The article below is my understanding of Admiral DK Joshi and his resignation as the Naval Chief. I know him as a person of principles and ethics and the article contents also point to that direction. Read if the Idea of India and those who have lived by its code and sacrificed their career to sustain it interests you. Those who have followed the case will note the extent of media distortion of the facts and seriously wonder whether much of media is not unwittingly harming the national interest in chasing trp and sensationalism. I also maintain that nothing has happened with which the Indian Navy cannot or will not cope. For I, it continues to be world-class and will find a way out of its current low point. The article is under print. ------------------------------------------------------------ AN ADMIRABLE ADMIRAL But will his unprecedented resignation shake the MoD out of its Rip Van Winkle stupor? *** A resignation is a grave act; never performed by a right minded man without forethought or with reserve. Salmon P Chase. Make sense who may. I switch off. Samuel Beckett. *** In a country where people holding high office rarely hold themselves accountable for mishaps that occurred during their stewardship, the Naval Chief’ Admiral DK Joshi’s ethical decision to take full moral responsibility for the spate of Naval accidents that occurred during his watch has invited the same national respect/approval as was once showered on ex-Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. In December 1956, Shastri resigned as the Union Railways Minister; accepting moral and constitutional responsibility for a Tamil Nadu train accident that resulted in 144 deaths. This article examines what led Admiral Joshi to ‘walk his talk’ and why his unprecedented act may be a timely wake up call for an India suffocating under policy inertia, disingenuous political discourse, poor work culture, endemic corruption and an accountability vacuum. The Thimayya Affair One cannot put Joshi’s decision to hold himself accountable in context unless one is made aware of an earlier Chief’s unsuccessful effort to do likewise. In early 1959, Army Chief General KS Thimayya, after conducting two major war-games-cum-operational-exercises in the Eastern and Western Theatres concluded that the Army needed urgent boosts in manpower and war-fighting wherewithal as also radical changes in deployment methodology before it could take on the Chinese. PM Nehru and Defence Minister Krishna Menon were duly informed. Nehru was diplomatically non-committal but Menon accused the Army Chief of “downright disloyalty and impropriety”. Thimayya resigned but Nehru unctuously talked him out of it and, on 1 September 1959, blandly informed Parliament about the case. Thimayya ended up losing both face and credibility. While he felt that “resignation was the only constitutional safeguard to a Service Chief against incompetent, unscrupulous/ambitious politicians,” when the climacteric moment came, he recanted on his decision, being politically naïve and gullible. Had he been steadfast, commentators believe the shameful 1962 debacle that followed could have been avoided or mitigated. An Admirable Admiral Let us therefore examine the career of the officer whose resignation might trigger off the ‘course correction’ that we desperately need. Admiral DK Joshi PVSM, AVSM, YSM, NM, VSM is the son of a Dehradun-based former Chief Conservator of Forests. Devendra is married and has two daughters. A graduate of the Naval War College, USA and India’s Defence Advisor in Singapore, hardnosed Joshi has had a distinguished command, staff, instructional and diplomatic career. He was FOC-in-C Western Naval Command, then Commander-in-Chief Andaman and Nicobar Command and Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC) before becoming the Naval Chief. This writer was a fellow Instructor with then Capt Joshi at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, and saw him as austere and dignified; a hard task-master who set exacting standards for his students. He ran a very “tight ship”. Those Whom the Gods Love, Depart Young Greek dramatist Menander’s prescient 3rd century BC prophecy holds true for Admiral Joshi. He who was admired and respected; was expected to set the Navy on fire departed prematurely, turning the sword he had ruthlessly wielded professionally on himself. With the scathing Parliament indictment by Defence Minister AK Anthony: It is the responsibility of the Navy to optimally operate and maintain (warships), as well as train its personnel suitably so that such national resources are optimally utilized and are not frittered away ringing incessantly in his ears since August 2013 when INS Sindhurakshak, the Kilo-class submarine exploded at its moorings, killing 18, the Kilo-class INS Sindhuratna incident, the 11th in sequence was the final straw. Admiral Joshi resigned and the beleaguered MoD promptly acquiesced. Unprofessional Conduct, Poor Work Ethic, Media Hype - or a Pot-pourri? In the seven months preceding his resignation, the Navy suffered ten accidents since the INS Sindhurakshak sank; the Coast Guard one - all of them under full, often thoughtless and poorly researched media glare. INS Talwar collided; INS Konkan suffered engine-room fire and INS Betwa a sonar-dome crack; INS Vipul developed a hole after indigenous refit. INS Airawat, INS Mysore and the Kilo-class submarine INS Sindhughosh were grounded in shallow waters. INS Tarkash damaged its jetty. INS Vikramaditya (erstwhile Gorshkov) had a troubled home run. Not the least, Coast Guard cutter Sangram accidentally fired a live 30mm shell at HQ Western Naval Command. The INS Sindhurakshak’s salvage bill (by a US firm) is Rs 240 crores. Cumulative accident losses since August 2013 are pegged at Rs 10,000 crores. Given that the Navy’s net budget for 2013-14 was Rs 36, 343.5 crores, the damages are severe. The fact that it was the Kilo-class submarine accidents that finished Admiral Joshi’s career means that we need to understand this weapon system; the Sindhuratna accident and related details better before reflecting on culpability and blame-worthiness. Thumbnail Sketch: Kilo-Class Submarine Designed by Rubin Design Bureau, these feared attack submarines are tailored for a wide array of anti-shipping, anti-submarine operations and were first developed for the Russian Navy in 1980-1982 under ‘Project 877 Paltus’. NATO codenamed ‘Kilo’, the submarine has been a remarkable success story and has several versions currently in service. Russia still operates 17 and, since 1986, has exported 33 to India (10), China (12), Iran (3) and to Romania, Poland, Algeria and ROK. The Indian submarines are termed the Project 877EKM Sindhughosh class. They are improved/upgraded modifications of 877E and have improved radars, cruise missiles, inertial navigation and automated information and control systems. The K-class submarine is considered among the most silent in the world and has superb underwater management capability, automatic diving control and quality sonars for interception and mine-hunting. Its sound-absorbing “anechoic” rubber tiles reduce the range at which the submarine can be detected by passive sonar. The kilo-class has a submerged speed of 17kt. Its range is over 9000km when snorting (operating at “periscope depth”; thereby allowing diesel generators to charge batteries) and 650km when submerged. It has six watertight compartments. The main power supply is diesel-electric but emergency back-up is provided by two banks of battery cells used for submerged operations. The Battery Conundrum “Transition to Eminence: The Indian Navy 1976-1990” by GM Hiranandani is an authoritative 2005 book commissioned by NHQ. It mentions that the Kilo-class has 448 batteries (not 240 as media has reported). Located fore and aft in battery pits with the sailor’s bunks/billets above them, they cumulatively weigh 300 tons with each battery measuring 1 x1/2m. Their “life” is measured in 100 charge and discharge cycles/three years. With no exhaust outlet possible underwater, battery charging can only be done on surface or at “snort” (periscope) level because the chargers diesel exhaust then gets taken out along-side the submarine’s periscope. In the Russian operating cycle, a three year refit cycle called “Current Repairs” coincides with battery replacement. The book states that the Russian grid-system batteries supplied as Original Equipment produced far more hydrogen in tropical India (with its attendant ill-effects) than they did in cold Russia and, besides, needed cooling down. Private vendor Standard Batteries accepted the “improve” challenge and teamed with Tudor Batteries Sweden to create a battery with a unique “tube cooling” system. Far superior, the Indian battery has an enhanced life; releases lesser hydrogen. Consequently, for years now, Russia has been out-sourcing its Kilo-class batteries from India as are other K-class users. The implication is that notwithstanding media hype and disinformation about “obsolescent” K-class submarines, exhausted batteries and re-supply holdups due to bureaucratic obfuscation and court cases, the NHQ bulletin of 6 March 2014 stating that Sindhuratna still had 40% residual life in its batteries but may have had a problem with cabling needs consideration. The Accident INS Sindhuratna was commissioned on November 19, 1988. The Russians stipulate a life of 12 years, extendable by ten years after major refit. In reality this isn’t how things work, because Russia is still running its early 1980’s Kilo submarines as are China and other users. In the event, INS Sindhuratna after refit, was on 26 February 2014 undergoing early morning submerged workup with its crew of 70 with an additional 24 Inspectors headed by Commodore Submarines (West) SK Kapur on board when smoke was detected in the sailors billeting by Electrical Officer Lt Cdr Kapish Muwal and Officer on Watch, Lt Manoranjan Chowdhury. They frantically awakened the sleeping sailors to make them escape the combined lethal effects of the fire-fighting Freon gas and the Hydrogen gas leftovers in the battery pits; brave-heart Kapish leading. Going back for a final check, the affected compartments doors closed on them, asphyxiating them. Commander Sandeep Sinha, the Captain, initially oversaw the rescue efforts; then, though severely impaired by Freon-Hydrogen degradation he surfaced Sindhuratna to allow free ventilation. Kapish and Manoranjan, both Swords-of-Honour officers were consumed in the deathless “Captain Mulla” tradition. Sinha and seven others were on ventilator but survived. With batteries switched off and diesels not started to prevent mishap, the forlorn Sindhuratna was towed back to its moorings, smelling of death. The Kilo-class had claimed another victim…Admiral DK Joshi. He had walked the gang-plank for Navy/national good… This recall will however be incomplete without discussing a related, damning Russian submarine accident which preceded the Sindhuratna disaster by five years… K-152 Nerpa Accident This Russian nuclear-powered Akula-class submarine suffered serious loss of lives at 8.30 PM on 8 November 2008, when most crew were asleep. 20 people died and 41 were injured due to an “unsanctioned” release of the fire-suppressant Freon gas during a submerged workup in the Sea of Japan. Besides its crew of 81, Nerpa had a staggering 127 Inspectors onboard. The victims died of asphyxiation and lung frostbite because Freon is a refrigerant. Freon displaces oxygen, enabling it to extinguish fires rapidly in enclosed spaces. Each compartment of a Russian submarine has a LOKh fire-fighting station from which Freon can be delivered into that or adjacent compartments. The LOKh system responded to smoke and rise in compartment temperature, triggering off the submarines fire-extinguishing system, sealing the two compartments and filling them with Freon gas. Initial investigations (later recanted) suggested that a crewman may have played out of boredom with a control unit, increasing readings up from the original 30 °C to 78 °C, triggering off the fire-fighting alarms. It may be noted that K-152 Nerpa was officially leased to the Navy in April 2012 and renamed as the nuclear-capable INS Chakra II. Who is to Blame? Though qualified technical experts will attribute blame-worthiness, a dispassionate analysis starkly points towards the fact that the spate of accidents (two more have since occurred; pointing accusing fingers at indigenous ship-builders) has set back the Navy’s and overall India’s defence preparedness savagely. The rank and file of the Navy rated till recently amongst the finest in the world is distraught, professionally worried and understandably angry by the loss of invaluable lives. There is thus an obvious need for in-house, truly transformational, “follow-me” leadership at all levels - certainly at CO and Flag ranks - to get the Navy back on track. While that self-programming is in progress, Governance; whether in its clueless political avatar or its linear bureaucracy ever ready to play ‘ducks and drakes’, India needs to synergize and work its way out of the current logjam in policy-formulation and implementation, poor work ethic and mutual mistrust. It must make resource providers accountable; ensure that contracted warfighting materiel indigenous and ex-import is delivered as scheduled; not locked in unending litigation, corruption, sleaze and cancellation. It is also Government’s responsibility to ensure TV/print media accountability through Press Council and Self-Auditing mechanisms. Down to an alarming level of submarine/ship availability with low faith in our ship/submarine building skills, the Navy has never been as vulnerable as it is today. Admiral Joshi realised that his Service had spiraled downwards for reasons mostly beyond his control. He dared to walk his talk. The Governance must now get out of its unending stupor and get serious about course correction. A Malcolm Gladwell “Tipping Point” has been reached for India’s defence fraternity to either underwrite India’s sovereignty with panache – or have the Idea of India placed in serious jeopardy. That moment of deep crisis and, equally, turnaround opportunity is at hand. 2000 words 09 March 2014 Maj Gen Raj Mehta, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
Posted on: Mon, 10 Mar 2014 03:48:29 +0000
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