Al-Farabi and the Faculties of the Soul Al-Farabi (Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Tarkhan Al-Farabi–870-950 AD), philosophical predecessor to Avicenna, is important to a discussion of Avicenna’s psychology of the soul, as it seems apparent that, although not identical, the psychologies of the soul of Avicenna and Al-Farabi do indeed run parallel. Al-Farabi, in fact, provides the immediate basis for Avicennian psychology of the soul. (I will note here that I encountered some differences in interpretation on Al-Farabi’s psychology, specifically as relates to division of faculties of the soul. I will cite two interpretations here, as I think that they are indeed nearly identical and are only slightly varied.) A general interpretation of Al-Farabi is that there are four aspects (faculties) of the soul—the appetitive (desire), sensitive (perception/senses), imaginative (interpretation/catergorisation of perceptions), and rational (reason/cognition). Al-Farabi’s hierarchy of the soul applies to all living beings, from the lowest plant life to animals and humans. It is for humans that the rational soul is reserved. Human beings possess all faculties of the soul, but it is the rational soul—the faculty of reason and will–that reigns above the rest and is responsible for exercising control over the other, lesser faculties of the soul (appetitive, sensitive, and imaginative). (Reisman 61) We can see the inherent similarities here between Al-Farabi and Avicenna, even though it seems that the main divisions of the soul (for Al-Farabi) seem to be four faculties instead of three. However, there is another interpretation of Al-Farabi’s psychology that presents the soul in an even more familiar way to that of the Avicennian psychology. For this, we will take a look at Al-Farabi as put forth by Robert Hammond. According to Hammond in The Philosophy of Al-Farabi and Its Influence on Medieval Thought, Al-Farabi, in fact, divides the soul into three faculties or classes: the Vegetative, the Sensitive, and the Intellective. Each of these divisions has subsets of powers attributable to them. The Vegetative Faculty includes the Nutritive, Augmentative, and Generative Powers; the Sensitive Faculty includes Knowledge Power and Action Power; and, the Intellective Faculty has Knowledge Power and Action Power. (Although called the same, it should be noted that the powers of the Sensitive and the Intellective are not meant in the same way, as we shall see.) **Note: You can see the breakdown from Hammond’s text by clicking on Robert Hammond’s Interpretation of Al-Farabi’s Division of the Soul under the “Some Useful Information” section.** So, let’s take a look at Hammond’s breakdown, starting with the Vegetative Faculty. It has a nutritive power–one that is responsible for nourishment, for food-getting, and for sustaining life at the most primitive level. It also encompasses an augmentative power, or the power for growth. The third power is generative, which is the self-preserving power that everything living thing possesses–the power of self-preservation (procreation/reproduction). (Hammond, The Philosophy of Al-Farabi and Its Influence on Medieval Thought, 37) We can already see the parallel here with the Avicennian Plant Powers; they, too, involve nourishment (Nutritive), augmentation (Growth-Promoting), and generation (Propagating). Like Avicenna, the Vegetative Faculty is an aspect of every living, ensouled thing, from plant to animal to human. In order to survive and thrive (and remain living), the Vegetative Faculty is essential. (Note: I would make the leap that what Hammond calls the vegetative is, for Reisman above, the appetitive.) Next, Hammond breaks down the Sensitive Faculty of the soul. For Hammond, Al-Farabi divides the Sensitive Faculty among two powers–Knowledge and Action. Sensitive Knowledge is sensuous and perceptive by nature. It is the ideas and thoughts we gain through our senses, both external (the five senses) and internal (imagination, memory, and estimation (instinct)). This Knowledge Power of the Sensitive Faculty is also responsible for processing the ideas and images we gain from the senses into useful information. The Action Power is either sensitive or locomotive. Sensitive Action is “concupiscible and irascible.” (37) It seems that this would mean that those in possession of the Sensitive Faculty act in reference to whether or not something is desirable or not. An ensouled being would know whether or not something is good or bad based on the knowledge obtained through the external senses and stored and used by the internal senses. The locomotive aspect of the Action Power refers to the actual ability for (willful) movement in living things that have the Sensitive Faculty of the soul (animals and humans). This Sensitive Faculty is seen in both animals and humans. The correlation between Al-Farabi’s Sensitive Faculty and Avicenna’s Animal Powers seems apparent. They both encompass, for the most part, very similar aspects of soul; that is, the powers of Al-Farabi’s Sensitive Faculty and those of the Avicennian Animal Faculty are essentially the same–perception, imagination, willful movement, etc. (Note: I would place Reisman’s sensitive and imaginative faculties under this category.) Thus we come to the third division of the soul for Al-Farabi–the Intellective Faculty (the rational, for Reisman). The two powers associated with the Intellective are Knowledge and Action. Intellective Knowledge, for Al-Farabi, is of two natures–perceptive (“knowledge of the individual”) and abstractive (“knowledge of the universal”). (37) There seems to be a natural connection here between the two processes of the rational soul for Avicenna and the two natures of knowledge for Al-Farabi. As we have seen in the discourse on the rational soul, Avicenna tells us that our knowledge comes from either Divine Guidance (that which just is) or through reasoning. I think Avicennian “reasoning process” is Al-Farabi’s “perceptive” knowledge; both rely on ideas and thoughts (knowledge) gained through perception and enhanced by our ability to reason and engage in higher order cognition. Al-Farabi’s “abstractive” knowledge mirrors Avicennian Divine Guidance, which pertains to those things that are not sense-reliant and that are just known. Isn’t that what “knowledge of the universal” really is anyway? The second power of the Intellective Faculty is Action. This action power, for Al-Farabi, is what Hammond calls Intellective and specifically means “the will.” (37) This action, the will, is what separates human beings from the rest of the ensouled living things. Unlike plants and animals, humans can make deliberate choices; they can perform willful actions. Even for Al-Farabi, as we saw with Avicenna, it is Intellective Action that enables morality in human beings. That is, humans are capable of taking all that they gain through their Sensitive (Animal) Faculty and utilising it in ways that are either moral or immoral. To do this, we need choice; we need a will. And thus, it is the Intellective Faculty (both in knowledge and action) here–and the rational, Speaking Power for Avicenna–that distinguishes human beings from the rest of the living world.
Posted on: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 16:14:52 +0000
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