Is Hannibals reputation as one of Historys Greatest Generals deserved, or not? When Hannibal crossed the Alps and entered Italy in 218 BC he initiated the 2nd Punic War and won a series of battles that culminated in the Battle of Cannae, one of the worst and most memorable disasters in Roman history. However, following this disastrous loss, the Romans adopted the strategy proposed by Fabius Maximus Cunctator, Cunctator meaning the Dawdler. Originally an insult from his opponents in the Senate who favored embracing virtus and facing Hannibal boldly in the field, Fabius Cunctator became the author of the successful strategy for defeating Hannibal in Italy- Dont fight him. At least not directly. Hannibal now faced a problem that he proved incapable of overcoming. The Romans would no longer face a force commanded by Hannibal in open combat. Instead, they harassed his foragers, gave about as good as they got from his subordinate commanders, and generally whittled his forces down. Meanwhile, Hannibal had embarked on his invasion of Italy with, at best, tenuous support from the Carthaginian government. Even after the watershed victory of Cannae, the Carthaginian capital could not be persuaded to commit fully to pressing Rome in Italy. Furthermore, what had made Hannibals initial invasion of Italy so successful was how he had been able to swell his ranks with Gauls, unhappy with Romes steady northern expansion and always interested in testing their valor in battle and winning some plunder, that he was able to recruit both in Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul. This gave Hannibal a useful source of cannon fodder other than his core of Iberian and Numidian troops who had been with him since his departure from New Carthage and earlier campaigns in Carthaginian Spain. It also gave him some scouts with knowledge of the passage through the Alps and with the terrain of his early campaign. Furthermore, Gauls had some excellent horsemen among them who could add to his already illustrious cavalry force, made up of the legendary Numidian horsemen. Hannibals strategy after invading Italy consisted of 3 parts: 1. Defeat the Romans in battle; 2. Demonstrate that they were incapable of protecting their allies; 3. Once the Roman alliance had crumbled and Rome was isolated, move for the decisive blow. With Cannae, he had succeeded in his first goal. The terror campaign he initiated in Southern Italy that followed Cannae was intended to affect his second goal. But the Roman alliance did not crumble. A few towns opened their doors to Hannibals army, he was able to plunder and barter enough to keep his army from starvation, but the tide never turned in his favor. Hannibal had maneuvered himself into a stalemate. And for Hannibal, isolated and without support in Italy, with his army dwindling around him and no hope of reinforcement in sight, stalemate was defeat. Meanwhile, Publius Cornelius Scipio, a young Roman patrician who had been present at three of Hannibals four major battles in Italy as a junior cavalryman, including the disaster of Cannae, had come to the forefront of Roman politics. And in Rome, coming to the forefront of politics meant coming to within reach of military command. Scipios father and uncle had both been killed fighting against the brothers of Hannibal in Spain, holding the Pyrenees against reinforcements from Hannibals only remaining source of strength- Carthaginian Spain. Scipio was able to gain the sympathy of the Roman people for the right to avenge his father and uncle, and therefore persuade the Senate to allow him to take command of the forces previously controlled by the elder Scipios, even though Scipio (who would later become known as Africanus) was at that time still to young to even be praetor. Taking command of Romes Spanish theater, Scipio quickly went about winning the respect and affection of his new army while building a strong network of intelligence, diplomacy and logistics. When he was ready to move, he moved with lightning speed and arrived at the Carthaginian stronghold in Spain, Cartagena, or New Carthage. He was able to move so quickly because he had gained the friendship of some Iberian tribes who provided him with scouts and guides, supplies, and auxilia. Exploiting a secret weakness of the strongholds defenses revealed to him by spies, Scipio was able to take the most critical city for sustaining the Carthaginian wars in Spain and Italy in a single day. Following this amazing victory, Scipio quickly fought a campaign against Hannibals two brothers in Spain, swiftly bringing them to battle and defeating them, even though he was outnumbered, in two decisive engagements. The war in Spain was, for all intents and purposes, won for Rome. It is also worth noting that it was around the time of the taking of Cartagena that Scipio adopted the Gladius Hispaniensis, the Spanish Short Sword that would become the trademark of the Roman Legionnaire. I have also heard that this is the first time the cohort was mentioned in connection to a Roman army, concerning Scipios forces in Spain. If anyone can provide a primary source for that, I would greatly appreciate it. I have only seen that claim in secondary sources so far, though they are fairly reliable. Following his surprising victories in Spain, Scipio was able to wrangle tacit approval from the Senate, and begin preparations for what History has come to know as the Zama Campaign. Since many know of the nominative battle of that campaign and since it is not my purpose, I will not relate the battle in detail here, except to make two points. The first is that, during the course of the campaign, Scipios diplomatic acumen once again played a pivotal role, as he was able to conclude a treaty with King Juba of Numidia, giving the Romans an ally in Africa that would prove essential to the success of the campaign, both in providing scouts, guides, spies and supplies, but also in providing Scipios army with a cavalry force with which he could hope to confront Hannibal on a battlefield. The second point has been made ad nauseum, it seems, so I will only repeat it here: Scipios tactics at Zama were those of a close student of Hannibal. So why do I say Hannibal does not deserve his reputation as one of Historys Greatest Generals? Because Good Generals win Battles. Great Generals win Wars. Scipio used diplomacy and a well constructed strategy with an obtainable goal in order to bring the 2nd Punic War to a successful conclusion for Rome. Fabius Maximus Cunctator developed a strategy to neutralize an enemy who could not be defeated on a battlefield (and Fabian Tactics is still synonymous with Scorched Earth or Guerrilla tactics today). Hannibal, by contrast, dragged his country into a war it was unwilling to undertake, thereby condemning himself from the outset to fighting with less than his full strength at his disposal and failing to secure a diplomatic coup even amongst his own countrymen. The war that he forced them into was predicated on a strategy entirely devised by Hannibal, which placed the balance of the strategy on diplomatic success. Hannibal was certainly a visionary as a battlefield tactician, and no-one can deny his effectiveness as a leader of soldiers. His use of cavalry on the battlefield and the seeming ease with which he achieved envelopment maneuvers against successive Roman armies speaks to his tactical dexterity, and the fact that he was able to keep his army in tact from when it left Cartegena, to when it crossed the Alps, to when it was bogged down in Fabian tactics in Italy, all the way to the battlefield at Zama speaks to his leadership of soldiers. Yet when the necessary diplomatic success proved not to be forthcoming after a terror campaign in Southern Italy, Hannibal showed little imagination in adjusting his diplomatic tactics to achieve his strategic goal, and as a result he not only ultimately failed in his campaign, but he brought his country a defeat in war that would seal their total ruin and confine a once great nation to the side-notes of History. If Great Generals win Wars, than Hannibal is among the very worst of Generals.
Posted on: Fri, 02 Jan 2015 20:59:33 +0000