A UNIQUE BOOK FOR PROFESSIONAL SOCCER MANAGEMENT • LEADERSHIP • FINANCE ANALYSIS Communication Sponsor Panagiotis (Takis) Alexopoulos Panagiotis (Takis) Alexopoulos works with the University of Peloponnese at the Department of Organization and Management of Sports in Sparta as an assistant professor. From June 2001 to April 2006, he provided his consulting services to the OPAP A.E. as a business consultant for sport issues, after a strict evaluation procedure released by OPAP corporation in order to get a high level of such services by a specialist. As of 2006, he provides his consulting services on strategy, performance and marketing for the organization and promotion of the game «Pame Stoixima» within the company OPAP International S.A. established in Cyprus. He graduated in 1985 from the National Kapodistrian University of Athens from the Department of Physical Education and Sports. He followed graduate and doctoral studies in England and Romania where he received his doctoral thesis. He is a holder of a degree of Football Manager (Players’ Agent) of FIFA, as well as coach of A Category. He is the author of six books on the subject of the football science and he has published at least 15 scientifi c articles to the international and Greek scientifi c magazines journals and conferences. He teaches to the graduate program «Organization and Administration of Sports Organizations and Business» of the Department of Organization and Management of Sports at the University of Peloponnese. He is a member of the steering committee of the graduate program of the school of Sciences of Human Movement and Quality of Life. He is married and he is a father of two children, Johanna and Jim. Address: University of Peloponnese, Department of Organization and Management of Sports Orthias Artemidos & Plateon, 23100 Sparta E-mail: [email protected] alexopoulos.takis@gmail Webpage: sparti.uop.gr/-toda alexopoulostakis.gr I. SIDERIS publications • 116 Solonos Str. • 106 81 Athens Τ: +30 210 3833434 • [email protected] • isideris.gr FIRST CHAPTER EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PROFESSIONAL SOCCER SECOND CHAPTER FACILITIES AND SPORT EVENTS REVENUES THIRD CHAPTER SPORTS AND MASS MEDIA FOURTH CHAPTER PROFESSIONAL SOCCER IN GREECE FIFTH CHAPTER THE PROFESSIONAL SOCCER FINANCES: THE FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE GREEK AND EUROPEAN SOCCER CLUBS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY SIXTH CHAPTER THE MOST IMPORTANT SUPERLEAGUE CLUBS 2003-2013 SEVENTH CHAPTER THE FINANCIAL PARAMETERS OF THE MOST IMPORTANT EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL SOCCER CHAMPIONSHIPS EIGHTH CHAPTER THE ORGANIZATIONAL, FINANCIAL, AND OTHER STATUS IN THE GREEK PROFESSIONAL SOCCER FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE GREEK SOCCER PROFESSIONALS NINTH CHAPTER ΤHE GREEK PROFESSIONAL SOCCER TV RIGHTS’ SELLING MODEL FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE GREEK SOCCER PROFESSIONALS Contents European soccer is one of the most –if not the most– important geographical sports area on the planet. In the European professional soccer championships some of the most famous and well paid athletes of the world play for some of the most wealthy and known clubs globally. These clubs transfer billions of euros, gaining profi ts. Moreover, they have revenues from ticket sales. Merchandising, media coverage rights (television, radio, internet, mobile phones) etc. As far as the expenses categories are concerned, transfers expenses take the lion share (transfer amount that is paid by the buying club to the selling club plus the agents’ fee plus the players’ salaries). Specifi cally in the big clubs the transfers expenses part of the total expenses is sometimes close to or more than 100% (eg Real Madrid). On the other hand though, the clubs that sell players get revenues for this action and there are clubs that, due to their scheduling earn essential part of their total revenues from selling players (eg Arsenal). One equally important revenue source for the clubs is their home games ticket sales. The top European clubs get millions of euros in every home game, since more than 60.000 fans fi ll their historical stadiums (in some clubs like Barcelona, there is a waiting list for many years and a strict priorities list of buying tickets, since its home games are sold out for many years). The big clubs like Real Madrid, Barcelona, Manchester United, Bayern, and Milan and other clubs of this size have a total capitalization of more than 300 millions euros, and their shares belongs to worldwide giant companies and businessmen. At the same time these clubs, in the framework of their sporting strengthening – through acquiring world class players with high transfer fees – but also their development of their assets – building new stadium or renovate the current one, building new training centre etc. – have accumulated enormous debts towards the public authorities and third parties (contractors, agents, etc.), that sometimes they can serve and other times they cannot serve, with the result of their bankruptcy and sporting decadence. This phenomenon is surely most often in lower size clubs fi nancially and sporting wise, clubs that don’t have the support of millions of fans (stadium spectators, TV viewers, supporters in general) like the big clubs have. For these reasons, UEFA developed the last ten years the Financial Fair Play, through which tries to put in order the clubs’ fi nances, and force them apply a logical policy in expenses, paying only a part of their revenues in acquiring players. That way, clubs will be fi nancially viable and sportingly strong in the relevant degree. first chapter EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PROFESSIONAL SOCCER Football is arguably the most popular sport on the planet since decades, passing through various organizational and morphological stages. Today clubs have turned into major football companies while in many cases they are transformed to economic giants. According to Forbes magazine, the value of the fi rst 20 clubs is estimated at $ 12.8 billion and their turnover touches $ 5.2 billion. So in this context as market interest increased for the sports industry, the economics of sports business and mainly football are gradually developed as a recent and emerging fi eld of study. Indeed the fi nancial issues concerning football have gained a strong scientifi c and technical interest since unfortunately the management of football clubs across Europe is not characterized by rationality and consistency. third chapter SPORTS AND MASS MEDIA second chapter FACILITIES AND SPORT EVENTS REVENUES An important asset of the professional soccer clubs is their sporting facilities. The clubs’ stadiums except being their natural home are at the same time an important tool for increasing their revenues, through tickets sales and commercial space exploitation (shops, parking lots, multipurpose facilities, food and fun places etc.). The clubs, in order to increase the “match game revenues”, that is called the revenues in their home games, design and apply special promotional activities, through which they show off the stadium “experience” that the lucky fan can live if he watches the game in the stadium and not on television or other media. Thus, the stadium gets another “entity” and put extra value and more income to the club. Most of the stadiums in Europe are public and built with public funding the previous decades. There are though cases – especially the last two decades and mostly for big clubs - where the funding for the design and construction of the facilities was based on a loan that the club or/and the construction company signed with banks, and for its payment the club gives to the bank or/and the construction company part of the facility’s revenues for a predetermined period – usually more than 20 years. When the loan is paid in full, the club receive the facility’s total revenues. Besides their sporting facilities’ exploitation, the clubs organize many sporting and social events during the year. Except for their home and away games, the club management, wanting to offer more “product” to their fans, in the meantime between their games, they design and implement events with varying subject. Important events for the fans are the new players presentations, those where the fans can participate (dinner with players, players reply to fans questions, participating in the team’s trip to away game etc), the social responsibility actions (visits to organizations, support to socially weak, design and implementation of learning-support programs etc), the festive events (awards, Christmas events etc.) as well as other thematic events. Essential role in the clubs’ promotional activities coverage, not only for the sporting events exploitation but for their events hosting, play the mass media, sporting and other, that cover in full these actions. The area of sports and especially of the professional soccer is one of the most important for media coverage and this is shown by the games’ TV ratings and the number of sport media (newspapers, television channels, radio stations, websites, magazines). In many developed soccer wise European countries, some of the TV programs with the highest ratings were the respective national professional soccer championship games and especially games between big clubs (e.g. Olympiacos – Panathinaikos, Real Madrid- Barcelona, Manchester United-Liverpool etc.). The TV coverage of the soccer championships started in the 1960 in the big European countries and, while in Greece they started in mid 1980s with the showing of the championship highlights by ERT. Due to the appeal of soccer, soon the championship’s television rights’ value increased geometrically and in this played a crucial role among other factors the entrance of the private commercial television stations in the bidding to acquire the rights. Soon big championships’ TV rights moved from public broadcasters to private groups of media (Mediaset from RAI in Italy, Kirch from ARD/ZDF in Germany, BskyB from BBC/ITV in UK etc.). Similarly in Greece, tv rights ended up to Supersport in 1995 and since then with the interval of some years in the mid to late 2000 – when ΕRΤ covered some clubs’ games – stayed in private sector hands. Concerning their value, it is indicative that the rights were sold from EPAE (the championship authority) to ΕRΤ for the amount of 400 million drachmas (approximately 1,1 million euros) in early 1990s and ended up to be sold for 100 million euros in early 2000s to Alpha Digital, which off course went bankrupt. Today, the rights’ value is 60 million euros, and there is pressure, due to the fi nancial crisis to further decrease. Off course, in the developed soccer wise European countries the rights’ value is multiple of the Greek ones and keeps increasing, in a negative fi nancially wise environment, which seems not to affect the European and global football. Characteristic facts are that Real Madrid and Barcelona earn yearly more than 200 million euros from their games TV rights sale, while the English championship of Premier League TV rights are sold for over 1,5 billion pounds per year. Important parameter in the championships’ TV rights selling procedure is if they are sold separately by each club (for its home games) or collectively by the relevant authority (for the total games). The confl ict between clubs, competition authorities, national governmental authorities and international authorities (European Union) is in a large scale the last two decades. Legal confl icts almost in every country, championships’ lock outs and intense public contradictions look place until the application of a liquid, varied, European rights selling model. In most countries the collective selling from the championship authorities to the highest bidder-TV station is legal. After the sale, each club participating in the championship receives part of its total TV revues, based on a predetermined percentage, which takes in consideration its appeal and commercial value, its sporting success and other parameters. Nevertheless, the big European clubs in certain cases succeed to sell their rights individually to interested TV stations, signing that way even bigger deal than in those in the framework of a collective sale. Now in Greece, all the Super League clubs sell collectively their TV rights to ΝΟVA and share the relative revenues with the formula as described above. fifth chapter THE PROFESSIONAL SOCCER FINANCES: THE FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE GREEK AND EUROPEAN SOCCER CLUBS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY fourth chapter PROFESSIONAL SOCCER IN GREECE In Greece, the professional soccer championship is hosted by Superleague, which followed the EPAE in 2006. Basic reason for the creation of the SL was the collective need of designing and selling a homogenous TV rights’ package resulting to the increase of its value, as well as the adoption of the same strategy in sponsorships (that wasn’t successful in the same level as it happened in the TV rights). The Super League was established with the initiative of the three big clubs (Οlympiakos, Panathinaikos and AEK) with the cooperation of Skoda Xanthi, all four of which captured the idea and presented it to the rest clubs, and applied it altogether. Off course crucial point in the SL history was the initial agreement in 2006 for the future entrance of all the clubs in one joint venture for the sale of the rights collectively by SL. This happened in 2012 when all the clubs (even the ones that the previous years had valid TV contracts with ΕRΤ, like Οlympiakos and Skoda Xanthi), entered the rights’ collective selling by SL to NOVA. The SL during its operation the last 8 years shows an important social activation, through a multiple social responsibility program, designing and applying actions – among others – for the social caring against the social problems of racism, doping, violence, match fi xing etc. Another important organization of Greek soccer is the Greek Football Federation (EPO) that organizes all the amateur championships, and the national teams activities, being the superior authority of Greek soccer. The EPO has a long standing tradition, since it was established in and started the promotion and development of soccer in Greece. Basic goal of EPO is the development of amateur soccer, through the increase of amateur athletes and the full representation of the national teams abroad (under 17, 19, 21, A Team, Women etc.). The Ministry of Sports and the General Secretariat of Sports are the public authorities that monitor the operation of soccer (and off course all sports) in Greece and cooperated with EPO (which is self operated based on the constitution of the world football federation FIFA). The Professional Sports Commission suggests the licensing or not of the professional soccer clubs (and those of basketball as well) for their participation in the national championships. Based on the fi les the clubs submit, it decides respectively. The last years its role is very important, trying to fi x the Greek soccer problems, and it was common until recently the clubs to compete in the framework of their respective championships without fulfi lling their basic tax, insurance and organizational contractual obligations. In the mid 2000s, when the fi nancial size of the clubs went totally out of control, leading in many cases to bankruptcies not only of the clubs but also of the companies involved in them (TV giants like Kirch and ITV), and at the same time increasing the competition gap between the clubs which could spend enormous amounts to acquire world class players and the rest clubs, UEFA designed and started to apply step by step the Financial Fair Play, a guide of sensible fi nancial and organizational management of the clubs, which the clubs should apply to be viable and if they don’t do it they will have sporting and fi nancial bans by UEFA. It is an undisputed event that the application of the FFP is reality in large scale in small and medium size clubs than and not to the big European clubs. One could say that small and medium size clubs’ management and owners may felt relief with the FFP, since now they are not supposed to offer that big salaries to players and sign commercial and contractors agreements with that big cost like in the recent past. In other words, the market “adjusted downwards”. The same didn’t happen though with the big European clubs, where the pressure of the fans, the owners ambitions and also the general lay out of the clubs, which are designed the last 30 years to sell a high quality “product” to their clients – fans, led to a partial and not full application of the FFP. Also the big clubs push all the time UEFA to loosen up the FFP regulations, using the constant threat for leaving from the UEFA championships and forming their own closed league. At the same time with the fi nancial upsizing of the clubs, came their entrance in the relevant European stock markets. The start was made by the English and Italian clubs , and not only the big but also the small and medium sized ones. Soon, at least in Italy they realised that the advantages are not the ones predicted in long term and also that their sporting failures affected their share value more than anticipated. In England, where there is a more developed knowledge and culture for the stock exchange and its operations, even medium sized clubs continue to market their shares in the London stock exchange and the New York stock exchange (Manchester United). In general lines and especially outside England, the stock exchange clubs’ entrance was an effort that didn’t have the desired result, one could say. For over a decade, European football has been plagued by fi nancial problems that threaten to change the balance and the status quo that is known so far. Almost within the majority of the European championships, with a few exceptions that simply serve as confi rmation of the rule, football clubs record negative economic results which are added to accumulated losses from previous fi nancial years, complicating their hazardous problematic situation. The development model followed by European football clubs based on excessive spending for transfers of players as a result of the need for teams to maximize their athletic performance neglecting the impact of these decisions on their economic situation. UEFA wanting to deal with this problem, created the Financial Fair Play regulation. The aim of this project is to put an end to the waste of clubs for transfers and to address the derailment of the salaries of players which in many cases surpass sustainable levels. For instance, in Spain the salaries of players reach up to 70% of clubs budgets. Clubs are invited within specifi c timeframes to balance their fi nancial statements or to operate in so-called “breal-even point”. Practically clubs must stop spending more money than they can produce and thus is necessary to obtain a rational economic behavior and strictly follow their budgets constraints. The new regulatory framework is practically applied since 2012 and was preceded by a pilot period from 2010. It will be fully applied from 2014-2015 season since then it would end the adjustment period of the clubs. Until then they will be allowed to record losses as the amount of 64.000.000 €, provided they follow a plan of reorganization. Risker clubs who are unable to achieve some indicators should provide very detailed budgets regarding their strategic plans. The Financial Fair Play aims to make European football more healthy and sustainable in the long run, encouraging thereby investment in the development of academies and sports facilities. As mentioned above, the development and application of these rules came as a result of the poor economic situation of European football. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the fundamentals of the Greek Super League football clubs before (2009-2010) and after the adoption of the Financial Fair Play (2011-2012) and to compare the Greek reality with their respective clubs from the major Leagues in the European continent as the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Spain. For this reason we collected fi nancial data from the fi nancial statements 67 clubs in those countries for the period 2009-2012. The analysis is based on ratios of activity, effi ciency and sustainability. The analysis will compare these ratios among countries and we will separate clubs based on their ownership structure (distinguishing among listed and non-listed football clubs) and their legal form (private company, limited liability company or members association). The results showed that the Greek and Italian clubs are in the worst economic situation since all having accumulated losses over the last four years and also present high leverage which suggests that in the near future they may face acute problems continuing their activity and signifi cant weakness of repayment of outstanding obligations. In contrast, the German clubs appear to be more fi nancially healthy showing a positive return of their assets in combination with low levels of leverage do not conceal immediate danger for a reduction of income probable bankruptcy. In contrast, Spanish and English clubs are somewhere in the middle since they reported heavy losses in 2012, but on the contrary are characterized by suffi cient viability and combining competencies to effi - ciently exploit their investments in sporting talents in order to create sales. Under these circumstances they can gradually reverse the negative accounting results and return on a profi table track in the near future. Furthermore, the separation of clubs within listed companies and not, showed that the losses are constant throughout the period of the investigation for both subgroups which means that the listed clubs despite the close supervision of the institutions of each country’s stock market, appear in a worse fi nancial position relative to unlisted clubs. Indeed, unlisted clubs seem to adjust more easily to the new conditions as they began to limit their losses between 2009 and 2012. In contrast, listed clubs while profi table in 2009, the following years their losses increase far and exceed those of unlisted clubs. Therefore we conclude that both categories of clubs have substantial economic issues to confront in order to avoid losing the licensing of the central supervisory body. Finally, we examined whether the legal form of the clubs directly affects the way in which clubs raise and channel funds in their investments in the sport (players, facilities, etc.) and the further impact on their economic effi ciency. So we separated sample clubs in three categories of legal form, the private company, limited liability Company with share capital dispersion and union members. The results showed that the form of union members was the most economically viable since the involvement of supporters in the administration of the club enhances the control and monitoring of administrative decisions limiting overspending and mismanagement, phenomena that are more usual in the form of the private company. The clubs in the form of private enterprise are more unprofi table since the decision of the owner is directly affected by the fans and the local community rather than economic rationality. It is a common belief that the Greek championship clubs don’t attract in their home games the same spectators number, comparing to the period 1980-2000. From one hand the extended in the previous year’s stadium violence and also the low level of the offered spectacle forced out of the stadiums large part of the fan base. In general lines and besides the big clubs, the stadiums are half empty with the capacity less than 50% in average. The big clubs (Οlympiacos, Panathinaikos, AEK, PAOK) continue to fi ll their stadiums, with a slight decrease in their numbers, due mostly to the current fi nancial situation. Off course the clubs’ management have decreased the tickets prices, have created alternative ticket packages and this has resulted in keeping the same or even partially increasing the tickets in many clubs’ home games’ tickets. In the other important revenue source for the clubs, that is the transfers, the numbers have largely decreased the last 4 years of the Greek crisis, after a rapid increase in the boom years (1990-2010). Now, the big clubs spend some hundreds of thousands for players’ transfer from other smaller Greek championship clubs, while those numbers were 7 or even 8 digit some time ago (Κonstantinou transfer from Iraklis to Panathinaikos in early 2000). Moreover the amounts paid in players’ transfers from clubs abroad have also largely decreased. Finally the players contracts themselves have decreased at least by 50% in most clubs. Off course the transfers amounts in big championships are breath taking and there is comparison with the Greek data. It is worth mentioning that the Greek clubs after a 30 years long experience and relation with the European championships and clubs, start to develop a culture of investment players – buying in low cost unknown, young and talented players and selling them abroad for a satisfactory amount (Olympiakos, Panathinaikos, Skoda Xanthi etc.). As previously stated, both for the home game tickets and transfer amounts spent, the fi nancial crisis of the last 6 years has largely affected the Greek clubs. Despite the fact that these clubs are viable in most cases and they don’t face the bankruptcy prism, like most limited companies in Greece, their numbers have decreased considerably. The European and global soccer fi nancial boom is something totally different from what the Greek clubs management lives everyday. The billions of euros that circulate every year in the big European championships through the share acquisition, sponsorships, advertisements, TV rights, transfers and commercial deals seems like a dream in the Greek soccer current situation. The Greek championship TV rights are the primary source of income for the clubs. The deal for yearly income of 60 millions euros by NOVA for the Superleague clubs is the most important tool in the effort to remain viable. The 2 millions euros in average for every super league in the middle of the standings consists approximately 50% of its budget, but also for big clubs it continues to consist an essential part of their revenues. Although the TV rights scene has changed many times since mid 1980s, the Greek clubs TV rights are sold collectively by Superleague to NOVA and the income is distributed to the clubs with a pre-determined percentage, based on parameters like the club’s appeal, commercial value, sporting success etc. The professional soccer in the big western European countries started to become commercialized in the mid 1970s with the entrance of the big private television networks in the respective national championships games TV rights acquisition bidding. At the same time, the championship authorities designed and implemented step by step an extended business plan for the development of the product offered to the fans, which from that time and on were faced as clients that buy a product. They renovated the old and dangerous club stadiums, built new stadiums – palaces, applied marketing techniques to create players – idols, which not only offer spectacle in the fi eld but also are idols for the younger – and not only - fans (which follow the consuming pattern of their idols) for a high fee. During the whole period of the last 30 years, all numbers that concern the big European championships club operation have increased enormously. The revenues from TV rights, sponsorships, advertisements, commercial deals transfers, etc have increased from some hundreds of millions to tens of billions every year for its championship. Characteristically, the team uniforms sponsorship for the big European clubs (BWIN in Real Madrid, AIG in Manchester United, Qatar Airways in Barcelona etc) that overcome in value the 30 million euros per year in a depth of at least 3 years. Specifi cally in the area of the TV rights, the big European championships experimented for 3 decades, starting from selling to the public broadcasters (BBC/ITV in England, ARD/ZDF in Germany, TVE in Spain, RAI in Italy etc.), and then selling the rights to private commercial media groups (BSkyB in England, Kirch in Germany, Mediaset in Italy etc.). At the same time, from the collective selling of the rights by the championship authority (Premierleague, Budeslida, Primera Division, Serie A), the clubs stepped to the individual selling (Spain) and back to the partial collective selling (Italy). Through the new deals the top European clubs get more than 100 millions euros, either via the collective deals (Premierleague, Budesliga) or the individual ones (Serie A, Primera Division). In the selection of their TV rights selling model and the designing of the respective deals, the clubs take into consideration many parameters such as e.g. the effect in the home games stadium attendance, in the TV households accessibility in the games coverage (if they don’t afford to buy subscription packages), in their games’ TV ratings (something that is very important for the sponsors, advertised in them and commercial partners). Furthermore, essential component of a TV rights collective sale is the income distribution model for the participating in the joint venture clubs. The joint venture upon agreement of all parties, pre determines parameters like the sporting success, the commercial value, the appeal of the clubs etc to distribute the income amongst them. During the long term procedure of creating the current TV rights selling model of the big European championships, national governmental and European authorities were involved, which had intense confl icts with the championship authorities. Sometimes legal confl icts were carried out between clubs that wanted to sell individually their TV rights. Other times, the Competition Authority of the European Commission and the respective seventh chapter THE FINANCIAL PARAMETERS OF THE MOST IMPORTANT EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL SOCCER CHAMPIONSHIPS sixth chapter THE MOST IMPORTANT SUPERLEAGUE CLUBS 2003-2013 The Greek professional soccer clubs’ managers believe that from the fans point of view, the championship is by itself a product and not a sum of separate games. This simply means that if a game between two clubs is not incorporated in the framework of the championship, then the game will not have the same interest for the fans, since the outcome will not defi ne the clubs’ standings in the championship and their possibility to win the championship. Specifi cally, the clubs’ fi nancial status is believed to be medium or bad, the management style to be medium and the relation between the clubs to be medium as well. The aforementioned beliefs of the managers emphasize the need for design and implementation of a different management style from the clubs, which will lead to better fi nancial results and the improvement of the clubs’ relations. At the same time and concerning the academies with young talents in the professional soccer clubs, the managers think that these academies are of medium evaluation, while the professional soccer clubs investment in talent creation level, they there is an average interest in that investment. The problems in professional soccer are among others, the reliability of games’ outcome (referees), the clubs’ stadiums’ conditions, the academies’ players’ quality and the foreign players’ quality. Further problems are the competition with other sports, the involvement of people with not the knowhow in the clubs’ management. Off course, the fans violence and the indifference of the state create problems that are valued by the managers to be important. eighth chapter THE ORGANIZATIONAL, FINANCIAL, AND OTHER STATUS IN THE GREEK PROFESSIONAL SOCCER FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE GREEK SOCCER PROFESSIONALS national competition authorities decided that the TV right collective selling deals made by the championship authorities were not valid (Premierleague). Some of these competition authorities’ decision was ruled as valid by the respective national and European courts, while others were ruled to be against the law and the country’s constitution. The wider legal framework even today, both in national and international level is liquid and the decisions are based on how the sold product is defi ned (game or championship), on if the subject under discussion is a product or social good, on if the sale of all games to one network prevents the competition and on the interpretation the courts give to many other parameters. The rapid technological growth with the offer of new technological services to the European citizens the last 30 years has opened new roads to the commercial exploitation of the European clubs media coverage rights. Specifi cally the subscription TV, the cable networks, the clubs’ own TV stations, the creation of various sport channels has happened since many years in the developed European countries. At the same time, the internet and the mobile telephony have been important mediums of coverage of the clubs’ games and other activities. Millions of fans all around Europe can watch games, trainings, news, historical and other practical info about the clubs, can buy their products and get services, as well as to interact in the framework of their favorite club. ninth chapter ΤHE GREEK PROFESSIONAL SOCCER TV RIGHTS’ SELLING MODEL FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE GREEK SOCCER PROFESSIONALS Τhe Greek professional soccer clubs’ managers believe that the games’ tv rights should belong to the professional soccer respective authorities, that are the Greek Football Federation (EPO), the Superleague (for the fi rst division) and the Football League (second division). They think that the fans should pay a subscription or other kind of charge to watch the games they want. Furthermore the managers believe that the games get value in the framework of the national soccer championship and if those games were carried out as separate events, they would not have the same value. Concerning the TV rights selling model, the managers take into consideration in the TV rights selling procedure, the competitive balance maintenance, through the fi nancial enhancement of all clubs and their provision with the chance to bid for the talented players’ acquisition, they think that the rights’ collective and individual selling to one or few networks doesn’t prevent competition. The managers evaluated the TV rights’ collective selling model as medium. They think that their clubs’ revenues represent an important percentage of their income, that with the current selling model their revenues compared with their real value are almost the same, that in case of a collective selling the total revenues the clubs will earn are more than the sum of the revenues the clubs will earn from individual sales to TV networks. Finally they say that the maximization of the clubs’ total profi ts don’t lead to the maximization of each clubs’ profi ts individually. The managers believe that the revenues’ distribution equally or based on the clubs’ performance doesn’t affect the clubs’ investment in talents incentives, since the other parameters (fans’ desire, owner’s or management’s ambition, talent “investment” etc.) play an essential role. Concerning the parameters that partially defi ne the TV rights selling model decision taken, the managers think that the current rights’ selling model has kept stable the home game’ stadium attendance. At the same time they think that the stadium attendance is an important factor in the decision taking procedure, while they state that the current rights’ selling model has kept stable the home games’ stadium attendance. It is worth mentioning that until now this clubs’ choice has a small “cost” in most of those, since only Olympiakos has a stadium with alternative functions for the spectator and off course offer the chance for the club to have extra revenues and not only those from ticket sales (sales of products and services in the shops of the stadium, food and fun services, parking etc.). The majority of the managers don’t take into consideration the chance of increasing the home games TV ratings in the rights’ selling procedure, while they believe that the current rights’ selling model has kept stable their home games’ TV ratings. Finally, most managers believe that the TV households’ home games’ media coverage accessibility is not an important factor in the rights’ selling decision taking, while they think that the rights’ current selling model has kept stable the TV households’ home games’ media coverage accessibility. Characteristically, the subscription tv network NOVA carries out (as Supersport during the fi rst years) the clubs’ games’ vast majority TV coverage from 1995 until today. The clubs have chosen to have more revenues than larger TV audiences (in the case of the rights’ selling to ERT). Statistics of the Greek Professional Soccer TV Rights ’ Sel ling Mod e l
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