Somalia: Taking Positions in the Jubbaland Deadlock August 17, 2013 // admin1 // News By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein Having failed to displace the Jubbaland administration in Kismayo militarily through the militia of the Marehan alliance led by Barre Hirale in July, the Somali Federal Government (S.F.G.) attempted to broaden the conflict in Somalia’s deep south by securing support from external actors. That effort appeared to bear fruit on August 4, when the heads of state and government of the troop contributing countries (T.C.C.) of the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and Ethiopia and the S.F.G. released a communique in which the principals expressed support for the S.F.G. in “establishing its authority in the Jubba Region especially its control of the state owned infrastructure including the seaport and airport.” Giving some teeth to their backing of the S.F.G., the T.C.C. “agreed that AMISOM and the Chiefs of Defense Forces of Ethiopia and Somalia … urgently work out the modalities and operationalization of an AMISOM multinational force to be deployed in Kismayo.” Were the S.F.G. to be successful in taking over Kismayo’s seaport and airport from the Jubbaland administration, which now holds them, the S.F.G. would have won the prize of the deep south and would have effectively crippled the Jubbaland administration. Whether that will happen remains in doubt. What is clear is that the T.C.C. and Ethioopia are on record siding with the S.F.G. in its dispute with the Jubbaland administration over control of Kismayo; the S.F.G. has scored a diplomatic victory that has allowed it partially to recover from its military loss. The situation on the ground, however, remains what it was, with the Jubbaland administration in charge of Kismayo and determined to stay there. The deadlock in Jubbaland between the S.F.G. and the Jubbaland administration remains in place, with the possibility that the deadlock might be broken eventually in favor of the S.F.G. by external actors. The word “possibility” must be stressed; it is not clear whether or not the S.F.G. has gained any practical benefit from the T.C.C. decision. Kenya Put on the Back Foot Pushes Back The S.F.G. was enabled to gain an opening to secure external support by its accusation that the Kenyan contingent of AMISOM that has lead responsibility for Kismayo had aided the Jubbaland administration militarily in its ousting of Barre Hirale’s militia from the city. That allegation, backed up by testimony on the ground (disputed by Kenya), allowed the S.F.G. to argue that the Kenyan Defense Forces (K.D.F.) in AMISOM were not neutral peacekeepers, much less on the S.F.G.’s side as the internationally-recognized government of Somalia; but were allies of the Jubbaland administration. Kenya’s position in the conjuncture of actors in Kismayo was weakened as a result of the perception that its forces had been responsible for the Jubbaland administration’s victory. The S.F.G.’s resistance could gain favor among external actors that had their own interests for opposing Kenya. The T.C.C. communique reflected an alliance between the S.F.G. and Uganda, which is the major contributor to AMISOM and the lead state in the mission. The communique was the result of a struggle inside the T.C.C. between Uganda and Kenya. The S.F.G., which had requested the meeting of the T.C.C. that preceded the communique, came to the meeting with a maximum program that called for the removal of the K.D.F. contingent from Kismayo. Africa Review reported that, at the August 4 meeting, Kenya “strongly objected” to the S.F.G.’s demand, and that the S.F.G. withdrew it. The diplomatic trench warfare then proceeded, with Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, who hosted the meeting in Kampala, holding out for an agreement close to the S.F.G.’s demand, and Kenya’s president, Uhuru Kenyatta, pressing to maintain Kenya’s presence in Kismayo. The result was the call for a multinational force in Kismayo that would back the S.F.G.’s control of Kismayo’s seaport and airport. Kenya had won a wording that allowed the possibility that the K.D.F. would form part of the multinational force, but it had to concede Jubbaland’s control of infrastructure and its lead position in AMISOM in Kismayo. Strategically, if the T.C.C. position is implemented, Kenya would have to surrender its interest in having a buffer state (Jubbaland) on its border and a dominant sphere of influence in Somalia’s deep south. At best, Kenya had succeeded in doing some damage control, leaving the Jubbland administration in the lurch. Uganda’s interests in supporting the S.F.G. are not perfectly clear. It had an interest in having an undisputed lead role in AMISOM, maintaining influence with the S.F.G. in Mogadishu and gaining economic advantages from the S.F.G., and getting an edge in its competition with Kenya for influence in East Africa. An additional consideration was provided by an August 8 analytical article in Uganda’s Observer newspaper, which assessed expert judgments on Uganda’s position. The Observer’s angle was that the core of the communique was the “ceding” of the seaport and airport to the S.F.G., which could be construed as a cover for a Ugandan “drawdown” from AMISOM, or as a redirection of AMISOM’s forces towards a “surge” to take Somalia’s hinterland from the Salafist revolutionary Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.). The Observer cited evidence for both scenarios; the communique asks for an increase in AMISOM forces, but there is a likelihood that the European Union, which provides the biggest share of funding for AMISOM, intends to “slush” the mission. In the wake of the T.C.C. meeting, the S.F.G.’s president, Hassan Sh. Mohamud, expressed his satisfaction at the results on his return to Mogadishu on August 6, saying, according to Shabelle Media, that the S.F.G. would now “control government assets.” He assured all the “Jubbaland communities” that they would “benefit equally” from S.F.G. authority. Kenya, however, having been placed on its back foot, immediately began to push back. On August 5, Xinhua reported that Kenya’s foreign minister, Amina Jibril Mohamed, had said that the S.F.G. “must concentrate on winning the hearts of its people and gaining their confidence so that it does not face opposition,” a veiled reference to the Jubbaland administration and its supporters. That Kenya was unwilling to accept a strict interpretation of the Kampala communique became clear on August 7. Reuters quoted Kenya’s foreign affairs principal secretary, Karanja Kibicho: “The government of Kenya is ready to handover the two ports, but it must hand over to someone and that someone must be a negotiated process. Otherwise, if (Kenya) just left, we would be sliding back to where we came from.” Kenya’s Daily Nation newspaper reported that Kibicho said that the airport and seaport should be negotiated between the S.F.G. and the leaders of “federal member states” [including, presumably Jubbaland] in line with the “Somali constitution.” The deadlock was again firmly in place and the Jubbaland administration had gotten some breathing space. The Jubbaland administration joined the Kenyan push back on August 6, issuing a Statement on the TCC Summit in Kampala that scored the T.C.C. for “completely overlooking local reality” and the “regional administrative process” that had created Jubbaland. Countering S.F.G. claims to legal sovereignty over the seaport and airport, the statement noted that Jubbaland’s control of the infrastructure follows in the line of Somaliland’s control of the Hargeisa airport and Berbera seaport, Puntland’s control of the Bossasso seaport, and the Galmudug administration’s control of Hobyo. Arguing that AMISOM had no legal authority to manage “former state infrastructure,” the statement said that the issue “should be addressed at a national level through negotiations between regional states and the national government.” The statement concluded that the S.F.G.’s move to take the seaport and airport with external support threatened “to sabotage” ongoing (and so far stalled) negotiations between the S.F.G. and the Jubbaland administration. On August 11, Shabelle Media quoted Jubbaland’s president, Ahmed Madobe: “The federal government is consulting the international disputes with foreign countries, which clearly violates the federal constitution.” The deadlock was cemented, with each side in its respective new position. Short-Range Forecast Whether the T.C.C. decision to support the S.F.G. in “establishing its authority in the Jubba regions” presages an S.F.G. takeover of Kismayo’s airport and seaport, and, therefore, the crippling of the Jubbaland administration; or it is yet another complication in the persisting deadlock depends on whether AMISOM deploys a multinational force in Kismayo. At present, there are several steps still to be taken if the multinational force is to come into being. Firstly, AMISOM and the chiefs of Ethiopia’s and the S.F.G.’s defense forces have to work out the “modalities and operationalization” of the force. The plan must then be approved by the Western powers that bankroll AMISOM. Finally, the plan must be implemented in the face of Kenya’s and Jubbaland’s opposition. Each of those steps is fraught with difficulties. What the composition of the force would be is unspecified. On August 6, Uganda’s New Vision newspaper reported that it would be an Ethiopian Defense Forces, Somali National Army, and K.D.F. operation, which, if that were to be the case, would place the conflict directly at the heart of its proposed resolution. As for the Western “donor”- powers, a closed source reports that Great Britain, which has taken the lead role among the “donor”- powers, is pressing the S.F.G. to stop opposing the Jubbaland administration and to concentrate instead on speeding a permanent constitution for Somalia, revealing a divergence between the “donor”-powers and the T.C.C. (Uganda). That neither Kenya nor the Jubbaland administration seems ready to concede to Uganda and the S.F.G. makes it likely that the deadlock will persist. The S.F.G. scored a diplomatic victory, but the costs of turning it into a decisive change in the balance of power appear to be prohibitive. The S.F.G. would need greater support by more external actors to make the T.C.C. decision stick. It should always be remembered that the conflict in Kismayo is likely to decide what kind of political organization – centralized federalism (S.F.G.) or decentralized federalism (Jubbaland) – Somalia will have, if any. The parties to the conflict have lost sight of its importance and are engaged in “rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.” Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago [email protected]
Posted on: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 19:31:07 +0000
Trending Topics
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015