I know Ive been flogging a dead horse with posts refuting the idea - TopicsExpress



          

I know Ive been flogging a dead horse with posts refuting the idea of Austrian fragility, but I feel the point really needs to be driven home. Call a sort of personal crusade against the mainstream. As a student who specialises primarily in Austrian history I have the great good fortune to deal with much more specific details concerning the Austrian state than the general historian who tends to gloss over the evolution of Austria and its position within the European state system. So, on that note. Another indication of Austrian relative superiority in 1914 compared to earlier eras is the existence of an Austrian Navy. Now indeed compared to the German or the British navies the Austrian Navy was quite small. But this misses the fact that there was an Austrian Navy at all. There was no Austrian navy in 1814, much less in 1714. Navies are expensive luxuries, not only are ships themselves very expensive, but valuable personnel is needed to operate them. And developing the infrastructure to construct them is a tedious business. In the time of Maria Theresa the Ministry of Kaunitz proposed the acquisition of frigates to form an Austrian Navy. This suggestion was shelved until Joseph II took it up in 1786, when he formally created the Austrian Navy and gave it an ensign. Josephs designs on Venice and his brief Antwerp Company in Belgium, where he attempted to open the Scheldt, was an indication of Josephs interest in naval power. However the navy he created remained embryonic until after the Wars of Napoleon, when Archduke Frederick, and then much more importantly Archduke Ferdinand Max (future Emperor of Mexico), really gave the navy a jump start. It was under the Archduke Max that the Austrian Navy became a major naval force and its structural foundations were solidly laid. Under the Archdukes patronage the Austrian Navy built several modern warships that gave Austria a respectable sea power by the war of 1866, whereas Austrias Prussian rival still had no navy, a further indication of Austrian economic superiority. It is a testament to Austrian vitality that Austria was able, unlike say Turkey, Japan, or Spain, to build her own ships autochthonously. The yards in Trieste were eventually able to build even dreadnoughts, and the Skoda Works in Bohemia were able to supply them with state of the art shipborne artillery. The Austrian Navy was certainly much more durably constructed than the Italian Navy, its primary rival, and was undoubtedly much more efficiently crewed and commanded. The Austrian Navy had proven its worth at Lissa in 1866, when the Italians, despite being in superior strength, were decisively defeated by the Austrians at sea which ended Bismarcks schemes of an invasion of Dalmatia. Though navies are expensive business, it was arguably cheaper for Austria to secure her Dalmatian coast, exposed as it was on the west side of the Dinaric Alps, with a fleet instead of trying to repulse Italian amphibious landings. During the war of 1866 and throughout the duration of the First World War the existence of the Austrian fleet served to protect Dalmatia, which left Galicia as the only exposed area of the Monarchy. But again it would be valuable to compare Austria and France between the two time periods to reveal Austrias relative position. in 1714 Austrias military establishment in total numbers of armed men was about one quarter that of Frances. In addition France had nearly eighty ships of the line and dozens of smaller craft comprising the second most powerful navy in the world, behind Britains. Austria had no navy at all. So even though Austria was relieved of the financial burder of maintaining a fleet, the French were still nonetheless able to outnumber them four to one on the ground overall. This alone should reveal that Austrias relative position vis-a-vis France in 1714 was far worse than Austrias position vis-a-vis anybody in 1914. France was clearly in a league of her own in 1714 and Austria was hardly even a contender statistically. Not even the Russians achieved a superiority of four to one over Austria in 1914, which France possessed in 1714. By 1830 this had changed dramatically. By that year, according to Paul Kennedy, Austrias standing forces actually exceeded Frances with 273,000 men to Frances 259,000. No longer was France so overwhelmingly richer and stronger. No more did France have 400,000 men to Austrias barely 100,000. And by 1830 Austria, too, had a navy. Of course this was much smaller than Frances navy, but it was respectable and indisputedly controlled the Adriatic, the purpose it had been built for. Despite its superior fleet, France did not even attempt to enter the Adriatic in 1859, nor attempt to land in Dalmatia, which Napoleon had done during his time when no Austrian Navy was present. By 1914 Austria had an efficient and reliable fleet that was more than a match for the Italians, who shrank from fighting it. And we see that Austrias position in 1914 was not quite so bad as we are often lead to assume by most general histories. Historians have rightfully explained that decline is a relative phenomenon. Nations very rarely decline in an absolute sense, they get stronger all the time. But they decline in a relative sense, decline really means that others are growing faster. Thus Spain in 1800 certainly could easily defeat Spain in 1600. But 1600 Spain had a much better chance of defeating France in her time, than 1800 Spain had of the France in her time. Meaning that both Spain and France had become much stronger since their year 1600 manifestations, but proportionately France had advanced far more. In this respect Austria no doubt was in decline. Of course Austria in 1914 could easily defeat Austria in 1714, or in 1814, but let us observe this decline in context. Austria was a power rising in 1714, but it was rising from a comparative low point. Though it was rising at a faster annual rate than France, France was so far ahead that this was hardly even noticeable for nearly the entire century. Conversely in 1914 Austria was at a relative high point. Though Austria was in decline, its strength had so greatly improved that were presented with the strange spectacle of the declining Austria of 1914 being in a better position relative to its rivals than the rising Austria of 1714. In 1914 Austria was arguably a match for France, more than a match for Italy, and though Britains power was a different nature and so difficult to compare, in terms of army size and continental influence Austria was far the superior of Britain. This meant that only Germany and Russia possessed a marked recognisable superiority over Austria. But neither of them possessed a superiority so overwhelming as that which France possessed over Austria in 1714. So Austria wasnt sitting too badly in 1914. Not as bad as it had been before. Throughout the entire eightheenth century France had been in slow relative decline. This is masked by Frances sudden resurgence at the end of the century and her fantastic conquests under the Republic and Napoleon. But in actuality the steady reforms of Austria under Maria Theresa and Francis I, and then at a much increased tempo under Joseph II, transformed Austria into, on paper, and on land at least, the strongest power in Europe by 1789, whereas it had been much the inferior of France at the beginning of the century. Austrias near parity with France was proven between 1795-1797 when, even without Prussia, Austria defeated France in Germany and was at least able to match French numbers in Italy if not able to outfight the French there. Then again in 1805 and 1809 Austria proved herself capable of nearly matching French numbers, and it must be conceded that Austria lost from being out-generalled by Napoleons singular genius, not because France was relatively much stronger than Austria. As Napoleon himself realised in 1809, Austria, if efficiently led, was a match for France. This was absolutely not the case at the beginning of the century when Austria could only defend Germany thanks to the genius of Eugene, the generous subsidies of the Dutch and British, the activie participation of those two powers in the war, and the support of all Germany and the major indigenous states of Italy. For example the War of the Spanish Succession shows a grand coalition composed of all the German states, the Dutch, the English, the Sardinians, the Portuguese, segments of the Spanish population, especially the Catalans, and at last of course the Austrians. These were defied by France alone for nearly fifteen years without being able to achieve any decisive success. When a member of a team Austria scored victories and seemed strong. but when alone Austria wasnt so impressive. During the War of the Polish Succession the Dutch and English declared their neutrality, declining to open up a front against France in the Netherlands. Though Germany rallied, the French had the run of the Rhine, scoring some notable successes to prevent any serious activity on this front by either side. While in Italy the French were victorious almost ridiculously easily. The Austrians could not withstand them at all, and Austrian defeat in the north resulted in them being humiliatingly defeated by even the Spaniards in the south. By contrast in 1809 Austria alone faced France, and Frances German and Italian allies, where she proved herself capable of giving the French a run for their money. This illustrates an extraordinary increase of strength from 1700 to 1800. Before the reign of Joseph II it can be said that alone the Austrians could not beat anybody, not even the Turks. The Great Turkish War saw the Austrians greatly assisted by the Russians, the Venetians, the Polish, and the German states who rallied to the imperial banner. In 1716 the Austrians were greatly assisted by Ottoman preoccupation in the Morea and by the threatening moves of the Persians in Iraq, who went to war with the Turks in 1722. In 1737 the Russians were busy in the Crimea while the Turks through their full weight against Austria, who was humiliatingly defeated since there were few distractions this time. With the Ottomans able to deploy nearly their whole strength against Austria, even at this late date Austria was unable to defeat them on her own power. After the reign of Joseph, following the administrative reforms of his parents and his own far reaching reforms, this changed as Austria was able to fight and win in wars with only her own forces. Or rather, she ought to have been able to. Austria was certainly capable of victory in 1809, which alarmed Napoleon, and in 1859, and in 1866. She was capable of defeating her opponents in any of these wars, even by herself, which is an astonishing improvement over previous eras when it would have been unthinkable. And what I mean by ought to have been able to, is that Austria was able to match her opponents man for man, gun for gun. In these subsequent wars Austria was defeated by superior leadership, not superior military strength. And the defeats of Austria at Wagram, at Solferino, at Königgrätz, were so narrow that it can easily be seen how a different decision may have led to Austrian victory.
Posted on: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 10:26:23 +0000

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