Nawaz Sharifs US Visit : Strategising in Haste by: Lt Gen (Retd) Ata Hasnain, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM & BAR Prime Minister Nawaz Sharifs dilemma is symbolic of the dilemma of the state of Pakistan; the confusion and paradox he lives in reflects the chaos in the region and Pakistans position in world polity. In the midst of the most unclear situation in international relations today, Sharif decided to visit the US. He had very few options but to do so, early enough. In his latest term he had to seek some clarity to allow him to progress the governance of his country and look at where the future was taking it. Media analyses from Pakistan have been kind to Sharif on the achievements of the visit while those in India have underscored the lack of clarity in the end results. The New York Times wrote that “Mr Sharif has acknowledged that there will be no economic growth without security, and there will be no security unless Afghanistan is at peace and Pakistans relations with India are improved.” Security and economics is what makes up the dilemma of Mr Sharif and covers almost every facet of the problems besetting Pakistan today. Sharifs stated agenda and wish list were reasonably simple - economic assistance for the failing and flailing economy, end to drone strikes inside Pakistan, mediation on Kashmir and nuclear parity with India. However, the situation in his country and the region demands a mile long agenda. Talks with the Pakistan Taliban, control over terrorist groups, stage managing the process of securitization of Afghanistan during the ISAF pull out and having fool proof mechanisms in place for support to the arrangement which occupies the vacant space are but just a few of the concerns. These do not appear to have been given much importance in the emerging matrix. For the US it is important that Pakistan remains stable while the drawdown is in process. It is equally important that Afghanistans eastern neighbor retains the capability to play a role to the advantage of the US. Estranging Pakistan at such a juncture is surely not in the US interest but the moot point is whether strengthening Sharifs hands at the cost of the powerful Pakistan Army would play against the stability that the US desires for the coming period when it will be vulnerable with its troops in pull out mode. To top it General Kayani is nearing the end of his extended tenure. His has been a hot and cold relationship with the US brass but anyone who knows the realities of the subcontinent will understand that the relationship of the Pakistan Army with the US has always been special; special enough to withstand the pressure of loss of Pakistani lives at the hands of US forces. An executive role for General Kayani may well have been suggested by the US side, to ensure that his services are available for any crisis management. To expect the new Chief, several years junior to General Kayani, to deliver with any degree of reliability would be questionable. In addition such an arrangement would actually help Mr Sharif in curtailing the power of the Army when it is not effectively commanded by a single hat. What effect this will have on the counter insurgency operations only time will tell. Drones are the symbol of US military power in the Af-Pak region. To expect the US to cut back on drone attacks where required would be unrealistic. Mr Sharif tried his best and probably next to the economic agenda this aspect topped the chart. Merely speaking about it would send positive messages within Pakistan. The Pakistan Taliban knows that Mr Sharifs powers of convincing the US leadership over such a concession would be limited. However, he made a brave effort using the ploy that such attacks diluted his capability to open dialogue with the Pakistan Taliban. The US leadership would have mulled this and concluded that while internal dynamics of the militancy in Pakistan are unlikely to lead to any drop in violence in the near future the targeted elimination of leadership would definitely pay greater dividends. The practical demonstration of this has come within two weeks with the killing of Hakimullah Mehsud. It also placed the power circles of Pakistan in much confusion. On one hand the perpetrator of numerous attacks in Pakistan was dead while on the other the national territory of Pakistan once again appeared violated. Sharifs announced intent of raking up Kashmir with the US President and requesting for US intervention appeared to have been well set up considering the events of the last eight weeks or so. In the current US-India-Pakistan equation one thing does clearly stand out; the US would never desire a situation in Kashmir which would give reasons to Pakistan Army to dilute its operations on the Western border and redeploy reserves to the Line of Control (LoC). That would be to the detriment of the ISAF. The Pakistan Army carefully calibrated its activities on the LoC in conjunction with the ISI backed terrorists. Keeping it below the appreciated threshold of Indias tolerance it managed to achieve three things. Firstly, it marginally took the pressure away from its internal security operations where the Pakistan Taliban invariably goes slower with supposed Indian threats at the LoC. Secondly, it refocused attention to the military aspects of Kashmir, specifically the LoC, at a time when the Indian establishments dealings with the population appeared to be fructifying further after the success story of 2011-12. Thirdly, it set the stage for the demands on the US to play a more proactive role on Kashmir while projecting the possibility of another showdown with India. No doubt this was masterfully done as Pakistan is always wont to do when taking any military or diplomatic initiative. However, the progress of such a strategy always remains Pakistans Achilles heel; its inability to think the next step. Whether he was set up by the Pakistan Army to act as he did or he was a part of the entire strategy will always remain suspect; the Kargil syndrome is difficult for Mr Sharif to shed. The US maintained its traditional stance of non-interference and the need for mutuality while dealing with Kashmir. It would surely have realized that this is hardly the time to upset equations as stability in the region is of prime importance even as it sets up its own withdrawal from Afghanistan. Mr Nawaz Sharif in all likelihood has returned disappointed because except for diplomatic niceties and the economic package he has little to display. The strategy appears to have been put together in a hurry, attempting too many things and unnecessarily raking up Kashmir at the behest of the Army. How he will emerge as his own man and in what time frame is difficult to assess but the current strategy has definitely not given him the image of being in charge.defstrat/exec/frmArticleDetails.aspx?DID=441
Posted on: Wed, 20 Nov 2013 01:48:12 +0000
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