Theres nothing wrong with asserting a moral high ground in a social movement, but there is everything wrong with assuming that a moral imperative is sufficient to cause i. sustained and ii. fundamental damage that would iii. necessitate the involvement of the HK government in iv. achieving democracy v. from a highly realist state. The virtue of realpolitik is none but epitomised by Prof. Simon Shen (a very intriguing academic scholar who offers the rare gem of insight in HKs largely emotivist political discourse as it stands) and his internationalist critique of HKs situation as it stands today. To contextualise the Umbrella Revolution as a domestic issue is an efficient tactic that is adopted by both the PRC and the West. The PRC, due to its need to maintain a front of solidarity and trivialise the current uprising. The West, due to their ulterior motives in illustrating Chinas interventionist policies and augmenting their Chinese Root of Evil (whilst avoiding a direct critique of how the Chinese are rising threats to their economic interests and political stability...). Yet for us to so naively assert that HK WANTS DEMOCRACY NOW is merely a domestic affair is, as I quote the infamously corrupt yet humiliatingly funny Jiang Zemin, simple and naive. Many would argue that the current protests are necessary in order to provide legitimate political bargaining chips to facilitate negotiation. Indeed, if we buy the analysis of neoconservatives or even neoliberalists in how they approach negotiating with terrorist regimes (I saw an article on the House News Blog a while ago promoting this view... interesting but flawed), SURELY realistic pressure is necessary to force the government to come to the negotiation table. Let me illustrate why this proposition is flawed. 1. An analysis of the burdens in the current situation must be done. And there are three levels. a. An essential premise upon which the government = pressurised argument is the belief that the government must at least be actively hindered or suffering from the social movement. There must be sufficient inconvenience to the extent that the administration is likely to respond. Judging by the highly flexible and adaptive policies of the current HKSAR government (relocating offices, moving governmental leaderships around, making public statements of gasbag BS etc.), its evident that OC/Umbrella Revolution etc. has very minimal impact upon the political administration itself. b. The second sub-argument asserts that the people are sufficiently impacted to the extent that they would approach the government and pressurise it into negotiations. Three responses. First of all, that HK has an unfortunately (or fortunately) strong transportation network has illustrated how our traffic has been largely able to adapt to the protests. Yes, there were traffic jams. Yes, there are traffic congestions as we are speaking today. Yet if we take away the disruptive shock of the initial few days, its not imprudent of us to posit that HK has already adapted itself to OC and Umbrella Revolution. The impact upon the majority of HK is minimal, if not negligible. And I did correctly predict this in the article I wrote in June. Second of all, that Hong Kongs population will shift and direct their dissent towards the government is a foolish assertion. The effective propaganda campaign and characterisation from the government has accelerated the waning support for the movement. Yes, condemnations have been made (with which I would agree) against the governments HANDLING of the issues. Yet surely such presentation, such portrayal (even in itself) is already detracting away from the movements aims of illustrating how the undemocratic nature of the regime is leading to its existing problems. People may be unhappy, but theyre unhappy with how the government is RUN, not what the government IS. Third of all, as an extension to the second response above... the increasing antagonism of the taxi drivers/minibus drivers etc. is very apparent. Yes, mobs were involved. Yes, some of them were probably paid. But to simplistically characterise and alienate all of them as paid mobs hired by Xi Jinping reflects both i. over-simplification and ii. smearing on the behalf of the protesters. The rhetoric employed by the protesters - that one moment of disruption will lead to long-term prosperity and democracy and freedom... - is quickly fading as the uncertainty looms over whether or not the movements aims can actually be achieved. c. Even if we take all the premises above as true, that CY Leung would suddenly become HKs Messiah (unlikely, look at how he has responding and brushing off the protests!) and stand firmly for Hong Kong... it is unlikely that the Central Government has interest in completely politically liberalising HK fundamentally. Here I must make a case for distinguishing between liberalisation and concessionary, constitutional changes. Whilst calm and structured negotiations will probably enable all involved parties to seek an easy and PR-friendly way out in the form of TACTICAL CONCESSIONS - the protesters win because they have succeeded (and knowing the Pan-dems, they can gloat and boast all they want... crooks.); the HKG wins tactically because it has mediated peace and restored civility; the PRC wins because it has shown to be willing to follow its CONSTITUTION; an unconstitutional and OUT-OF-THE-LAW decision is unlikely to be in the PRCs interests. Lets take all the ideologue analysis aside for a minute. I have already given reasons for which civil disobedience may be legitimate (and analysed why they did not, and still do not apply to HK as it stands today - both in terms of the results and in terms of the deontological principles). Lets take all the rhetorical and emotivist bullshit of civic engagement away from the discussion. Yes, I am aware that I am fundamentally restricting my Opposition to a very unfair, tautological basis - but I am yet to be convinced on what I think is the most important issue. The bottom-line is... the PRC is willing to lose out on short-term economic profits (if needed be, and realistically unlikely to happen on the long run!) to preserve its political face. And such concerns are not merely driven by its long-lasting narrative of inner order/Heavens Mandate and recent ideological developments (particularly emphasised under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao) of the Hexie paradigm - peace and harmony, for those of you who are less Chinese-savvy. They are also driven by a more realistic understanding that economic wealth and capital can only be accumulated through the existing political order; that whilst gradual opening-up and crackdown on corruption are acceptable, fundamental changes in political institutions are not. Just look at Gorbachev and the USSR for a very interesting parallel. The Colour Revolutions at the end of the Cold War are not merely driven by ideologues who wish for change, but also misplaced calls on behalf of the then- and former Soviet states. The end conclusion of this analysis is that China is more willing and likely to react through Constitutional means as opposed to extrajudicial processes. When MLK and Gandhi succeeded in their movements, they were dealing with regimes that, regardless of their practical implementation or realistic logistics, carried the name of democracy and accountability of the vote. To claim that fighting against an undemocratic regime through civil disobedience is wrong - may appear to be a cowardly and emotively wrong statement to produce. But its also true that public pressure, accountability, perception etc. are important complementary mechanisms to civil disobedience... only in democratic states. The PRC gives less about what its people think than how it thinks it looks. And the reason for this is simple. You had news and newspapers and media and public voices broadcasting MLK and Gandhi and Mandela and even the Boston Tea peeps during their campaigns. You had the ability to gain traction. Unfortunately, in a country where 1.4 billion people see 90% of them under strict control and suffering from the Silent Chamber effect... you do not see traction. You see the Jasmine Revolution - crushed within two weeks. You see the regional protests - crushed within a week. You see officials and people being pulled down from their positions - not because of their wrongdoings, but because of their wrong choices and siding with the wrong parties. China cares. But it cares more about saving face than performing moralistic grace. Thats why its a realist state. 2. I would then like to examine the reasons for which the movement was so successful initially in its first week... and why it has gone downhill since. a. I posit that the Shock Doctrine narrative (and its deterioration) was key. When the TIME and NYT and BBC began broadcasting the Occupy Central protests, their very language encompassed words and particular diction such as UNPRECENDENTED, REVOLUTION, BREAKING NEWS, SENSATIONAL. People in HK and abroad were pumped, not only because of the natural novelty factor of the news, but also because HK is not traditionally considered a hotbed for protesting activities and public mass demonstrations. So for the first week or so, large groups of spectators (myself included) went to the protests to spectate and witness history. Ill admit it here: I was shocked, surprised, and pleasantly shaken by the protests. They were fresh - and fresh, cognitive dissonance tended to change our minds. b. Yet when the first week elapsed, public support began fading. Not only was it because of the aforementioned factors. It was also because of the loss of the freshness. Many of those who initially joined the movement had subscribed to the Shock Doctrine - surely the HKG could not refuse to react to such a massive and substantial public act; so surely change could be achieved. Yet as time drags on... the surprise, the faith in the doctrine, the subscription to civic engagement began dropping. Drastically. People lost hope. And the analysis from this highly narrative statement (yes I do realise its subjective and disputable, so please challenge me if you think I have erred) is that: without the surprise, without the element of irregularity, with the normalisation of the public gatherings - the movement has been dying. c. Our minds have grown accustomed to the existence of the protests; our lives have acclimatised. And without positive response from the gov. - we the people are losing faith. For a social movement - any, in fact - so dependent upon public discourse (Wan Chin be damned), the movement is losing its only straw of capital. And this leads onto my last theme of analysis: 3. The issue of purpose and solidarity. The tradeoff between mass mobilisation and mass concentration must be recognised. The only way for People Power protests to work is to draw in as wide as possible a supporter basis. The advantage of this is that it creates an illusion of force and representation. Indeed, the 928 crackdown from the police resulted in the public outcry of foul play. Some people (myself included) attended the protests out of anger and disappointment in the government. Others went to party and drink and celebrate their days of school. Some wanted universal suffrage. Some wanted a democratic China. Some wanted CY Leung to step down. a. Were they unified? Perhaps yes - initially. It is unwise to say the movement was never in one form or piece. Yes it was. People were united by emotions of anger and wrath, by the sentimental and Romanticised appeal of revolutionary spirits. In the case of the French Revolution, these sentimental uniting factors worked. But not in HK (see above). And with this, we see a long-term dissipation of unity. b. The movement is losing unity and focus. Internal divisions are surging as we see the revolution dividing up into factions. The rightist, nativist views held by Wan Chin are all very insightful and intriguing - but rendered bullshit by the protesters bollocks tactics in Mongkok and TST. TSTs cleared. MKs nearly cleared. The student unions have claimed to represent the movement - but were rejected by many for hijacking and leftising the protests. The original political crooks, Mister Benny Tai and the rest of his crew, are nowhere to be seen apart from making the cliched, formalised speeches about how the government is illegitimate. Youd think that when Benny Tai has spoken the same thing for 10000x times people would get it and he would have to find something new to say... But no he hasnt and didnt. c. The movement is dying. From the removal of road blocks and restoration of traffic... to the increasingly distracted aims of the movement... we see its fragmentation. We are witnessing its death. Its high time for us to transform the deteriorating status quo into opportunities. We need negotiations with clear signposting. We need realpolitik maneuvre that does not involve counterproductive efforts. We need to step back and realise that conceding is not cowardly. Its an act of ambiguous bravery.
Posted on: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 10:06:09 +0000
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