WORK IN PROGRESS! I am editing a paper (written by Professor Kuna (Department of Sociology UDUS and myself, in 1998) meant for publication, it then dawned on me that a portion of that paper is like prognosis on some of the current happenings in Northern Nigeria, even though the discourse touches historical matters, that is the period between 1946 to 1966, as it affects the region then. In this post you may see some semblance of literary expositions that is so because the actual paper has to do with THE POLITICS OF ABUSE AND POETICS OF VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN NIGERIA, 1946-1966. We need critical comments and observations. Thank you. The analysis of dissimulation and poetics as active forms of domination and resistance in postcolonial Northern Nigeria must be situated within the historical context of the construction of the colonial and postcolonial states. These poetic forms of resistance take several dimensions. Resistance is expressed against a particularly harsh or ungenerous emir, warhead, or father through songs and poems. Indeed young girls sometimes express resistance to forced marriage through their songs and poems. The expression of such form of resistance is quite historically old. Without attempting to comment on its origin, one could say that this form of opposition to power has been in practice in the old Hausa States, and possibly in Bornu too. In some of these areas, such forms are expressed in poems during installation ceremonies. Indeed one of the mechanisms in the mobilisation of opinion against Habe rule by the Jihadists in 1804 was literary and poetic expositions. This forms of resistance continued during the years of the Caliphate and beyond. One could therefore see poetics as a historically determined medium for the expression of resistance in Northern Nigeria that has been used by dominated groups and classes. Consequently, we can analytically distinguish about three forms of such resistance, corresponding to three social groups in the society, although in reality such distinctions do not exist. There is first the poetics expression of the ulema against unjust leadership in the caliphate. Although such ulema were part of the state apparatus, it asserts its independence whenever state excesses begin. The second, also originating from the ulema are those poetic expressions generated by, or created in the course of the continuing struggle against colonial domination. The third are those poetic expressions emerging from the peasantry that reflect opposition not just to pre-colonial forms of domination, but also to those forms of domination that arose from colonial conquest. All three elements are to a certain degree in the poetic expositions we are dealing with, though these became much sharper due to imposition of territorial and social homogeneity over heterogeneous boundaries, and the corresponding unitarist state project and discourse this imposition implies. It should be stated from the onset that the British overthrow of Sokoto Caliphate in 1903 resulted not just in the imposition of the colonial state, but also in the imposition of certain territorial and social boundaries that have had profound implications for questions of domination and resistance. To begin with, the concept of “Northern Nigeria” as a territorial, and socio-political field of power as distinct from other areas that came to constitute Nigeria is a colonial contraption (Kuna: 1998). The effect of the construction of this field of power is the attempt at the imposition practically as well as discursively, of a notion of homogeneity in furtherance of colonial exploitation. Since the imposition of such homogeneity was a necessary precondition for the construction of the colonial state, the conquest of Sokoto caliphate draws our attention not just to the collapse of a pre-colonial structure, but also to the more important question of its reconstruction in terms of different operating logistics and field of power. Thus it was that while the caliphate’s frontiers were somewhat amorphous, a new geographical and social boundary carved domestically and internationally, was imposed. The consolidation of the colonial state thus involves the political reconstruction of pre-colonial geographical and social spaces. It was such a reconstruction that enabled the retention, in a modified form of the centralized bureaucratic organization of the caliphate, and its imposition on other areas in what is now Northern Nigeria that was never parts of the caliphate. There were two main sources of resistance to the consolidation of such a state. The state derives its control from the pre-colonial power structure; for the strength of Islam within the ulema, their students and the wider public makes it possible to criticize state actions as either just or unjust, or whether indeed state functionaries were acting on the basis of the shari’a. The expression of resistance was through poems, and other activities such as migration to the eastern part of the caliphate, but it very rarely took open revolts, though there was that too. The ground for opposing state actions and functionaries became ever sharper due to the tensions that emerged from caliphate’s loss of legitimacy in agreeing to serve directly under “white” or “infidel” rule. “White” rule was not just alien, it was also country to Islam, and must, at least for a significant part of the ulema and the general society, be resisted in whatever form it appeared. Pre-colonial resistance to the caliphal state, often organised along religious lines, also began to be defined by the British as “Militant Islam” that poses a serious threat to the whole colonial state structure. This engendered a categorization between “official” and “militant” Islam, and sources of opposition were dealt with in those terms. Such resistance was addressed through the deposition or killing of those emirs that either resisted, or did not support British policy openly, or those that were sympathetic to “militant” Islam. Equally noteworthy, is that the organization of such resistance, in the cases where it reached open revolts, was dealt with severely by a scorch earth policy (Birniwa: 1987; Bello: 1991; Abubakar: 1980). This was not the only form of resistance against the colonial state apparatus. Resistance from the late 1930s to the early 1940s became influenced a great deal by the beginning of agitation for independence. The ulema, the emergent educated class, and the peasantry opposed both colonial rule and the Emirs that now rule on behalf of colonialism. Again both state domination and resistance to it were defined in terms of the distinction between “official” and “militant” or “fundamentalist” Islam (Saeed: 1982). The whole colonial state structure became geared towards dealing with the “threat” of “militant” Islam, as represented by some sects such as the “Tijjaniyya”. Such established Islamic “fundamentalism” was well rooted in certain cities, and it became the center of opposition to the “new” political arrangement introduced by colonialism. As such, the central political ideas on which opposition was based or could be based, such as the notions of the fairness of rulers, of justice, of resistance against colonial rule as justified, as well as of the exclusiveness of the Muslim constituency and the role of the ulema as guardians of that constituency did not die with the Sokoto Caliphate. Such issues and roles re-emerged as powerful battlegrounds for struggles against the state in the subsequent political history of Northern Nigeria (Hiskett: 1984; Birniwa: 1987). The reconstitution of pre-colonial and in particular emirate authority indicates that the transfer of power raises the very serious question of legitimacy of pre-colonial institutions, and therefore on the texture of the relationship between rulers and the ruled (Kuna: 1997). The emirate system was now reconstituted as the native authority system, and though emirs directly ruled the people, none was deceived as to the presence of the British in the background. This in effect produced a situation similar to the one that existed on the eve of the jihad of 1804, namely, a rift within the state apparatus in which the political leadership’s syncretistic activities were opposed by the ulema. Here, the problem was compounded by the fact that the new political arrangement and the pre-colonial state apparatus were geared towards legitimizing alien, and above all, an un-Islamic system. Moreover, the organization of the new state structure through the construction of customary law, and of native authority administrations added a new source of tension. Native authorities were at various levels manned by, or through the pre-colonial state structures. Since this was a closed administrative system organised on the principle of the benevolent despot, emphasis on descent and social standing rather than education and merit became the basis of a serious conflict between the emergent educated elites and emirs. These tensions, situated as they were within the colonial unitarist conception of state, began to influence the organization of struggles along two main patterns and justificatory ideologies: the “conservative Islamic tendency”, reflecting those groups supportive of the existing NA establishment as represented by the emirs and chiefs who occupied its summit, and the “Islamic revolutionary tendency” that wanted a complete change or re-organization of the system. The former tendency reflects not just an attempt to maintain tradition, for note must be made that some sections of this social force vouched for gradual changes in the administrative system. It in addition, and this is where a critical difference with the later tendency lies, calls into being the pre-colonial state apparatus, in order to justify not just its rule, but also the unitarist state project. In this sense, it relied on the long tradition of jihad and conquest by the founders of the caliphate, and posed its current relevance in terms of finishing the task of expanding the frontiers of the Caliphate that was interrupted by the colonial conquest in 1903. The ultimate goal was to ensure a smooth transition from a colonial to a neocolonial status, against the backdrop of the achievements of a pre-colonial state structure, and the things it represents (Birniwa: 1987). The cultural/political associations that started emerging during the late 1930s to the early 1940s ultimately reflected this general divide, though some of these associations initially did not demonstrate such overt and sharp distinctions. The first of such cultural associations, the Northern General Improvement Union was founded in 1941, and it drew membership from both tendencies. Thus, people like Abubakar Imam, Wazirin Zazzau Sanusi, Mallam Julde, Malam Jumare, R.A.B. Dikko, John Garba, Sa’adu Zungur, the Emir of Zazzau, the Resident, the District Officer (D.O) and others based in Zaria were its originators (Kano: 1973). The diversity of opinions such an organization consisted of was bound to generate heated debates, and it did when people like Sa’adu Zungur had fundamental disagreement as to the nature and purpose of the organization. Such organization had membership drawn from the remnants of the pre-colonial state apparatus as well as from the colonial state, and were more often that not organised as for a protection of such interest (Kano: 1973). The more radical members of this organization like Sa’adu Zungur could not accept a situation where women were discriminated against or a situation where the unjust practices of the Emirs and Native Authorities could be condoned. This opposition was only justified and supported through extensive quotations from the Qur’an, but was also expressed through poems and songs. The NGIU was therefore disbanded, and its members transferred to other locations within and outside the province. Sa’adu was transferred to Anchau to fight infectious diseases. Although the NGIU was disbanded, this did not appear to have stopped the organization of interests along the two major tendencies we identified above, throughout Northern Nigeria- from Bauchi, Kano, Kaduna, Sokoto, Katsina, to Zaria and through the pages of newspapers such as the Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo and the West African Pilot, issues such as the role and operation of the native authorities, the position and role of emirs in tax assessment and collection, gender inequalities especially in education, the “backwardness” of the North, and the nature of the emergent postcolonial state were raised and debated. Three volatile issues dominated these debates: forced conscription of Northerners to fight at the war front, forced labor at the tin mines in Jos, and the diversion of food meant for the people to the war front. At different fora across the Northern provinces, such issues were raised and expressed through literary and poetic forms. It was clear that the colonial government and the native authorities, at the head of which were the emirs, were the subject of discussion. Such debates and discussions were mainly justified on religious grounds, though for the ‘conservative Islamic tendency’ reform was the watchword, while for the ‘radical Islamic tendency’ a fundamental change in the system was the main goal. Such debates also became increasingly organised in associations whose ideological positions vis- a vis colonial rule, native authorities and emirs became sharper and began to assume two distinct, if incoherent camps. Thus it was in that kind of scenario that the Bauchi Discussion Circle (later the Bauchi General Improvement Union), was formed in 1943. It was during these years also, that the Zaria Zumunta Association, Sokoto Youth Social Circle, and Citizens Associations of Kano were established. As the 1940s drew to a close, some of these organizations began to merge into political parties. Thus was formed the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) from a merger of various cultural associations, amongst which are: the Jam’iyyar Mutanen Arewa, Bauchi Community Centre, the Sokoto Youth Social Circle, and the Citizens Association of Kano. By 1951, the NPC had shredded its radical numbers, and had clearly become the establishment party whose general goal was the defense of the existing power structures. Due to its composition and membership in its formative years, the NPC could, and did make a claim to radicalism, for it openly criticized the traditional establishment and advanced some radical reformist ideas which seriously alarmed the colonial state and the emirs specifically. This tension led not just to steps for shedding such radicalism, but it also led to the emplacement of mechanisms for accommodating reforms aimed at improving rather than changing the colonial establishment. Both issues were talked through first, the attempt an unsuccessful one, to prevent NA and government officials from participating in politics (Sklar: 1965), and of “coercing old guard” emirs into accepting the inevitability of peaceful reforms, if violent ones are to be deflated (Yakubu, 1999). It was the attempt to shed the NPC of its radicalism and radical elements that culminated in the rift between the conservatives and radicals at the NPC’s Jos convention in 1950 in which several radical members were expelled (Dudley: 1968; Sklar: 1965). The “Islamic revolutionary tendency” is itself historically grounded, for it derives from the long tradition of protest activity and resistance by the ulema and the peasantry. In this sense, the critical issues it draws to demonstrate its relevance is fairness, legitimacy and piety. It thus also traces its origins back to the jihad and its leaders, for it claims that there was a fundamental distinction between the ideals and practices of the original Jihadists and their heirs: the former emphasized fairness, justice, piety, learning, contemplating and the principle of non- hereditary succession, while the later demonstrates unfairness, injustice, un-Islamic practices, the confiscation of peasant property, as well as hereditary succession. To this tendency, the object of resistance lies not just in sweeping away the injustices perpetrated by the whole state structure, but that resistance against colonialism and its divisiveness is also a religious duty. The Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) is in the main then an organization that championed the objectives of the ‘radical Islamic tendency’. Initially launched in 1946 under the name the Northern Elements Progressive Association (NEPA) resolved to foster “mutual understanding and cooperation” between the peoples of the north, as well as to clear away the belief that “the Northerner is silent because he is satisfied” (NEPA: 1947). NEPA’s objectives, right from the start, were radically political and were expressed in pungent criticism both of the colonial establishment and of the emirs who cooperated with them. The disbandment of NEPA in 1949 led to the formation of NEPU in 1950. Consequently NEPU’s objectives were radically different from NPC’s, and there was a strong association between the objectives of both associations. NEPU was in addition committed to the “total emancipation of the talakawa from the domination of a privileged few through the reform of the existing autocratic political institutions” (NEPU: 1950). It was against not only the native administrations. Its articulation of the anti-colonial struggle in anti-imperialist and Pan-Nigerian nationalist terms meant it was also against regionalism as well as the colonial state. By thus declaring itself against regionalism and autocratic power, NEPU was seen as posing a serious threat to the whole colonial project. This threat became even more serious in view of NEPU’s efforts to build alliances within and between regions. The distinctiveness of both parties was therefore historically embedded in the kind of issues both came to represent. Beyond the parties lies two social forces that were locked in conflict over the nature of domination, the exercise and limits to such domination, the relationship between rulers and the ruled, as well as the nature of the emergent postcolonial state. Such conflicts had been greatly influenced by religion, and their expression indeed took place mainly through religious language. The expression of such conflict and the opposition to them had been predominantly poetic and literary. This is not to say resistance to domination has not been organised, but that given the context in which these forces operated, poetic abuse and literary violence had come to assume a position of greater significance as vehicles of action.
Posted on: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 12:44:35 +0000
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