Okay, here goes! Apologies for the length but there is a lot to cover: It is very difficult to find analogous case studies that can easily applied to the issue of a Solent Crossing, for the simple reason that the specific situation is almost (though note quite) unique. The best way of describing the available example would be to look at those solutions that have been completed and draw inferences from them. The French model; If the State determines that a bridge in needed, the build a bridge. The Western islands, (including the oft mentioned bridge to Ile de Re) and the motorway crossing of the River Loire at Angers being two clear instances where the views of the local population (who may well be displaced by the construction) are over ridden by the centrist determination that the project will proceed. The major European project; the Oresund bridge/tunnel and the proposed fixed link joining Denmark directly to northern Germany (the Fehmarnbelt fixed link) where there is an over-riding politically driven imperative to increase the trans-border union. Thus the proposed costs that are in the region of £4bn (the bridge solution would have been some 8% cheaper) can be spread between nations and with EU central funds. Thus the estimated repayment period of 39 years is considered acceptable given the perception of the strengthened political union. The UK capital project; The Humber Bridge.(further details below) How we do things here! Taking the examples above into consideration, it can clearly be seen that neither the French nor the wider European models work in the UK environment. If one looks back into recent history at the construction of major transport projects, the over-riding picture is one of dispute, conflict and delay; Take for example;- Newbury By Pass M3 cutting through Twyford Down. Hindhead Tunnel Despite these being seen as hugely desirable for the community as a whole, all were characterised by legal challenge and/or an illegal guerrilla campaign against the project. The cost of these legal challenges and the policing alone accounted for both projects over running in terms of both time and budget. ** Mention should also be made of the proposed tunnel on the A303 at Stonehenge. Despite this being considered a high priority traffic improvement project (given the popular description of the road as the ‘Devil’s Highway) and a low cost solution being discussed – a ‘cut and cover’ tunnel, the 2007 costs of £470m for the 2.9km section was considered too expensive and was therefore shelved. The Solent Crossing: In the absence of a detailed geological survey of the Solent area (which impacts on both bridge and tunnel) it is not possible to say if the physical conditions either suit or work against either solution. But the potential crossing area contains a number of specific challenges; Southampton is one of the UK’s busiest container ports, indeed, ABP are right now busily deep dredging the Solent sea bed to facilitate the next generation of container ships. It is inconceivable that any project that impacted on this traffic would be allowed to proceed. However, not only do these mega-vessels require deeper water, they have a far greater height above sea level. The current vessels using Southampton have an ‘air height’ of 73 m, to this figure another 15 m would need to be added for radio ariel’s, rise of tide and future growth in ship size. Thus any bridge solution would need to be far higher than most other bridge heights, yet the low level of the shoreline ( at the mainland end) would require a longer approach ramp in order to keep the gradient on the up and down sections within acceptable limits. The Solent is also one of Europe’s leading sailing areas, with significant reliance on both the mainland shore areas and on the Island on the leisure marine industry. Again, it is inconceivable that any solution that impacted on this, either during construction or as part of the end solution would be considered as acceptable to a far wider community than just the Island. Case Study: The Humber Bridge. Just as with the Solent, there had long been talk of placing a fixed link across the Humber, with the solution being something of a political ‘football’. So sensitive was the ‘cost v benefit’ equation that a swing in political voting intentions of just 1% was sufficient to all but stop the project in its tracks, as the resulting changes in who held political control determined the success – or further delay to the project. For any project of this nature, the starting point is a Bill being passed at Westminster that gives the central government sanction for the construction. This is the stage that HS2 is at now; a fixed link to the Island would need time in the parliamentary schedule for debate, first and second readings and then the final imprimatur of Royal Assent. For the Humber Bridge, the Humber Bridge Act was passed by the Macmillan Government in 1959. The bridge, which spanned just over 2km and had a height of 30m (just one third of that required for a Solent crossing) was initially costed in at £23m. Detailed design started in 1971 (and by the way, there was little in the way of dissent for the link, so planning delays were fairly minimal) with main construction starting in 1972/3. The bridge finally opened in 1981. However, by now the costs had spiralled; even allowing for the periods of high inflation at that time, the overall cost of the bridge was now £145m ( the original cost of £23m, taking inflation into account, can to £98m – the rest was cost overrun). When interest is added to this figure, estimates of the total cost range from £350m to £500m (albeit at 1980s values). The rationale for the bridge has be predicated on toll traffic paying for the bridge, but a major over-estimate of the projected traffic flows and the increase on interest payments mean that there is a strong likelihood that the bridge will never clear the debt on the toll revenue alone. The conclusion to all this, as set out in the excellent précis in the book Understanding System Failures (Bignell and Fortune) is: “Hard facts have to be faced…… the Humber Bridge would seem to be an engineering triumph and a memorial to a dream that died. Unfortunately, it is a very costly memorial. The price may end up being too high for the people of Hull to bear”. Fixing the Ferries: Given the stark warnings above, not to mention the major hurdles other priority schemes such as Stonehenge and HS2 have yet to successfully surmount, fixing the ferries could be a cost effective and achievable option. The Ferry Companies can stay exactly as they are, indeed, their position could easily be enhanced. A current ‘block’ of 10 one way tickets for car and passenger, with Wightlink, works out at about £24 per crossing. A subsidy that brought this figure down to £15, with this available from both operators, 24 x 365 would guarantee revenue streams for the two companies, yet give Islanders the fixed and acceptable cost travel that we need. That I guess in the end is a somewhat personal perspective – but if someone offered me, now, the cost of £5 per foot passenger each way, £15 with car, I think I’d tell them to forget the fixed link. And by the way, this would cost less per annum than the CalMac subsidy (whoops – a different government…or no? The money for this comes from US! amazon.co.uk/economics-estuarial-crossings-particular-University/dp/B0007B714A/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&qid=1417172221&sr=8-5&keywords=humber+bridge+tolls
Posted on: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 11:04:22 +0000
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