The Gibraltar of the North lost! Sveaborg, Swedens foremost defensive works, was built to stop Russian forces from invading Finland, and it was strong enough to withstand storms and its garrison and stores were sufficient to sustain a siege for several months. Despite this, Sveaborg surrendered to Russian forces within a number of weeks, more precisely on this day, May 3, in 1808. The fortress of Sveaborg was built from 1748, and by the time of the Finnish War 1808-09, it was still not completed. The reason for this was first and foremost: After the Great Northern War 1700-1721 and the later Hats Russian War (named so after one of the two political parties in Sweden, the Hats), or the Russo-Swedish War of 1741-43, Sweden had almost no money left, however, the Hats policy of appeasing France and being the French shieldbearer in the North, led to substantial revenues coming Sweden to good use, thanks to France. Even with the money given to them by the French, building this great fortress was halted in 1757, when Sweden, due to French pressure, lunged headfirst into the so-called Pomeranian War, which was a threatre of the Seven Years War. The war was characterized by a back-and-forth movement between the Swedish and Prussian troops, neither side able to deliver a decisive victory. The war was formally ended on 22 May 1762, and the peace treaty crushed any hopes the Hats had for recovering lost territory from Prussia, and this unpopular and costly war eventually led to the Hats downfall. The construction of Sveaborg began in 1748, it was built as a protection against Russian expansionism, and it was placed on six islands and is today part of the Finnish capital, Helsingfors, and the original plan of the construction of the fortress was heavily influenced by Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, the foremost military engineer of the time. In a peace treaty 1807 between French emperor Napoleon, and Russian Czar Alexander I, the Czar promised to attack Sweden, in an effort to force her to join the Central Blockade against Great Britain. The natural reward for this undertaking was that a successful war would leave Russia in possession of a large part of Swedish territory, namely Finland. The so-called Finnish War began in February 1808, and even though the war continued until September 1809, it could just as easily have been ended on May 3 1808, when Sveaborg fell to Russia. The commanding officer of Sveaborg, Carl Olof Cronstedt had already on February 1 received alarming reports from the Swedish ambassador in St. Petersburg, and troops in Finland were mobilized and around 4500 soldiers were stationed in Sveaborg, along with its garrison of 2250 men. A small Russian army, consisting of around 2000 men had captured Helsingfors already in the beginning of March, but it took until early April until Russia had amassed any kind of force large enough to even insignificantly threaten Sveaborg, 6500 men and 59 artillery pieces. However, already on March 23, Carl Olof Cronstedt entered into negotations with the Russians, and on April 6 a truce was concluded. The truce would be in effect until May 3, and at that time, if no relief, consisting of at least 5 ships of the line had arrived at Sveaborg, Cronstedt would surrender the fortress, along with the Coastal Fleet to the Russians. By May 3, the sea was still covered with ice and no relief had arrived, and so, the great fortress of Sveaborg, dubbed the Gibraltar of the North by English historian William Coxe, was handed over to the Russian commander General Friedrich Wilhelm von Buxhoeveden. But how on Earth could Buxhoevden achieve such an enormous advantage in so short time with such an inadequate force? The obvious answer is that Cronstedt gave it to him. But why would anyone surrender an unbeaten fortress to an inferior enemy force? Cronstedt himself argued that it was his task to keep Sveaborg for as long as possible. In the beginning of April, Cronstedt realized that the ammunition he had would suffice for no more than a couple of weeks more of artillery duels, and confronted with this fact he accepted a treaty with Russia, hoping that he would give the High Sea Fleet in Karlskrona a fair chance to come to the rescue. As it was, he managed to keep Sveaborg two months from the date of the Russians arrival to Helsingfors and he did indeed feel that he should deserve credit for this. But what did Cronstedt have to say? In his printed apology he says that he could not have imagined an attack against Sveaborg in winter from land, and he mentions that when he took command (in 1801) the fortress was not fit for defense and points out that the fortifications were spread out and not continuous, and that the 6000 men that had been detailed as a garrison were insufficient, and that he ended up with only 4700 men. Furthermore, he explains, a sally (a sudden issuing of troops against the enemy from a defensive position that can be launched against the besiegers by the defenders) could not be used because his enemies were spread out all around the fortress. According to available sources, the garrison numbered 6,750 men, not 4,700. Also Cronstedt ignores the fact the Russian force did not exceed 2,000 during the two first weeks of March when a sally obviously could have proved to be disastrous for the Russians. And he does not give the faintest of reason for the excessive shelling that would have caused the supply of gunpowder to run out if it had continued. Could Sveaborg have been marred by some serious defect that made it much more vulnerable to shelling and storming than the above examples? Accidentally, we are in a position to know a great deal about the hardiness of Sveaborg. During the Crimean War, in 1855, Sveaborg was bombarded with heavy artillery from points outside the range of its own guns. Within two days a fleet from the British and French navies heaped upon the fortress 20,000 missiles weighing on average 50 kg, i.e. altogether 1,000 tons. This was nearly 70 times more than the weight of the 1,565 bullets that hit Sveaborg during five days in 1808. The 1855 bombardment resulted in 62 killed and 199 wounded, that is to say about seven times the total loss in 1808. However, the Russian Commander of Sveaborg did not strike his colors or beg for mercy. The surrender of Sveaborg in undoubtedly one of the most important events in the history of Finland. Therefore Carl Olof Cronstedt is naturally a central character of it. In Sweden, he was recognized as a traitor after the war, condemned to death in the court of Stockholm (later abolished on the initiative of the Russian emperor). He alone was made responsible for the loss of Finland, and therefore ending one era in Swedish history, and Cronstedt was also by many condemned as a traitor in Finland. He was made a symbol of an embarrassing war and a failure to stop the Russian army. In the end, the treaty of Fredrikshamn separated Finland from Sweden after over 400 years of being a part of Sweden, which led to an even worse animosity towards the Russians, and when the new Swedish king, former French Marshal, and Sovereign Prince of Pontecorvo, Jean Bernadotte, named Karl XIV Johan in Sweden, struck a deal with Russia, renouncing Finland in return for Norway, many people in Sweden almost went into shock. Pictured is a modern aerial view of the fortress of Sveaborg, and Carl Olof Cronstedt. - Tobbe
Posted on: Sat, 03 May 2014 09:10:56 +0000
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