Understanding political Islam in Somalia Michael Shank Published - TopicsExpress



          

Understanding political Islam in Somalia Michael Shank Published online: 29 March 2007 # Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007 Preface By the time this article is published, much will have transpired in recent months within Somalia. Between December 2006 and January 2007, the Ethiopian and United States governments invaded Somalia by land and air, respectively, ousting the ruling Union of Islamic Courts based in Mogadishu. Now, aided by neighboring African peacekeeping forces, Ethiopia and the US are attempting to reinstate Somalia’s weak Transitional Federal Government, once based in Baidoa, within Mogadishu city proper. The Transitional Federal Government, in its first major declaration of power over Mogadishu, instituted martial law over the city, cracking down on the same public services that the Union of Islamic Courts were criticized for targeting. Egypt’s forces, reported to be 15,000 strong, remain stationed throughout Somalia but are due to withdraw in the coming weeks, once peacekeeping forces commissioned by the African Union arrive. US air, ground and naval forces, however, are stationed indefinitely within the region in an attempt to track down three suspected al-Qaeda operatives assumed to be in collusion with the Union of Islamic Courts, though the Courts have denied any affiliation. Not long after US military strikes on Somalia, on January 17, 2007, in public remarks at a Somalia conference hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC (Frazer 2007), US State Department’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer stated that the US will pursue three objectives in Somalia: (1) mobilize international support for the Transitional Federal Cont Islam (2007) 1:89–103 DOI 10.1007/s11562-007-0001-3 M. Shank Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, 3330 Washington Blvd, Suite 500, Arlington, VA 22201, USA M. Shank (*) 1040 North Quincy Street, Apt. #302, Arlington, VA 22201, USA e-mail: [email protected] URL: michaelshank.net Government and humanitarian assistance in Somalia, (2) deploy an African stabilization force within Somalia, and (3) encourage political dialogue between the Transitional Federal Government and key Somali stakeholders. It is this third objective that is most relevant to this article. The United States government, according to Ambassador Frazer, insists that the Transitional Federal Government must pursue a path of peace, reconciliation of stability and begin dialoguing with all stakeholders, including moderate Islamists. However, the US simultaneously insists that the Union of Islamic Courts must not be reconstituted as a political entity. As part of the dialogue and reconciliation process within Somalia, US Ambassador Frazer in her statement on January 17, 2007 pledged indefinite US participation in and support of the dialogue process initiated by the Transitional Federal Government. In all these efforts, what the US fails to recognize, to which this article will attest, is that the politically-oriented Islamist movement within Somalia will not suddenly or dramatically diminish now that the Union of Islamic Courts lacks power over Mogadishu. Ambassador Frazer stated that the US will allow for dialogue with organic court systems throughout Somalia, but dismissed engagement with politically-inclined Islamic court systems. However, continued US isolation of a once-and-still pervasive political Islamic movement within Somalia will only serve to marginalize a substantial portion of the population and exclude from the dialogue process a majority, not minority. Moreover, US proclivity to label Somali religious leaders as Islamist extremists – whom clan members perceive as fellow clansmen – will only further alienate potential allies. Failure to include all Somali stakeholders in the dialogue process, even the Islamists considered extremists by the US will weaken and eventually erode any government’s ability to rule with full legitimacy. Lastly, as this article will explain, Ethiopia- and US-affiliation with the Transitional Federal Government substantially undermines the already-weakened government’s ability to gain confidence among the Somali people and hinders its ability to gain lasting control of Mogadishu. It is critically important for the Transitional Federal Government, the Ethiopian and US governments, and concerned African neighbors and international allies providing peacekeeping troops and humanitarian assistance, to understand why political Islam emerged so forcefully in 2006 and why it resonated within the Somali populace. Unwillingness to comprehend the origins of this movement and efforts by the Transitional Federal Government, Ethiopia or the US to exclude political Islamic elements from dialogue, reconciliation, or governance, will further under- mine attempts to create a sustainable Somali nation-state and increase the likelihood of a reemergence of political forces operating outside the jurisdiction of the internationally-recognized government. This article provides a necessary primer for officials reconstituting Somalia’s political leadership. Unless this reconstitution process is conducted with full awareness of and deference for what emerged and transpired politically in 2006, Somalia’s new leadership will falter, and quickly. If, however, interveners like Ambassador Frazer recognize and account for the historical origins, importance of identity, theological implications, and overall popularity of political Islam within Somalia, then perhaps a sustainable future lies ahead for Somalia. It is on this note that the article begins.
Posted on: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 12:29:01 +0000

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