Paul: Please file a legal notice to the Clerk of Newtown of my intent to file a lawsuit today or before the statute of limitations set in. This is a Conspiracy. Newtown Police Department Newtown School Board Ct Emergency Services and the CT State Police. I have 20 Ct State Police sworn affidavits that have been falsified which are now felonies I have no less then 10 Newtown sworn police officers sworn affidavits that have been falsified which are now felonies I have the Head Custodian sworn affidavit which is falsified which is a felony. I have video evidence which is beyond a reasonable doubt that will validate the first two claims. I have the Newtown Police official sworn police dispatcher transmission transcript which is falsified which is a felony by the police dispatchers. Please go to sandyhookjustice which will allow you to read the Newtown Police official transcript which any reasonable police agency will validate as impossible actions for Dec 14, 2012. Pictures that are time stamped showing that this is a conspiracy. I think you know by now what really happened through your contacts. They have done everything they can not to provide me with my CT FOIA requests. How can I file a lawsuit when they have failed in providing me with the information needed through the CT FOIA requests showing their Conspiracy This is urgent since all of them have failed in responding to my Ct FOIA requests since March of 2013. Simple questions that should not be exempt from Public Records and they ignore the laws of Ct. Inflicting Emotional Distress on me and my family causing my business to suffer and not is no longer operating. There failure in responding has now mase me a pariha with all other National School safety Consultants. I am now labled as a FRAUD, LIAR, SCAMMER, MOSSAD AGENT, ZIONIST and on and on with videos made off me with a Hitlers musatche crushing my family and all the good work I have done in my lifetime. They have through their actions created Panic and Fear in every school district, private and parochial in the country. Sec. 52-595. Fraudulent concealment of cause of action. If any person, liable to an action by another, fraudulently conceals from him the existence of the cause of such action, such cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against such person so liable therefor at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon first discovers its existence. (1949 Rev., S. 8335.) This was previously the rule in equity proceedings. 19 C. 438. Fraudulent concealment affects surety on bond. 66 C. 64. Statute does not apply to action by receivers against directors of bank for negligence. 89 C. 451. Suspends running of statutes until right is discovered. 93 C. 558. Must be pleaded specially. 143 C. 31. Cited. 188 C. 301. Cited. 189 C. 162. Cited. 191 C. 150. Cited. 198 C. 660. Cited. 207 C. 204. Cited. 214 C. 242. Cited. 232 C. 527. To prove fraudulent concealment plaintiff must show that defendant had actual awareness, rather than imputed knowledge, of the facts necessary to establish plaintiffs cause of action, intentionally concealed these facts from plaintiffs, and concealed the facts for purpose of obtaining delay on plaintiffs part in filing a complaint on their cause of action. 281 C. 84. Cited. 7 CA 245. Cited. 15 CA 496; Id., 677. Cited. 16 CA 108. Cited. 19 CA 16. Cited. 31 CA 235. Plaintiffs burden of proof under section discussed. 53 CA 102. Cited. 17 CS 198. Cited. 42 CS 187. Sources and Authority Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration. By participation in a civil conspiracy, a coconspirator effectively adopts, as his or her own the torts of other coconspirators within the ambit of the conspiracy. In this way, a coconspirator incurs tort liability co-equal with the immediate tortfeasors. (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 510-511 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 869 P.2d 454], internal citations omitted.) While criminal conspiracies involve distinct substantive wrongs, civil conspiracies do not involve separate torts. The doctrine provides a remedial measure for affixing liability to all persons who have agreed to a common design to commit a wrong. (Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 312, 333 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 339], internal citation omitted.) As long as two or more persons agree to perform a wrongful act, the law places civil liability for the resulting damages on all of them, regardless of whether they actually commit the tort themselves. The effect of charging . . . conspiratorial conduct is to implicate all . . . who agree to the plan to commit the wrong as well as those who actually carry it out. (Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 784 [157 Cal.Rptr. 392, 598 P.2d 45], internal citations omitted.) The elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy; (2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto; and (3) the damage resulting. (Mosier v. Southern California Physicians Insurance Exchange (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1048 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 550], internal citations omitted.) [T]he major significance of the conspiracy lies in the fact that it renders each participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrong, irrespective of whether or not he was a direct actor and regardless of the degree of his activity. (Applied Equipment Corp., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 511, internal citations omitted.) A complaint for civil conspiracy states a cause of action only when it alleges the commission of a civil wrong that causes damage. Though conspiracy may render additional parties liable for the wrong, the conspiracy itself is not actionable without a wrong. (Okun v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 454 [175 Cal.Rptr. 157, 629 P.2d 1369].) Because civil conspiracy is so easy to allege, plaintiffs have a weighty burden to prove it. They must show that each member of the conspiracy acted in concert and came to a mutual understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, and that one or more of hem committed an overt act to further it. It is not enough that the conspiring officers knew of an intended wrongful act; they had to agree—expressly or tacitly—to achieve it. Unless there is such a meeting of the minds, the independent acts of two or more wrongdoers do not amount to a conspiracy. (Choate, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 333, internal citations omitted.) A cause of action for civil conspiracy may not arise . . . if the alleged conspirator, though a participant in the agreement underlying the injury, was not personally bound by the duty violated by the wrongdoing . . . . (Doctors Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 39, 44 [260 Cal.Rptr. 183, 775 P.2d 508], internal citation omitted.) Conspiracy is not an independent tort; it cannot create a duty or abrogate an immunity. It allows tort recovery only against a party who already owes the duty and is not immune from liability based on applicable substantive tort law principles. (Applied Equipment Corp., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 514, internal citations omitted.) A conspiracy cannot be alleged as a tort separate from the underlying wrong it is organized to achieve. As long as the underlying wrongs are subject to privilege, defendants cannot be held liable for a conspiracy to commit those wrongs. Acting in concert with others does not destroy the immunity of defendants. (McMartin v. Childrens Institute International (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1393, 1406 [261 Cal.Rptr. 437], internal citations omitted.) We agree . . . that the general rule is that a party who is not personally bound by the duty violated may not be held liable for civil conspiracy even though it may have participated in the agreement underlying the injury. However, an exception to this rule exists when the participant acts in furtherance of its own financial gain. (Mosier, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048, internal citations omitted.) Conspiracy liability may properly be imposed on nonfiduciary agents or attorneys for conduct which they carry out not simply as agents or employees of fiduciary defendants, but in furtherance of their own financial gain. (Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 692, 709 [282 Cal.Rptr. 627], internal citations omitted.) The basis of a civil conspiracy is the formation of a group of two or more persons who have agreed to a common plan or design to commit a tortious act. The conspiring defendants must also have actual knowledge that a tort is planned and concur in the tortious scheme with knowledge of its unlawful purpose. (Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1582 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 752], internal citations omitted.) Liability as a co-conspirator depends upon projected joint action. The mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough . . . . But once the plan for joint action is shown, a defendant may be held liable who in fact committed no overt act and gained no benefit therefrom. (Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Assn. (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 168, 176 [79 Cal.Rptr. 543], internal citations omitted, disapproved on another ground in Applied Equipment Corp., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 521, fn. 10.) Furthermore, the requisite concurrence and knowledge may be inferred from the nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interests of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances. Tacit consent as well as express approval will suffice to hold a person liable as a coconspirator. (Wyatt, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 785, internal citations omitted.) It is a legal commonplace that the existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from circumstances, and that the conspiracy need not be the result of an express agreement but may rest upon tacit assent and acquiescence. (Holder v. Home Savings & Loan Assn. of Los Angeles (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 91, 108 [72 Cal.Rptr. 704], internal citations omitted.) Of course, the agreement between conspirators need not be proved by direct evidence, but may be shown by circumstantial evidence that tends to show a common intent. In fact, in the absence of a confession by one of the conspirators, it is usually very difficult to secure direct evidence of a conspiracy, so that in the usual case the ultimate fact of a conspiracy must be determined from those inferences naturally and properly to be drawn from those matters directly proved. (Peterson v. Cruickshank (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 148, 163 [300 P.2d 915], internal citations omitted.) [A]ctual knowledge of the planned tort, without more, is insufficient to serve as the basis for a conspiracy claim. Knowledge of the planned tort must be combined with intent to aid in its commission. The sine qua non of a conspiratorial agreement is the knowledge on the part of the alleged conspirators of its unlawful objective and their intent to aid in achieving that objective. This rule derives from the principle that a person is generally under no duty to take affirmative action to aid or rotect others. (Kidron, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1583, internal citations omitted.) While knowledge and intent may be inferred from the nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interest of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances, [c]onspiracies cannot be established by suspicions. There must be some evidence. Mere association does not make a conspiracy. There must be evidence of some participation or interest in the commission of the offense. An inference must flow logically from other facts established in the action. (Kidron, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1583, internal citations omitted.) Secondary Sources 1 Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 9, Civil Conspiracy, Concerted Action, and Related Theories of Joint Liability, § 9.03 (Matthew Bender) 13 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 126, Conspiracy (Matthew Bender) 4 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 46, Conspiracy (Matthew Bender) (New September 2003)
Posted on: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 01:57:25 +0000
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