Siachen Conflict 27. Background. (a) The Dispute. (i) Siachen is a 76 km-long Glacier, with a width of two to eight km. It is flanked by the Karakoram Range, in the east and the Saitoro range in the west. It is described as the highest battle field of the world-(5000 metres above sea level). (ii) The importance of Siachen glacier lies in its proximity to strategic junction of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, China and the Northern areas now under the control of Pakistan. The Army feels that without control over Siachen, India could become vulnerable to Sino-Pakistani attack, (iii) The origin of the dispute lies in the Siachen Glacier area remaining undemarcated since the Karachi Agreement of 1949 which defined the Cease-Fire Line (CFL) in Jammu and Kashmir. The CFL ended at a point named Khor (map co-ordinate NJ 9842). This left about 65 kms of area to the north undemarcated. (iv) India interpreted the extension of the CFL through the glacier to the north along the Saitoro Ridge. Pakistan wants the CFL to run eastwards from NJ 9842 to Karakoram pass. (v) The dispute began with Pakistan unilaterally extending the LoC all the way up to the Karakoram Pass, taking 10,000 km of Indian-claimed territory, including the Siachen glacier. (vi) To reassert its claim, India launched Operation Meghdoot by stationing a regiment in Bilafond Pass in 1984. By mid 80s, the dispute escalated to a fierce war. India gained the dominant position by capturing the heights of Saitoro range. 31 (b) Indias Proposals. (i) Agreement on comprehensive cease-fire in Saltoro Range to freeze the ground positions. (ii) Discussions on modalities for implementation of cease-fire in an agreed time-frame. (iii) Bilateral monitoring mechanism for cease-fire including flag meetings and a hotline between divisional commanders. (iv) .Authentication of the existing ground position of troops in Saltoro beyond NJ 9842 (map reference point). (v) Discussions on other aspects. (c) Pakistans Position. (i) Implement 1989 agreement for disengagement and redeployment of troops. (ii) The Siachen problem is on account of non-resolution of Kashmir question resolutions. (iii) Areas occupied by India in 1984 were controlled by Pakistan as part of northern areas. (iv) Pakistan was clearing mountaineering expeditions to Siachen area. (v) Demarcate beyond NJ 9842 (map reference point) to Karakoram Pass in the East. (d) Talks on the Siachen Dispute. (i) Ninth Round of Talks. The ninth round of talks on the demilitarisation of Siachen was held in Islamabad on May 26-27, 2005. The Indian delegation was led by Defence Secretary Ajay Vikram Singh and the Pakistani side was led by Defence Secretary Tariq Waseem Ghazi. (ii) Indias Emphasises on Authentication of Current Troop Positions. India reiterated its commitment to redeployment of troops only if both sides agreed on the methods for authentication of current troop positions. India insists that it did not commit any aggression in 1984 as Siachen forms part of Jammu and Kashmir, the whole of which is an integral part of Indian territory. It maintains that by sending troops to Saltoro, it pre-empted Pakistans attempt to take over the heights. (iii) Pakistan Insists on Withdrawal of Troops to the Pre-1984 Position. Pakistan considers Indias positioning of troops on Saltoro in 1984 as a violation of the 1972 Shimla Pact. The Pakistani side insisted on the withdrawal of troops to the pre-1984 position as per the 1989 agreement without any preconditions. Pakistan claimed that India backed out of the pact in the last minute. (iv) Differences Persist on Interpretation of the 1989 Pact. Despite nine rounds of talks differences persist on the interpretation of the 1989 pact. India maintained that the understanding, not an agreement, clearly stipulated the authentication of troop positions, Pakistan said the agreement was unconditional. (e) Strategic Importance of Siachen. (i) Siachen is an area in which India has a strategic upper hand in comparison to Pakistan, according to Defence analysts. Since Indian troops dominate the upper reaches, they have been able to successfully repulse the Pakistani attacks. 32 (ii) In military terms, Siachen is a point where India can exert pressure on the Pakistan military in times of conflict, according to defence analysts. (iii) Siachen separates Pakistan from China, hence, without Siachen, India troops would be exposed to Chinese or Pakistani attacks from Aksai Chin or Karakoram Highway. The Indian troops could be outflanked in case there are conflicts in Kargil and Leh sectors, according to analysts. (f) Cost of Defending the Siachen Glacier. Defence analysts point out that India has lost 760 troops at Siachen since 1984. Maintaining troops at Siachen costs India close to Rs.4 crore a day, and estimates of the total money spent on defending the glacier exceed Rs.20,000 crore. (g) Reasons Behind the Indian Armys Insistence on Authentication of the Present Position. (i) Ensures Indias Interests are Safeguarded. The Indian Army Chief, Gen. J.J. Singh has stressed that prior authentication of the 150-km Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) on the glacial heights would safeguard Indias Position. Since Indian troops dominate the upper reaches, the present positions on the ground will ensure Indias interests are safeguarded when disengagement takes place. (ii) Provides Grid-by-Grid Answer to Pakistans Cartographic Aggression. Analysts point out that by insisting on the authentication of the present positions held by both sides, the Indian Army wants to provide a gird-by-grid answer to Pakistans cartographic aggression. (iii) Helps India Build an International Case for Support. The Army also feels that authentication will help India build an international case for support if ever Pakistan reneges on the terms of a withdrawal agreement. (h) Political Solution for Demilitarisation of Siachen. Analysts point out that instead of maps the authentication of troops positions could be done through any other high-tech means like satellite images, aerial surveillance, sensors or physical inspections. However, the only guarantee that the Siachen glacier will remain demilitarised once India and Pakistan withdraw troops is a political one. Analysts feel that the political leadership on both sides should discuss the terms of settlement directly. 28. Eleventh Round of Talks on Siachen (Islamabad, April 6-7, 2007). (a) Talks Deadlocked on the Question of Authentication of the Troop Positions. The eleventh round of Indo-Pak talks on Siachen was held in Islamabad in April 2007. However, the talks did not make any tangible progress, with both sides sticking to their positions on the question of authentication of troop positions on the glacier. (b) Authentication of the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) the Bone of Contention. Both sides have accepted the need to demilitarise the glacier since 1989. But the bone of contention has been the authentication of the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) beyond the NJ-9842 grid reference point, where the well-delineated LoC stopped in the 1972 Shimla Pact, right till the Karkoram Pass. (c) India Reiterates Its Position on the Authentication of the AGPL Before Any Demilitarisation. India reiterated its Position that the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) should be authenticated before any discussion on proposals for demilitarisation of the glacier. India insists that it has to be a sequential process. India insists on the authentication of the AGPL since it occupies over 50 dominating posts on the Saltoro Ridge and withdrawal of troops without authentication could lead to Pakistani troops moving into positions vacated by the Indian troops, making it difficult to dislodge them from there. (d) Pakistan Willing to Record the Present Troop Positions but Insists on Implementation of the 1989 Agreement. According to reports, Pakistan is willing to record the present troop positions but offered it as a larger package of disengagement, including the implementation of what it calls an agreement 33 between the two countries in 1989 for the withdrawal of troops from Siachen. Pakistan fears that authentication of the AGPL would strengthen Indias claims on Siachen and turn the AGPL into the Line of Control, according to analysts. (e) Both Sides Agreed to Continue Discussions. A joint statement issued at the end of the talks between the Defence Secretaries of the two countries said that discussions were held in a candid and constructive atmosphere. Both sides agreed to continue the discussions to resolve the issue in a peaceful manner, and reaffirmed their commitment to the November 2003 ceasefire. Sir Creek Dispute 29. Background. Sir Creek Waterway is a 96-km long strip of water in the marshes of the Rann of Kutch, separating Gujarat from the Pakistan province of Sindh, along which the boundary between India and Pakistan has not been demarcated. (a) The Dispute. (i) Demarcation of the boundary has been the bone of contention between the two countries for several decades. Eight round of talks have been held so far without the resolution of the differences. (ii) In 1914 an agreement was signed between the then Government of Sindh and Rao Maharaj of Kutch. According to the agreement, both sides agreed to a boundary line running through the middle of the Creek as a border between the two sides. (b) Indias Position. (i) India seeks to justify its position on Sir Creek on grounds of history by referring to the land extremities of the estuary as represented in a 1914 map. It also cites normal nautical principles to strengthen its case. (ii) According to India the green line on the 1914 map is an indicative line which in technical terms can be called a ribbon line. The boundary is defined by the mid-channel of the Creek as shown on a 1925 map. Boundary pillars have been erected in the middle of the Creek, indicating the frontier line. (iii) Differences Should be Resolved Bilaterally. In the sixth round of talks held in New Delhi on November 9, 1998, India rejected Pakistans bid to internationalise the Sir Creek issue, reiterating that all differences between India and Pakistan after the Simla Accord have to be resolved bilaterally. (c) Pakistans Position.. (i) Claims the Entire Sir Creek. According to Pakistan, the entire Sir Creek, with its eastern bank defined by a green line and represented on a 1914 map, belongs to it. (ii) Insists on Defining the Sir Creek Area in a Manner Which Will Give It Control Over a Larger EEZ Pakistan is insisting on defining the extremity of its land frontier in the Sir Creek area in a manner which will give it control over a larger Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). (iii) Wants to Internationalise the Issue. Pakistan insists that India should agree to its proposal to take the Sir Creek dispute to an international tribunal. (d) Significance of the Sir Creek Dispute Resolution. 34 (i) Resolution will Help to Submit Their Claims on the Limits of Their Respective Continental Shelves. As a result of the continuing Sir Creek boundary dispute, neither India nor Pakistan can submit their claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on the limits of their respective continental shelves. This had to be done by 2004. (ii) Without the maritime boundary between them, neither country can exploit the resources in its Exclusive Economic zones (up to 200 nautical miles) or its continental shelf (up to 350 nautical miles). (iii) The delineation of the maritime borders has acquired fresh urgency on account of the likely presence of oil and gas along the sea bed in this zone. A resolution of the sea boundary can therefore have major repercussions on plans by both countries to achieve energy security, according to analysts. (iv) A settlement of the dispute will also address Indias differences with Pakistan over fishing rights. (e) Joint Survey of the Sir Creek. In December 2005, India and Pakistan concluded their technical-level talks on the demarcation of Sir Creek. A Joint Statement issued after the talks said that in pursuance of the understanding reached during the Foreign Minister-level meeting in Islamabad on October 3-4, 2005, the Indian and Pakistani delegations met in New Delhi on December 20-21 to formulate the terms of reference for carrying out the Joint Survey of the Sir Creek. The two sides held constructive discussions and would report to their respective Governments on the discussions. 30. Current Talks on Sir Creek. (a) Experts Meet on Sir Creek (Islamabad, December 22-23,2006). (i) Officials of India and Pakistan met in Islamabad in December 2006 for discussions to resolve the Sir Creek issue. The Indian delegation was led by chief naval hydrographer B.R. Rao and the Pakistani delegation was led by Major-General Jamilur Rehman Afridi, Pakistans Surveyor-General. (ii) The discussions were held for determining the coordinates for the joint survey of Sir Creek and adjoining areas without prejudice to each others position. (b) Joint Survey of Sir Creek (January 15, 2007). India and Pakistan conducted a joint survey of Sir Creek, the 96 km-long strip of water. The two sides had conducted a sample joint survey of Sir Creek in January 2006. (c) Exchange of Sir Creek Maps. On May 17, 2007, India and Pakistan exchanged maps of Sir Creek marked with their respective claims during technical-level talks in Islamabad. The maps would form the basis of further discussions on the disputed maritime boundary in the Rann of Kutch.
Posted on: Sat, 31 May 2014 16:19:25 +0000
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