The complainant in this case was an officer in the Ghana Armed Forces. He was the Provost Marshall. His duties touched on security and discipline within the armed Forces. The appellant on the other hand was a corporal. He had had 19 years military service to his credit. On the night of 19th November, 1996, the appellant was alleged to have done something very strange. The appellant who was then living in barracks in the Burma Camp in Accra had earlier in the day left the barracks to town. He spent much time in town. At the time he was driving back to the barracks at about 11.30 p.m. the Provost Marshall was also driving into the Burma Camp. According to the prosecution the Provost Marshall stopped at the Burma Camp traffic light because the red light was on, meaning all vehicles must stop. But as he waited, a car from behind drove past him, ignoring the red signal. When the green light came on, the Provost Marshall decided to find out the person who drove through the red light. He therefore followed the other car and found it parked near a house. The owner came out and was about to enter his room when the Provost Marshall walked up to him and, recognizing the appellant, the Provost Marshall asked why he drove through the red traffic light. The appellant said the red light was not on. The denial surprised the complainant and he asked for the appellant’s identity card. According to the prosecution the appellant produced the card; but when he realized that the complainant intended to keep the card and also lodge a complaint against him he decided to collect back his card. During the struggle he was alleged to have hit the complainant in the face with a blow. The complainant fell down and the appellant sat over him and rained blows on him. Some people who were around the scene went to the rescue of the complainant. When freed, the complainant rushed to the military police and reported the incident. Men were sent to arrest the appellant but the appellant was combative and engaged them in a fight. It took a three-man reinforcement to overpower the appellant and confine him to cells. He was later charged with the typically military offences of (1) striking a superior officer, (2) use of violence against a superior officer and (3) conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. The appellant denied the offences. SISMEN NIXON TETTEH v. THE REPUBLIC (2002) SC
Posted on: Thu, 24 Oct 2013 11:33:55 +0000
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