Strategy and anguish of the State of Emergency, 1976 (Pt. 2) published: Sunday | July 2, 2006 Edward Seaga THE MOST gruelling campaign ever undertaken by the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) came to an end in early June, 1976. The target of 1,000 meetings set for January-June had been fully met. The support received was growing by the month and candidates began to feel that the possibility of victory in the forthcoming general elections was becoming real. I called a conference of all candidates and their principal organisers for June 19, to assess phase one and to plan phase two of the campaign. The meeting in the grand ballroom of the Holiday Inn Hotel in Montego Bay was packed, the candidates were brimming with confidence. LETTER RECEIVED Not too long after the conference got under way, I received a message from the local police headquarters that Prime Minister Michael Manley was sending an urgent letter to me by special courier. I was asked to receive it just before noon. I went to my suite wondering what circumstances could warrant this interruption. I would soon find out. The letter advised that a State of Public Emergency was to be proclaimed by Governor-General, Sir Florizel Glasspole, at noon on that day, Saturday, June 19. I returned to the conference to read the letter and discuss the contents. But no useful purpose could be served in trying to return to the agenda. The meeting had lost its structure as everyone was exchanging views on what they thought was the strategy afoot. The overwhelming view was that this was a plot by Michael Manley to stifle the growing JLP threat. Imagination was running wild on what would happen and how to deal with it. The meeting was eventually concluded so everyone could return to his or her base. My view was restrained. In 1966, I had personally experienced the declaration of the first state of emergency, lasting one month, October 2-November 2, covering a part of West Kingston. Gun violence had begun to emerge for the first time as angry PNP supporters reacted to the bulldozing of their stronghold, Back OWall, in June, 1966, to make way for a new comprehensive development Tivoli Gardens. Neither Dudley Thompson nor I was forewarned of the declaration. Both headquarters were searched and both of us were prohibited from entering the area. The outcome was a significant calming. I had to bear the West Kingston episode in mind because if this emergency was to be carried out on the same even-handed basis as in West Kingston and for the same purpose, it would have to be given full support. Any condemnation would be contrary to what could be the popular public opinion and the JLP could be condemned. I wanted to find out more about the purpose of the emergency and to watch how it would unfold. I did not have long to wait to determine the intent of the declaration. Before the conference disbanded, a contingent of the security forces had taken up positions around the hotel. Two members of the JLP campaign team were held for detention by the security forces: Ray Miles and Pat Stephens, both known businessmen, neither of whom had any association with political violence. The Miles and Stephens detention had sent a strong signal that a political strategy was at the root of the declaration. I hastened home only to be confronted with news of the detention of two JLP candidates: Ferdie Yap Sam and Peter Whittingham, as well as the PNP caretaker for the South-West Clarendon constituency, Edwin Singh, who was seeking election as the PNP candidate, against the wishes of the PNP hierarchy. The detention of Singh got him out of the way. Soon after, Pearnel Charles was detained. Other JLP front-line supporters were quickly detained, including such unlikely persons as George Lazarus and Babsy Grange who were in charge of the sports and culture programmes, respectively, at Tivoli Gardens. The score sheet was beginning to bulge with JLP detainees. There was no question now that a devious political strategy was in place. Prime Minister Manley made a short broadcast to the nation on Saturday night, June 19, on the day that the declaration was proclaimed. The broadcast was short on specifics, particularly on the reasons for and the consequences of the declaration. On June 20, I issued a full statement on the intentions of government and dangers of a politically-biased state of emergency. My statement was strident, reflecting the range and depth of feelings of the JLP. In the interest of space, only the significant segments of that statement are summarised here: The Government yesterday declared a State of Public Emergency covering the entire island. It is the right of a government to declare a State of Emergency if it finds itself unable to cope with a threat to society like the present violence now reaching critical proportions in Jamaica. This is of grave concern to all Jamaicans. Any proper constitutional instrument used by the Government to effectively fight crime has always and will always have the full backing of the Jamaica Labour Party ... The Government has put before the people its reason for declaring a State of Emergency: the need to increase the powers of the security forces to fight crime effectively. The country must now be told by the Opposition what these additional powers are, what they mean in the daily life of the people, and what impact this step will have on the economic and political life of the country. It will be recalled that in 1974 the Government introduced a Suppression of Crime Act to enable the Security Forces to deal effectively with gun crimes. This Act gave the security forces the widest possible powers to detain persons on suspicion and to search anywhere without warrant. However, such persons retained their constitutional rights to trial and would have the right to defend themselves before a Court and to face their accusers. In declaring a State of Emergency, the Government has not given the Security Forces any wider powers to search without warrant or to detain without reason; these already exist in the Suppression of Crime Act. What the Government has done instead is to withdraw the right of the citizen to defend himself before a Court and his entitlement to face his accuser. Hence, any person in the country can now be detained without any reason whatsoever being given and without any right of trial whatsoever. When a citizen is required to give up this right he must expect to be convinced that the purpose warrants the suspension of the most fundamental right which he possesses, the right to self defence which is in fact his right to maintain his freedom. This is, in effect, the essence of the State of Emergency and it was on this premise that the whole purpose would rest. What occurred, based on the extension of powers, given to the security forces would determine the real purpose of the emergency declaration of June 19, 1976: The security forces used their powers recklessly and politically: - Numerous selective detentions were made, with emphasis on one political party, the JLP. The detentions, it was admitted by the police, was based on a list of names collected on police hearsay and loose circumstantial evidence. This list cited persons who were said to be threats to the peace and safety of the country without investigation or proof being offered by the police, nor sought by the Minister who was required to satisfy himself as to the validity of the charge. Indeed, the Minister of National Security even signed blank detention orders for the police to use as they wished. - Widespread searches of households were conducted, some at 2 a.m. and 4 a.m. in the mornings; the home of a JLP executive member, a well known businessman, who was present in Montego Bay on the night of the declaration, was searched at 2 a.m. while he was away, by 28 security officers who terrorised his wife and children who were huddled in their bedrooms in night clothes. - Whole families of persons who were important front-line workers for the JLP campaign and electoral machinery were terrorised by threats of search of their homes and by detention causing wholesale defection from the campaign teams to fight the election; - A propaganda war of pamphlets was unleashed by organisations affiliated or ideologically friendly to the PNP which accused selected JLP candidates who were considered important political targets, of all manner of libelous and scurrilous activities. Despite the addresses of the organisations being listed on these pamphlets of hate, the police refrained from any action to deter them although the messages of hate were precisely the substance to provoke action inimical to peace and stability. There is no further need to list other actions in this campaign of terror. Sufficient to say that it worked. The JLP never regained the strength it had built up in the first six months of 1976. The election was lost by a wide margin. But much more was lost. The fateful State of Emergency succeeded in changing the face of Jamaica. The impact on the economy and politics of the country was enormous. What was designed to have been the end of a problem, became the beginning. Edward Seaga is a former Prime Minister and Leader of the Jamaican Labour Party. He is now a Distinguished Fellow at the UWI. E-mail: [email protected]
Posted on: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 01:20:02 +0000
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