A Gift Bungled, Then Redeemed The 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq was a godsend for bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the Sunni Islamist movement. It retains that status today, and will for the foreseeable future. The war provided the perfect Koranic predicate for a defensive jihad: an infidel power had attacked a Muslim country without provocation, occupied it, built a regime based on man’s not God’s law, and given rule to the heretical Shia. Thus, the Iraq war provides irrefutable justification for Muslims—not just Islamists—to join the cause bin Laden has called for since 1996, universalizing jihad. “Do not think that the war will be between the United States and Iraq or between Bush and Saddam,” bin Laden told Muslims four months 140 | OSAMA BIN LADEN before the invasion. “It is between you, all our Muslim brothers, and us on the one side and the Crusaders and the Jews on the other.”37 Furthermore, the invasion did for bin Laden what he had not done for himself: it vetted him in Muslim eyes as an acute analyst of Amer- ican intentions. Since August 1996, bin Laden had warned Muslims that Washington intended to destroy strong Muslim states; topple any Muslim regime threatening Israel or blocking the creation of “Greater Israel” from the Nile to the Euphrates rivers; and seek to control oil- rich Muslim states. In Iraq, it did all of these things. Iraq proved that the U.S. government intended to rid the Muslim world of God’s law and substitute man-made law, constitutions, elections, and parlia- ments.38 Perception is always reality, and many Muslims now perceive that bin Laden’s warnings were correct, lending him stature. This is especially true about the U.S.-Israel relationship. As the role pro-Israel neoconservatives played in causing the Iraq war became known to Muslims, bin Laden’s earlier words became prescient. “I have already said that we are not hostile to the people of the United States,” bin Laden had said in 2001. “We are against the system, which makes other nations slaves of the United States, or forces them to mortgage their political and economic freedom. The system is totally in the control of the American Jews, whose first priority is Israel, not the United States. It is simply that the American people themselves are the slaves of the Jews and are forced to live according to the prin- ciples and laws laid down by them. So, the punishment should reach Israel. In fact it is Israel which is giving a bloodbath to Muslims and the United States is not uttering a single word.”39 As noted, the Iraq war advanced bin Laden’s offensive against Muslim rulers and their Islamic scholars. The invasion could not have occurred without the help of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. The U.S. occupation also was not viable without their help. In Islamic terms, there is no other way to see this than as Muslims aiding infidels to kill other Muslims, making them an enemy of Islam. The Arab regimes’ support for the war proved again that Mus- lim rulers would always side with infidels to kill Muslims, and this popular perception has undermined their religious justification for holding power. The “king’s scholars” were not men of wisdom but rather men who were willing to accede to their secular rulers in return SURVIVOR AND PLANNER, 2001–2010 | 141 for wealth and position—or simply to avoid jail. And if the clerics’ early acquiescence did not fully discredit them, their later decree that non-Iraqi Muslims need not fight infidels in Iraq shredded what remained of their credibility. Confronted by Allah’s gift of the U.S. war on Iraq, bin Laden and his lieutenants had to decide how to exploit it fully. This required that bin Laden’s words match al-Qaeda’s deeds; merely cheerleading Iraq’s Sunni fighters from the Afghan sidelines would not suffice. Al-Qaeda’s leaders named two goals in Iraq, one which might be called Islamic, the other organizational. Each could be achieved independently but pursued simultaneously. The Islamic goal was to join and assist the anti-U.S. Sunni insurgency, with the aim of beating the infidel occu- piers, denying Iraq’s Shias countrywide control, and building a Sunni Islamist regime. At the time of the invasion, however, bin Laden had few assets in Iraq beyond the ties al-Qaeda had made in 1999 to the Sunni Kurd group Ansar al-Sunnah in the north, and to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s group, which worked with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan before 9/11 and afterward left for Iraq. On leaving, al-Zarqawi had not pledged loyalty to bin Laden. Bungling the Islamic Goal From the start, Iraq presented the kind of situation bin Laden least liked: it had afforded too little time for planning and placing assets. Therefore Iraq’s insurgency—and al-Qaeda’s part in it—had to be con- ceived and managed on the fly. After the invasion, bin Laden and his lieutenants negotiated with al-Zarqawi over whether and on what terms he would join al-Qaeda.40 They were wary of the prickly disposi- tion al-Zarqawi had showed in Afghanistan, as well as his virulent anti- Shia beliefs.41 In the end—in my belief—they accepted al-Zarqawi’s loyalty pledge and named him chief of “Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers [Iraq]” to make the best of a bad situation. Al-Qaeda “warmly” welcomed union with al-Zarqawi’s group, bin Laden announced, but then issued an implicit order to him to abide by his “responsibility to the orders of God and His prophet.”42 Bin Laden’s wariness proved justified, for al-Zarqawi soon made himself the most potent strategic threat al-Qaeda faced after 9/11. While the Taleban’s 142 | OSAMA BIN LADEN temporary loss of Afghanistan was substantive tactical defeat, al- Zarqawi, his rhetoric, and actions would come close to destroying al-Qaeda as a credible international Islamist entity. We have seen that since 1996 bin Laden has made clear that al- Qaeda’s three war aims were to drive the United States from the Mus- lim world, to destroy Muslim tyrannies and Israel, and to settle scores with Shias. He also made clear that the goals must be pursued seri- atim, not in parallel. Why? First, because bin Laden believes that a Sunni-Shia war would undermine his ability to focus Sunni militants on going after U.S. interests. As much as they hate those interests, the militants—especially Wahhabis and Salafis—loathe Shia more. And so al-Qaeda’s best fighters and those of its allies would join a war on Shiism. Bin Laden’s view is not ecumenical. However, he argues that the greater threats to Islam—America, the Arab regimes, and Israel— must be beaten before settling the Shias’ hash. Were the Shias dealt with first, bin Laden believes, three things would occur. First, as noted, the militants’ U.S. focus would be bro- ken. Second, the Sunni rulers and their oil wealth would be the only prop for Iraq’s Sunni minority in a fight against the Iran-backed Shia majority. The Sunni kings, dictators, and generals al-Qaeda identifies as un-Islamic would be transformed into indispensable purveyors of arms and funds to Sunni mujahedin in Iraq. In addition, the rulers’ scholars would issue fatwas making the Iraqi Sunnis’ war against Iraqi Shias the holiest of holy wars, eternally damning any Sunni male who did not join the jihad against heretics in Iraq. So strong would be this sectarian pull, in fact, that al-Qaeda would be forced to side with Iraq’s tyrant-backed Sunnis to fight the Shia. Third, Arab regimes would blame AQI for the sectarian war, thereby costing al-Qaeda pop- ular support in the Muslim world. But al-Zarqawi paid almost no heed to bin Laden’s strategy regarding Iraqi Shia. From the day he pledged loyalty and was named its Iraq commander, he made it seem as if he meant to destroy al-Qaeda. He attacked coalition and Iraq regime targets regularly and effectively, but his men also behaved as takfiris, killing non-combatant Shias and Sunnis for not taking direction on religious and other issues. He bombed mosques, killed local mullahs and tribal chiefs, slaughtered civilians, and beheaded captives on television. In addition, he ignored al-Qaeda’s SURVIVOR AND PLANNER, 2001–2010 | 143 two cardinal rules for fighters sent to aid Islamist insurgencies: first, that country-specific insurgencies must be led by the country’s nationals, and second, that while al-Qaeda offers advice and aid as requested, it does not tell local fighters how to run their war.42A In a short time, al-Zarqawi managed to kill already slim chances of al-Qaeda’s helping Sunnis to a victory that would allow formation of a Sunni Islamist state in Iraq. In so doing, he also very nearly mortally wounded al-Qaeda’s standing both in Iraq and in the Muslim world. While al-Zarqawi’s campaign in Iraq had success—killing coali- tion and Iraqi soldiers in what bin Laden himself called “daring operations”––it was a train running full speed at al-Qaeda. By mid- 2005, Muslim and Western leaders opposed to bin Laden started to label al-Zarqwai and, by extension, al-Qaeda, as takfiris.43 True to his management style, bin Laden avoided public debate with al-Zarqawi, instead using his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri and a senior al-Qaeda leader known as Atiyah to press al-Zarqawi to stop killing civilians; to help him understand how he and Iraq fit in al-Qaeda’s overall strategy; and to explain how al-Zarqawi’s behavior undermined al-Qaeda’s efforts in Iraq and worldwide.44 In pressuring al-Qaeda’s Iraq chief, however, bin Laden had to walk a fine line. He not only needed to avoid publicly condemning al-Zarqawi—who was popular among the young. He knew that al- Zarqawi was not theologically wrong in killing some Sunni and Shia civilians in Iraq. Muslims of either sect who voluntarily worked for U.S.-led forces or the coalition-installed regime were legitimate tar- gets. Cooperation with infidels against Muslims negated their Islam. The problem was not with killing Muslims in this category, but with al-Zarqawi’s refusal to discriminate between them and innocent Mus- lims. He should have been focusing only on Muslims who aligned themselves with the occupiers. In trying to insulate al-Qaeda from the takfiri label, therefore, bin Laden could not concede the point that no Muslim was a legitimate target, for that position was theologically un- tenable; it would defame al-Zarqawi; and it would make the conduct of war by Muslims all but impossible. “Those Iraqis who get killed,” bin Laden argued in late 2004, “and who belong to [Prime Minister] Allawi’s renegade government—such as members of the Army, the security agencies, and the National Guard—are like Abu Jahl, the 144 | OSAMA BIN LADEN Qureshi Arab [who opposed and fought the Prophet Muhammad]. Their killing is sanctioned and they are infidels. Muslims should not pray for them. . . . Religious scholars have unanimously agreed that supporting the infidels against the Muslims is one of the major causes for departure from the Muslim faith, and is considered one of the ten major violators of Islam. This is the case if the infidel is foreign or Arab, ruled or ruler.”45 Bin Laden took it upon himself to handle the problem in public and assigned lieutenants to work privately with al- Zarqawi to fix what was becoming an intolerable threat to al-Qaeda. In an October 2005 letter, al-Zawahiri used the tone of a wise old uncle to give al-Zarqawi a clear but relatively gentle upbraid- ing. Throughout his ten-page missive, al-Zawahiri cited four issues al-Zarqawi needed to address to improve prospects for himself, for Iraq’s Sunni resistance, and for al-Qaeda. First, al-Zawahiri said, the mujahedin in Iraq needed to see their mission did not end “with the expulsion of the Americans from Iraq.” They needed to do political “fieldwork,” to help gather all the mujahedin groups into “a nucleus around which would gather the tribes and their elders . . . and all the distinguished ones who were not sullied by [working with] the [U.S.] occupation.” If the fighters were not united by the time the coalition left, al-Zawahiri warned, “secular- ists and traitors” would hold sway over them. Second, al-Qaeda’s deputy chief wrote that videotaped beheadings were costing Iraq’s Sunni mujahedin public support. “Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable,” al-Zawahiri said, “are the scenes of slaugh- tering hostages.” They alienated people. If captives had to be killed it would be better to do it “by bullet.” Third, al-Zawahiri wondered whether al-Zarqawi, who wanted to lead Iraq’s Sunni insurgency, was not stirring up “sensitivities” by “the assumption of leadership for the mujahedin or a group of the mujahedin by non-Iraqis.” Telling al-Zarqawi to look into this, al-Zawahiri asked what impact the sensitivities would have and how they might be eliminated “while preserving the commitment of the jihadist work and with- out exposing it to any shocks.” Fourth, al-Zawahiri explained that random attacks on Shiites and their shrines were—like behead- ings—were harming the Sunni cause. Yes, al-Zawahiri conceded, SURVIVOR AND PLANNER, 2001–2010 | 145 Shiites were heretics and needed to be brought to heel. But for now the attacks not only kept insurgents from killing Americans but alienated the majority of Muslims, who could not “imagine” the need to kill Shiites.46 Bin Laden remained dissatisfied with al-Zarqawi’s actions after al- Zawahiri’s letter. In December 2005, another, much harsher letter was sent to al-Zarqawi from a senior al-Qaida leader we know only as Ati- yah. Atiyah—like al-Zawahiri—expressed al-Qaeda leaders’ love and respect for al-Zarqawi and his followers and praised their military accomplishments. “After all, you are truly mujahedin against God’s enemies. . . . You are the ones who have spited America . . . and you have broken its prestige and thrown it to the ground.” Atiyah also praised al-Zarqawi for advancing al-Qaeda’s task of inciting Muslims to jihad with “vast good work of awakening the generation and resur- recting the Muslim nation.” But here ended the soft soap. Atyiah pro- ceeded to excoriate al-Zarqawi. Al-Qaeda’s aim in Iraq was not just killing the enemy. Echoing Clausewitz, Atiyah told al-Zarqawi that policy “must be dominant over militarism . . . [this is] one of the pillars of war that is agreed upon by all nations, whether they are Muslims or unbelievers.” “Therefore, unless our military actions are servant to our judicious shari’a policy, and unless our short-term goals and successes are servant to our ultimate goals and highest aims, then they will be akin to exhaustion, strain, and illusion.”47 Atiyah next focused on the obvious “shortcomings,” “flaws,” and “errors” in al-Zarqawi’s thinking and behavior, citing his need to hear “opinion, advice, and instruction” on remedying these faults from those outside his circle of advisers.48 Atiyah’s thinking exactly reflects bin Laden’s. His main points fall under traditionally bin-Ladenesque subheadings. Muslims are watching You represent al-Qaeda, Atiyah told al-Zarqawi, “a man of the public” whose “actions, decisions, and behavior result in gains and loses that are not yours alone.” They were, rather, “for Islam.” “Your actions have come to impact the entire world, and they are monitored and analyzed.” Al-Zarqawi’s actions in Iraq, Atiyah informed him, had to 146 | OSAMA BIN LADEN be taken with a view to his “integration” with the worldwide “jihad enterprise.”49 Follow orders Because al-Zarqawi’s acts were having worldwide impact, his decisions were not his alone. “You need to keep in mind,” Atiyah wrote, “that you are a leader in the field that is under greater leadership that is more potent and able to lead the Muslim nation.” Al-Zarqawi should hence- forth make no decisions “on a comprehensive issue” until he had con- sulted with “Shaykh Usamah and the Doctor, and their brothers there [in Afghanistan and Pakistan].”50 Get along with everyone Atiyah stressed bin Laden’s mantra that pan-Muslim support was es- sential and that al-Qaeda had to work with—“embrace”—less-than- perfect Muslims to achieve its ends. Local tribal shaykhs and especially “Islamic theologians” must be won to al-Qaeda’s side because only they could bring the Muslim masses. “The long and the short of the matter is that Islamic theologians are the keys to the Muslim commu- nities, and they are its leaders. For this reason, we should win them over by keeping quiet, overlooking things, and saying nice things, in spite of disagreement with them in most things both theoretical and practical.” This would involve winning over the population in Iraq, calling upon them to fulfill their obligation to wage jihad, “lauding them for the good they do,” and remaining quiet about “their short- comings.” Among the most crucial things involved is exercising all cau- tion against attempting to kill any religious scholar or tribal leader who is obeyed, and of good repute in Iraq, from among the Sunnis, no matter what. Per bin Laden’s guidance, Atiyah told al-Zarqawi that if he killed those he knew to be corrupt and treasonous “but who are respected and beloved by the people,” it would “act against all the fundamentals of politics and leadership.” Finally, Atiyah ordered al- Zarqawi to get along “with the brothers from other sects.” Killing them was “not appropriate,” fighting them now “is not good, indeed harmful, as God knows best.”51 SURVIVOR AND PLANNER, 2001–2010 | 147 Be patient Atiyah referred to al-Zarqawi’s very un-al-Qaeda-like impatience. “Do not act alone and do not be overzealous,” he advised. “Do not be hasty in reforming and mending the Muslim nation. Do not rush victory over the enemy, for the war and our journey are truly long. The important thing is to keep your reputation and that of the mujahedin pure.” Patience was vital in the military area, Atyiah noted, and attacking hotels in Jordan, for example, without consulting al-Qaeda’s leaders yielded “the mistake of lack of precision.”52 Always consolidate Reflecting bin Laden’s desperate desire to avoid in Iraq the Afghan debacle of winning but not consolidating power, Atiyah warned al- Zarqawi that his behavior could cost Islam the fruits of evicting the infidels. Writing of his experience in 1994–1995 Algeria, Atiyah noted that although the regime “was on the verge of downfall,” the muja- hedin “destroyed themselves with their own hands,” by alienating people with “oppression, deviance, and severity, coupled with a lack of kindness, sympathy and friendliness.” The enemy did not defeat them. Rather, they “defeated themselves.”53 Atyiah also made clear that al- Zarqawi’s position was not secure. When a subordinate did not take orders, and acted in a way that drove people “away from us and our faith and our jihad,” Atiyah said, al-Qaeda’s leaders would have to “replace him.”54 Atyiah’s letter disproves and discredits those Western writers who claim that after 9/11 al-Qaeda dissolved as a centralized organization and now exists mainly as a figurehead for multiple, uncontrolled affil- iates. It makes explicit, for example, that al-Qaeda is a centralized or- ganization, and that its leaders outside South Asia are not independent actors but subordinates whose actions affect the whole organization and therefore must accept the orders from al-Qaeda’s senior leaders.
Posted on: Tue, 06 Jan 2015 23:46:49 +0000
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