees overseas, which it defined as being outside North America. The Aleutians were considered to be North American soil, thus enabling the Canadian government to deploy conscripts without breaking its pledge. There were cases of desertion before the brigade sailed for the Aleutians. In late 1944, the government changed its policy on draftees and sent 16,000 conscripts to Europe to take part in the fighting. The battle also marked the first combat deployment of the 1st Special Service Force, though they also did not see any action. In the summer of 1942, the Americans recovered the Akutan Zero, an almost intact Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero fighter. This enabled the Americans to test fly the Zero and contributed to improved fighter tactics later in the war. Killed in action During the campaign, two cemeteries were established on Attu to bury those killed in action: Little Falls Cemetery, located at the foot of Gilbert Ridge, and Holtz Bay Cemetery, which held the graves of Northern Landing Forces. After the war, the frozen tundra began to take back the cemeteries, so in 1946 all American remains were relocated as directed by the soldiers family or to Fort Richardson near Anchorage, Alaska. On May 30, 1946, a Memorial Day address was given by Captain Adair with a Firing Squad Salute and the playing of Taps. The Decoration of Graves was performed by Chaplains Meaney and Insko. Veterans The 2006 documentary film Red White Black & Blue features two veterans of the Attu Island campaign, Bill Jones and Andy Petrus. It is directed by Tom Putnam and debuted at the 2006 Locarno International Film Festival in Locarno, Switzerland on August 4, 2006. Dashiell Hammett spent most of World War II as an Army sergeant in the Aleutian Islands, where he edited an Army newspaper. He came out of the war suffering from emphysema. As a corporal in 1943, he co-authored The Battle of the Aleutians with Cpl. Robert Colodny under the direction of Infantry Intelligence Officer Major Henry W. Hall. COMING UP - Prelude to battle (Midway) Picture 1 - U.S. Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers from the USS Hornet about to attack the burning Japanese cruiser Mikuma for the third time on 6 June 1942 Picture 2 - The extent of Japanese military expansion in the Pacific, April 1942. Picture 3 - Midway Atoll, several months before the battle. Eastern Island (with the airfield) is in the foreground, and the larger Sand Island is in the background to the west. Picture 4 - American troops hauling supplies on Attu in May 1943 through Jarmin pass. Their vehicles could not move across the islands rugged terrain. Picture 5 - The Navy radio station at Dutch Harbor burning after the Japanese Attack, 4 June 1942 Picture 6 - US military propaganda poster from 1942/43 for Thirteenth Naval District, United States Navy, showing a rat representing Japan, approaching a mousetrap labeled Army - Navy - Civilian, on a background map of the Alaska Territory, referred to as future Death-Trap For The Jap. Picture 7 - USS Growler Picture8 - Shiranui Picture 9 - Kasumi Picture 10- The heavy cruiser Salt Lake City under fire off the Komandorski Islands. Picture 11 - U.S. soldiers fire trench mortar shells over a ridge onto a Japanese position on 4 June 1943. Picture 12 - Map showing the recapture of Attu in 1943 Picture 13 - A map of the Bering Sea region. Picture 14 - Part of the huge U.S. fleet at anchor, ready to move against Kiska. Picture 15 - American troops negotiate snow and ice during the battle of Attu in May 1943. Picture 16 - Captured Japanese Zero. It was captured intact by U.S. forces in July 1942 on Akutan Island, after the Dutch Harbor Attack and became the first flyable Zero acquired by the United States during the Second World War. It was repaired and made its first test flight in the U.S. on 20 September 1942
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