Driver -- One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle... Boviers Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., p. 940. Traveler -- One who passes from place to place, whether for pleasure, instruction, business, or health. Locket vs. State, 47 Ala. 45; Boviers Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., p. 3309. Today we assume that a traveler is a driver, and a driver is an operator. However, this is not the case. It will be observed from the language of the ordinance that a distinction is to be drawn between the terms `operator and `driver; the `operator of the service car being the person who is licensed to have the car on the streets in the business of carrying passengers for hire; while the `driver is the one who actually drives the car. However, in the actual prosecution of business, it was possible for the same person to be both `operator and `driver. Newbill vs. Union Indemnity Co., 60 SE.2d 658. This definition, then, is a further clarification of the distinction mentioned earlier, and therefore: 1. Travelling upon and transporting ones property upon the public roads as a matter of Right meets the definition of a traveler. 2. Using the road as a place of business as a matter of privilege meets the definition of a driver or an operator or both. In this case, the word traffic is used in conjunction with the unnecessary Auto Transportation Service, or in other words, vehicles for hire. The word traffic is another word which is to be strictly construed to the conducting of business. Traffic -- Commerce, trade, sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, or the like. The passing of goods and commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods or money... Boviers Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., p. 3307. It seems only proper to define the word license, as the definition of this word will be extremely important in understanding the statutes as they are properly applied: The permission, by competent authority to do an act which without permission, would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort. People vs. Henderson, 218 NW.2d 2, 4. Leave to do a thing which licensor could prevent. Western Electric Co. vs. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118. In order for these two definitions to apply in this case, the state would have to take up the position that the exercise of a Constitutional Right to use the public roads in the ordinary course of life and business is illegal, a trespass, or a tort, which the state could then regulate or prevent. This position, however, would raise magnitudinous Constitutional questions as this position would be diametrically opposed to fundamental Constitutional Law. (See Conversion of a Right to a Crime, infra.) In the instant case, the proper definition of a license is: a permit, granted by an appropriate governmental body, generally for consideration, to a person, firm, or corporation, to pursue some occupation or to carry on some business which is subject to regulation under the police power. [emphasis added] Rosenblatt vs. California State Board of Pharmacy, 158 P.2d 199, 203. This definition would fall more in line with the privilege of carrying on business on the streets. Are these licenses really used to fund legitimate government, or are they nothing more than a subtle introduction of police power into every facet of our lives? Have our enforcement agencies been diverted from crime prevention, perhaps through no fault of their own, instead now busying themselves as they check our papers to see that all are properly endorsed by the state? How much longer will it be before we are forced to get a license for our lawn mowers, or before our wives will need a license for her blender or mixer? They all have motors on them and the state can always use the revenue. POLICE POWER The confusion of the police power with the power of taxation usually arises in cases where the police power has affixed a penalty to a certain act, or where it requires licenses to be obtained and a certain sum be paid for certain occupations. The power used in the instant case cannot, however, be the power of taxation since an attempt to levy a tax upon a Right would be open to Constitutional objection. (See taxing power, infra.) Each law relating to the use of police power must ask three questions: 1. Is there threatened danger? 2. Does a regulation involve a Constitutional Right? 3. Is this regulation reasonable? People vs. Smith, 108 Am.St.Rep. 715; Boviers Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., under Police Power. When applying these three questions to the statute in question, some very important issues emerge. First, is there a threatened danger in the individual using his automobile on the public highways? The answer is No It is the manner of managing the automobile, and that alone, which threatens the safety of the public? The automobile is not inherently dangerous. Cohens vs. Meadow, 89 SE 876; Blair vs. Broadmore, 93 SE 532. To deprive all persons of the Right to use the road in the ordinary course of life and business, because one might, in the future, become dangerous, would be a deprivation not only of the Right to travel, but also the Right to due process. (See Due Process, infra.) The third question is the most important in this case. Is this regulation reasonable? The answer is No No person shall be...deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property without due process of law. As has been shown, the courts at all levels have firmly established a Right to travel. Absolute In the instant case, the state, by applying commercial statutes to all entities, natural and artificial persons alike, has deprived this free and natural person of the Right of Liberty, without cause and without due process of law. DUE PROCESS The essential elements of due process of law are...Notice and The Opportunity to defend. Simon vs. Craft, 182 US 427. Yet, not one individual has been given notice of the loss of his/her Right, let alone before signing the license (contract). Nor was the Citizen given any opportunity to defend against the loss of his/her right to travel, by automobile, on the highways, in the ordinary course of life and business. This amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of Liberty. The right to travel is part of the Liberty of which a citizen cannot deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. This Right was emerging as early as the Magna Carta. Kent vs. Dulles, 357 US 116 (1958). One of the most famous and perhaps the most quoted definitions of due process of law, is that of Daniel Webster in his Dartmouth College Case (4 Wheat 518), in which he declared that by due process is meant a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. (See also State vs. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020; Dennis vs. Moses, 52 P. 333.) The distinction between the Right of the Citizen to use the public highways for private, rather than commercial purposes is recognized... Thus the legislature does not have the power to abrogate the Citizens Right to travel upon the public roads, by passing legislation forcing the citizen to waive his Right and convert that Right into a privilege. Furthermore, we have previously established that this privilege has been defined as applying only to those who are conducting business in the streets or operating for-hire vehicles. The legislature has attempted, by legislative fiat, to deprive the Citizen of his Right to use the roads in the ordinary course of life and business, without affording the Citizen the safeguard of due process of law. This has been accomplished under supposed powers of regulation. 1. Does the statute accomplish its stated goal? The answer is No! The attempted explanation for this regulation to insure the safety of the public by insuring, as much as possible, that all are competent and qualified. However, one can keep his license without retesting, from the time he/she is first licensed until the day he/she dies, without regard to the competency of the person, by merely renewing said license before it expires. It is therefore possible to completely skirt the goal of this attempted regulation, thus proving that this regulation does not accomplish its goal. Furthermore, by testing and licensing, the state gives the appearance of underwriting the competence of the licensees, and could therefore be held liable for failures, accidents, etc. caused by licensees. 2. Is the statute reasonable? The answer is No! This statute cannot be determined to be reasonable since it requires to the Citizen to give up his or her natural Right to travel unrestricted in order to accept the privilege. The purported goal of this statute could be met by much less oppressive regulations, i.e., competency tests and certificates of competency before using an automobile upon the public roads. (This is exactly the situation in the aviation sector.) But isnt this what we have now? The answer is No! The real purpose of this license is much more insidious. When one signs the license, he/she gives up his/her Constitutional Right to travel in order to accept and exercise a privilege. After signing the license, a quasi-contract, the Citizen has to give the state his/her consent to be prosecuted for constructive crimes and quasi-criminal actions where there is no harm done and no damaged property. These prosecutions take place without affording the Citizen of their Constitutional Rights and guarantees such a the Right to a trial by jury of twelve persons and the Right to counsel, as well as the normal safeguards such as proof of intent and a corpus dilecti and a grand jury indictment. These unconstitutional prosecutions take place because the Citizen is exercising a privilege and has given his/her implied consent to legislative enactments designed to control interstate commerce, a regulatable enterprise under the police power of the state. We must now conclude that the Citizen is forced to give up Constitutional guarantees of Right in order to exercise his state privilege to travel upon the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business. SURRENDER OF RIGHTS A Citizen cannot be forced to give up his/her Rights in the name of regulation. found restricting the right of the state to condition the use of the public highways as a means of vehicular transportation for compensation are (1) that the state must not exact of those it permits to use the highways for hauling for gain that they surrender any of their inherent Constitutional Rights as a condition precedent to obtaining permission for such use... [emphasis added] Riley vs. Laeson, 142 So. 619; Stephenson vs. Binford, supra. If one cannot be placed in a position of being forced to surrender Rights in order to exercise a privilege, how much more must this maxim of law, then, apply when one is simply exercising (putting into use) a Right? To be that statute which would deprive a Citizen of the rights of person or property, without a regular trial, according to the course and usage of the common law, would not be the law of the land. Hoke vs. Henderson, 15 NC 15. and... We find it intolerable that one Constitutional Right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. Simons vs. United States, 390 US 389. Since the state requires that one give up Rights in order to exercise the privilege of driving, the regulation cannot stand under the police power, due process, or regulation, but must be exposed as a statute which is oppressive and one which has been misapplied to deprive the Citizen of Rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the state constitutions. Constitutional Rights cannot be denied simply because of hostility to their assertions and exercise; vindication of conceded Constitutional Rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny them than to afford them. Watson vs. Memphis, 375 US 526. Therefore, the Courts decision in the instant case must be made without the issue of cost to the state being taken into consideration, as that issue is irrelevant. The state cannot lose money that it never had a right to demand from the Sovereign People. Finally, we come to the issue of public policy. It could be argued that the licensing scheme of all persons is a matter of public policy. However, if this argument is used, it too must fail, as: No public policy of a state can be allowed to override the positive guarantees of the U.S. Constitution. 16 Am.Jur. (2nd), Const. Law, Sect.70. So even public policy cannot abrogate this Citizens Right to travel and to use the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business. Therefore, it must be concluded that: We have repeatedly held that the legislature may regulate the use of the highways for carrying on business for private gain and that such regulation is a valid exercise of the police power. Northern Pacific R.R. Co., supra. and... The act in question is a valid regulation, and as such is binding upon all who use the highway for the purpose of private gain. Ibid. Any other construction of this statute would render it unconstitutional as applied to this Citizen or any Citizen. The Accused therefore moves this court to dismiss the charge against him, with prejudice. In addition: Since no notice is given to people applying for drivers (or other) licenses that they have a perfect right to use the roads without any permission, and that they surrender valuable rights by taking on the regulation system of licensure, the state has committed a massive construction fraud. This occurs when any person is told that they must have a license in order to use the public roads and highways. The license, being a legal contract under which the state is empowered with policing powers is only valid when the licensee takes on the burdens of the contract and bargains away his or her rights knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily. Few know that the drivers license is a contract without which the police are powerless to regulate the peoples actions or activities. Few if any licensees intentionally surrender valuable rights. They are told that they must have the license. As we have seen, this is not the case. No one in their right mind voluntarily surrenders complete liberty and accepts in its place a set of regulations. The people never give up their liberties but under some delusion. Edmund Burke, UCC1-308, 1-207, all contracts signed under duress are invalid!
Posted on: Wed, 03 Dec 2014 09:48:47 +0000
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