AAF: THE SAFETY OF HIGH SPEED RAIL IN POPULATED AREAS By Monique Miller For months, we have discussed the many impacts AAF will have on our communities. There has been a tendency to focus on how those impacts translate into costs, but we seem to have overlooked the human costs. The environmental impact study (EIS), which was paid for by AAF, was submitted to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) as part of AAF’s application for a $1.75 Billion federally subsidized loan. The study, released last month, concludes, “The Project would not appreciably affect public health, safety and security in the rail corridor.” A brief analysis of the facts contradicts the EIS conclusions on several fronts: 1. Over the past 15 years (1999 – 2013), there have been 221 fatalities along the FEC corridor from Miami to Cocoa. It is one of the deadliest corridors in the country. Under AAF’s plan, the number of trains will increase by over 300%, and the speed of the trains will double and even triple, relative to freight operations. 2. Technologies can be implemented to mitigate some of the increased risk. AAF is required by law to use Positive Train Control (PTC) technology by 2015. Unfortunately, PTC is designed to avoid accidents caused by human error, and, according to CityLab’s Eric Jaffe, only 35% of all rail accidents are caused by human error. What is AAF doing to mitigate the remaining 65%? 3. About 75 percent, 171 deaths, occurred on the right of way, outside of at-grade crossings, and involve trespassers. AAF offers nothing to address this problem. Setting aside the increased speed, we can conclude that the number of trespasser deaths could increase by the same percentage as the number of trains using the corridor. This could result in an additional 340 deaths along the FEC corridor in AAF’s first 15 years of operation. 4. FRA has strenuous requirements for grade crossing and safety equipment for trains traveling 111 mph, but the same is not true for trains traveling 110 mph. For example, trains going 111 mph must implement barriers at crossings that are capable of stopping vehicle impact and track intrusion, as well as electronic warning systems. For trains traveling 110 mph, the FRA simply recommends “the most sophisticated warning or traffic control devices that fit the location”, which does not have specific requirements. 5. The EIS is basing its safety impact study on the promise that AAF will make safety improvements, but no details are offered to explain what will be done, and, whether they will fully comply with FRA the On-Site Engineering Field Reports. In addition, the power to regulate safety is nebulous. It appears the sole authority to impose requirements is FDOT, and they have not made public their requirements. 6. AAF will be sharing the rail corridor with its parent company’s freight operations. Mixed use tracks present additional challenges. US Sugar recently built a 100 million gallon ethanol production facility in Clewiston, and the Florida taxpayers just agreed to pay $30 million to upgrade its privately owned railroad, South Central Florida Express, which connects with FEC in Fort Pierce for distribution of its products. Will FEC be equipped to transport ethanol, which is more explosive than oil, through the middle of significant population centers? How comfortable should we be with this arrangement when AAF has presented no detailed safety plan? How will FEC ensure its freight trains can safely dodge AAF’s 110 mph passenger trains? The EIS did not assess the consequences of a derailment, either by a high-speed train or a freight train full of ethanol or tar. 7. According to Brian Gilleran, FRA Grade Crossing Safety Engineer, “As train speeds increase, any condition that could result in train derailment becomes of greater concern. Any number of unforeseen events, such as motor vehicle brake failure, slick road surfaces, motorist errors, or other factors may result in a vehicle going through a lowered gate just prior to train arrival. At higher train speeds, the derailment potential is increased for a train collision with an errant motor vehicle on the crossing.” 8. AAF has not adequately explained its safety improvement plans, and the EIS has done an inadequate job, drawing conclusions about safety in the total absence of any specifics or substantiation. AAF has made no commitment to implement specific mitigation equipment and technologies, and because of the 110 mph speed, there appears to be no single agency responsible for holding AAF legally accountable for its safety choices. Nonetheless, Florida’s precious coastal communities will have to live with the consequences. eyeonbrevard/2014/11/07/aaf-the-safety-of-high-speed-rail-in-populated-areas/
Posted on: Sat, 08 Nov 2014 22:12:01 +0000
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