NSAM 295 and Human Rights Interests Governor G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African A=airs, told the House Subcommittee on Africa in 1966 that: “The broad aims of U.S. policy towards South Africa are essentially political. We support freedom, equality, and justice for the people of South Africa . . . These political aims are paramount. In scientiBc, economic, and strategic respects our bilateral relationships with South Africa are useful to us—even in some Belds important—but they are not essential to our national security.” Reinforcing this point, Williams went on to declare: “Our basic policies regarding South Africa stem from broad principles much more than from immediate speciBc interests . . .” 17 Indeed, more so than in the past, this was the case. The Johnson administration was prepared to distance itself from Pretoria where issues of principle were at stake. Williams’ testimony may have hidden key areas where material, rather than “political,” interests still held sway (see below), but in order to take a stand against apartheid, Washington DC was now prepared to sacriBce strategic and economic beneBts. The Johnson administration, as had been the case since the 1960 Sharpeville shootings, continued U.S. public rhetoric “condemning” apartheid. Early in the administration, Adlai Stevenson, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, pronounced Pretoria’s racial policies to be both “repugnant” and “morally intolerable.” Two yeas later, Assistant Secretary Williams conBrmed that the United States was “in complete and unalterable opposition to apartheid.” 18 It was in 1968, however, befor e the Or ga n iz ation of Afr ica n Un ity, that the administration delivered its deBnitive statement on this issue. Vice President Hubert Humphrey, in Addis Ababa, directing his comments to all the white minority governments of southern Africa, presaged: “To those who still believe that small minorities can indeBnitely hold domination over large majorities, I say: you ignore the most vital and inevitable movement of our time—self-determination . . . I say you tragically misread the will and determination of Africans everywhere. You JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION 51 misread history and fail to understand the future.” Humphrey made his government’s position rhetorically unambiguous: “Let us be clear where America stands. Segregation: we oppose it. Discrimination: we oppose it. Exploitation: we oppose it. Social injustice: we oppose it. Self determination: we support it. Territorial integrity: we support it. National independence: we support it. Majority rule—one man, one vote: we support it.”19 The extent of Washington DC’s growing frustration with the white minority-ruled southern African states is reEected in this last sentence. “One person, one vote” was a phrase that had been consciously avoided prior to Humphrey’s OAU address. A nu mber of s ymbolic acts wer e or ga n ized to s uppor t th is r hetor ic. Mu ltir acia l receptions continued to be held at U.S. embassy and consulate buildings in South Africa, despite Pretoria’s objections (and an apparent diM culty in Bnding contractors to undertake catering for these events); requests for Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller to meet President Johnson were deEected; and Charles Fahy, a former U.S. solicitor general, was dispatched to observe the trial of Nelson Mandela and his co-accused in 1964.20 In this latter case, although the United States was keen not to be seen as interfering in the Rivonia trial, Williams did go on record to voice U.S. “concerns” over this prosecution. 21 It was in areas where apartheid legislation directly a=ected U.S. government personnel, however, that the Johnson administration was prepared to confront Pretoria head-on. On several occasions, Pretoria attempted to persuade Washington DC not to assign African-Americans to U.S. government posts involving travel to South Africa or South West Africa. As early as December 1963, for example, Ulric Haynes, the State Department’s desk oM cer for South West Africa and the British High Commission territories, was denied a transit visa to visit Bechuanaland. Secretary of State Dean Rusk had to intervene personally, combined with a threat to reduce diplomatic representation between the two countries, before this visa was begrudgingly granted. Although Pretoria later attempted to play down this incident by explaining that Haynes’ visa was temporar ily denied as he was the U.S. desk oM cer for South West Africa, and not because he was an African-American, relations had clearly been damaged. 22 A similar incident occurred in June 1965, when Prime Minister Henrik Ver woerd publicly avowed that he would not per mit Afr ican-Amer icans to work in U.S. missile tracking stations located in the Republic. Even though all U.S. personnel based in South Africa at this time were white, the State Department promptly retorted with a statement emphasizing that “(a) the tracking station agreements contain no racial clauses, (b) the South African Government has not approached us [the United States] for modiBcation of these agreements, and (c) the U.S. cannot accept the imposition of racial conditions by the South African Government at [these] tracking facilities.”23 Again, Pretoria backed down, with diplomats privately explaining that the prime minister’s speech was part of a by-election campaign and for “internal political consumption” only. 24 A month later, however, relations hit a new low when South Africa’s acting foreign minister, under instructions from Verwoerd, suggested to U.S. Ambassador Joseph C. Satterthwaite that four senior members of his country team should be transferred from the Republic. The South African government U.S. POLICY TOWARDS APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 52 had “lost conBdence” in these oM cials. 25 Washington DC responded by recalling Satterthwaite for consultation and informing Pretoria that the U.S. personnel concerned would not be withdrawn, noting that Pretoria’s request had done “serious harm” to relations between the two countries. The United States threatened “tit-for-tat” reprisals should any of the four oM cials be subsequently made persona non grata.26 Again, South Africa chose not to push the issue. Of these attempts by Pretoria to dictate the racial characteristics, or otherwise, of U.S. oM cials in South Africa, it was a confrontation over naval visits to the Republic that had the most serious ramiBcations. The United States continued to publicly recognize the str ategic and oper ationa l impor tance of U.S. militar y acces s to the ports and airports of South Africa. 27 Cape Town, for example, had become a regular stop-o=point for naval vessels on route to Vietnam, especially those ships that could not navigate the Suez Canal. In the spring of 1965, however, the future of these visits came under question. The United States had requested clearance for the aircraft carrier USS Independenceto dock at Cape Town. As part of this request, the State Department sought assurances that none of the Independence’s crew would be subject to apartheid laws whilst enjoying shore leave. 28 After protracted negotiations, a suitable formula was found to provide “multiracial” entertainment for the Independence’s sailors. However, the South African government was not willing to extend this assurance to the Republic’s airports to accommodate the needs of the Independence’s aircraft pilots. Foreign Minister Muller hinted to Ambassador Satterthwaite that perhaps white-only aircrews could be assigned to these duties, and went on to say that in the future “where groups of Americans wished to use SA facilities they would be required to observe SA rules.”29 The Independence’s visit was immediately cancelled, as was a similar call for the USS Enterpriseplanned for November 1965. In February 1967, persuaded that the Independence incident had been a one-o= retaliation for the imposition of the 1963 arms embargo, and with assurances from the South African Ministry of Foreign A= airs that all U.S. crew members could now be accommodated on a nonracial basis if visits were resumed, the U.S. Navy scheduled the USS Franklin D. Rooseveltto dock at Cape Town. 30 Operationally, the use of this port saved the need for an expensive sea refueling of aircraft carriers bound for, or returning from, Vietnam. The FDR’s 1967 call, however, was not a success. Pretoria, once the ship had moored, reneged on its assurances, sparking international media interest in the incident and congressional protests back home. Apparently, the extent of the multiracial entertainment permitted by the South African government amounted only to a bus tour of Cape Town. U.S. sailors would be subject to apartheid legislation at all other times. 31 The FDR’s captain, in consultation with the U.S. embassy, cancelled all shore leave. 32 The U.S. missile tracking ship, USNS Sword Knot, caught up in this incident waited eight days outside Cape Town seeking per mission to dock. When the United States failed to get clariBcation from the South African government over its intentions vis-à-vis shore leave, the Sword Knotwas ordered to divert to Mombassa instead. 33 This e=ectively ended all U.S. naval visits to South Africa, a self-imposed ban that stayed in place for the remainder of the apartheid era. 34 As with the 1963 arms embargo, the United States was JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION 53 now willing to sacriBce speciBc strategic interests in order to demonstrate its opposition to racial discrimination in South Africa. Alongside this rhetoric, the symbolic acts, and confronting Pretoria to protect U.S. personnel from apartheid laws, the Johnson administration also used private contacts with the South African government to underscore its opposition to apartheid. Under s ecreta r y of State Geor ge Ba ll, for exa mple, us ed h is Brst meeting with the Republic’s ambassador, W.C. Naudé, to make clear, “while there are certain areas of agreement between the South African and American governments, there are diversities which can never be accepted just as Hitlerism and Communism could not be.” 35 Throughout the entire term of the Johnson administration, U.S. oM cials gently probed their South African counterparts, seeking and suggesting the need for a moderation of the Republic’s internal racial policies. 36 However, the immediate priority of the NSAM 295 strategy was South West Africa. The Johnson administration reasoned that any political capital the United States may have in southern Africa would be best spent here. Whereas a major initiative on apartheid would be rejected outright, it was predicted, moderation in South West Africa remained a possibility. The administration thus directed “maximum e=ort” to encourage Pretoria to change its course in South West Africa. U.S. oMcials considered it essential that a way be prepared for an “accommodation to the Bndings” of the imminent ruling from the International Court of Justice.37 In particular, Washington DC sought that the South African government, prior to the ICJ ruling, postpone legislation that would have seen a wholesale export of apartheid to South West Africa, as recommended by the Republic’s Odendaal Commission.38 Also prominent in the messages of these diplomats, as per NSAM 295’s guidance, was the call for Pretoria to respect and abide by the ICJ’s eventual decision. Johnson’s strategy of putting “South West Africa Brst” produced a victory for “quiet diplomacy” with Pretoria. In April 1965, Prime Minster Verwoerd issued a white paper announcing a delay to the implementation of the Odendaal Commission’s recommendations.39 As a Department of State report on the progress of NSAM 295 put it: “Verwoerd came round to full acceptance of our representations with regard to postponement. Citing South African technical reasons for delay, as we had suggested, . . . the South African Government [agreed to] ‘refrain from action which may be regarded—even theoretically—as detrimental or prejudicial to the alleged rights of the applicant states, or which may unnecessar ily aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court.’ In e=ect, all controversial aspects of the Odendaa l Repor t were postponed pending Court judgment.” 40 This minor victory gave legitimacy to Assistant Secretary Williams’ expressed opinion, a year later, that “the situation in South Africa has not rigidiBed irreparably.” 41 In this speciBc instance, at least, Washington DC could claim to have implemented a successful balance of condemnation and engagement.
Posted on: Fri, 21 Nov 2014 23:06:59 +0000
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