the true face of the palestinians by yours truly: The current dispute between the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), with regard to statehood and national boundaries is one that cannot be resolved through distributive solutions or, to a lesser extent, integrative solutions. This is due to the reasoning that distributive and integrative solutions contend to a set amount of grievances whereby they can be resolved with either physical or figurative incentives, respectively. During the current conflict, however, such means are not viable because, when one compares all the previous initiatives in attempting to resolve this conflict, the respective leaderships of both sides were irresponsive to the offered incentives. Dennis Ross (2004) declares that “no negotiation is likely to succeed if there is one environment at the negotiating table and another one on the street” (Ross, 2004: 769). It is also necessary to address that the Palestinian delegation tends to abide by its Charter, where it reads in Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it. They also assert their right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it (Kadi, 1969: 138). Throughout this discussion, the author will endeavour to establish the view that distributive solutions to the current dispute between Israel and the PLO are insoluble due to the growing discrepancies relating to such matters. Additionally, the past uses of such solutions have seen to produce unwanted outcomes. These include the 1996 skirmishes between Palestinian Security personnel and Israeli Border Police, using live ammunition, which was previously distributed to the former under the 1993 Oslo Accords. Another instance is the ongoing terrorist actions by such terror groups as Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and others, who are under the umbrella of the PLO. Before determining the constraints relating to distributive solutions regarding the Israel-PLO conflict, one needs to firmly understand what is meant by ‘distributive solutions.’ Distributive solutions relate to a ‘win/lose’ scenario, where one party is forced to compromise on a specific issue, while the second party obtains a certain want/need (La Piana, 2005). With relation to the topic of this paper, one can argue that Israel would be the ‘loser’ while the Palestinians could be seen as the ‘winners’. This could relate to a decision relating to certain territorial concessions or juridical understandings. This concept will be further demonstrated throughout this document by using historic instances with relation to the possible solutions. Furthermore, distributive solutions are normally aimed for individual gains when a stronger party is conducting negotiations with a weaker one – Israel vis-à-vis the PLO. Integrative solutions are those that take into consideration both parties’ needs and help recognise the ultimate advantage of cooperating with each other, rather than seeking unilateral solutions. Furthermore, they tend to result in a win-win situation, where both parties can approach the situation in an alternative viewpoint, in order to better decipher the true causes of the dispute, whereby they reach a solution they are both satisfied with (Rothman, 1992: 148). With relation to the Israel-Palestinian dispute, such issues include those of land, socio-economic constraints, as well as institutional disabilities and the role refugees. These issues will be addressed throughout the course of this paper. The first issue that needs to be addressed with relation to possible solutions is that of land. The current dispute between the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (or Palestinian Authority) entails a number of issues. One of these is land. Such land specifically relates to the current area that Israel occupies in its entirety (Dershowitz, 2003: 51). This problem seems to be one of the most confrontational of problems related to the current dispute as both parties lay a claim, whether they be rightly or not, to specific areas. For example, the Israelis lay a Biblical claim to the disputed area as well as their current inhabitation of the land. The Palestinians, on the other hand, also claim inheritance to the land due to their inhabitation prior to 1948, as well as their religious and political claims relating to Jerusalem (Lochery, 2005: 102-103). One must note, however, that prior to Israel’s independence in 1948, the majority of residents in Jerusalem were in fact Jews. According to Senior Harvard University professor Alan Dershowitz, directly prior to the United Nations’ Partition Plan of 1947, there was a Jewish population of 100,000, predominantly in the Old City and throughout the western parts of the city (Dershowitz, 2003: 69). Furthermore, in a nineteenth century population figure readied by the British consul in Jerusalem, it was reported that the Muslims of Jerusalem “scarcely exceed[ed] one quarter of the whole population” (Dershowitz, 2003: 17). In so arguing, one must recognise that, although there is a substantial number of Israeli-Arab and Palestinian population in Jerusalem (286,400), this constitutes 20% of the total population of the city. When dealing with the abovementioned predicament, one needs to take into consideration the demographics (as mentioned) and political/religious significance, with relation to Israel, more specifically the Jewish population, and the Palestinians. With relation to the Israeli argument, Jerusalem is currently the national capital, with respects to the seat of government. Additionally, one needs to mention the symbolic relationship to not only Israeli Jews, but World Jewry of Jerusalem; it is seen as the epicentre of Judaism, particularly the Western Wall in the Old City (Ovendale, 1984: 6-7). This ‘Western Wall’ is considered the last living structure that was the outer wall of the Second Holy Temple during the time of the Roman conquest. The Palestinian claims to the city, however, are far less tantamount. This is due to the historic evidence that prior to the Israel’s conquest of it in 1967, East Jerusalem was under Jordanian occupation without any relation to the ‘Palestinian cause’, but rather used a frontline against Israeli civilian and military positions in the western part of the city (Oren, 2003: 6). One must stress the relgious aspect with relation to Islam, where the Temple Mount is regarded as the third Holiest site to worshipers. It is commonly thought of as where Muhammad ascended to the Heavens. When finding a solution to this problem, one can suggest that only integrative solutions are viable, as whenever there have been attempts of using distributive ones, particularly during the 2000 Camp David peace talks between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat, the offer of transferring political administration of eastern Jerusalem to the Palestinians was rejected (Lochery, 2004: 176). In a journal article in 2002, lead Middle East negotiator Dennis Ross determined that this refusal for acceptance of such a concession is due Arafat’s revolutionary persona, in addition to the ever-growing stigma within the Palestinian arena of ‘armed struggle and liberation’ (Kondracke, 2002). Additionally, Jerusalem is the State of Israel’s capital city, where there are over 724,000 inhabitants, of which 65 per cent are Jews (Jerusalem Municipality). One tentative integrative solution that could be advised is the rights of all Palestinians to attend prayers in the religious sites, as well as their continual residency there, however, these occupants will be Palestinian citizens, with choice of becoming Israeli citizens. Alternatively, another solution with regards to the ‘integrative school’ could include the enhanced economic aid from Israel to the Palestinians, as well as the implementation of building projects in the Ramallah area, whereby this would be seen as the Palestinian capital city, largely due to the fact that it currently holds the Palestinian Legislative Council (Palestinian parliament), as well as the ‘official’ residence of Chairman Mahmud Abbas. Although this has a characteristic of a distributive solution, it is more so an integrative solution, as it entails economic incentives – with the construction and monetary aid – as well as the geographic reality in that the pivotal governing institutions already exist in the aforementioned areas. In doing so, the Palestinians will need provide extensive security measures whereby they would curb the continual terrorist attacks by terrorist groups, including the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade, Fatah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. With regards to other lands, more specifically, the Gaza Strip and the Judea and Samaria areas, one could suggest greater autonomy rights within the predominantly Palestinian cities and villages. However, where there are Israeli cities in such areas, these cities should stay within formal Israeli security and governmental control as the majority of the occupants are Israeli citizens. This distributive solution seems much so like those taken during the Oslo Accords of 1994. One difference is that the Israeli security forces will have a significant presence throughout greater Judea and Samaria areas as it will not be solely Palestinian. Furthermore, the area bordering the Jordan River should still be under Israeli control for agricultural and settlement reasons. With regards to the water situation, the two governments will have an understanding that, similarly to the current Peace agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel, a certain percentage will be allocated to the Palestinians (MFA, 2006). Additionally, the two sides will partake in the construction of irrigation and aquifers, to enhance their respective economies and citizens. In more specific relevance to the Gaza Strip, the Israeli government has already unilaterally disengaged from the area on 22 August 2005, effectively ending its 35 years of occupation (MFA, 2005). This disengagement, however, did not secure a quiet front on the part of the Palestinians’ actions, as well as the safety concerns of the Israelis in neighbouring cities and town. During the last12 months of being disengaged from Gaza, there has been a constant bombardment of Qassam home-made rockets into Israeli sovereign territory and populations. These rockets have been fired indiscriminately without regard to civilian casualties on the Israeli side. This further enhances the argument whereby the Palestinians are not in genuinely interested in a lasting peace with its predominantly Jewish neighbour, such as declared in the Palestinian Charter, where it states that in Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine… It is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase…the Palestinian people assert their absolute determination to continue their armed struggle (Kadi, 1969: 137)
Posted on: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 19:03:46 +0000
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