Ignorance, Rationality and the Cogito One of the major views against which Beckett is frequently cast is Cartesian rationalism. In Cartesian rationalism and similar approaches, certain knowledge is taken to be possible through deduction and reason, such as the famous Cogito ergo sum of Descartes theory. Acklerley argues that Beckett was immersed in the writings of Arnold Geulincx, a Cartesian theorist, from whom he derives the view that one has no value until dead (2004: 35). In the Cartesian tradition, while empirical reality may be doubtful because of perceptual errors, the existence of the subject and of reason is certain. Beckett is critical of this view as insufficiently aporetic. Takahashi suggests that Beckett is seeking the void that exists before, within, and beyond the rational mind (Takahashi, 2002: 40), a space inaccessible to Cartesians. Similarly, Trieloff (1984: 10) suggests that Beckett reveals an incapacity to determine the worlds ontological status. There is a suggestion in Beckett that one thinks with ones voice (Trieloff, 1984: 11), and the dependence of thought on physical sensory input or output undermines Cartesian binaries. According to some scholars, the main dispute between Beckett and Descartes is over the certain existence of the self. Beckett questions whether the self exists. If an authentic self exists, only its most superficial aspects can be perceived (Rabinovitz, 1989). Beckett reportedly told Lawrence Harvey that the authentic or deep self is distinct from the visible self, being both somehow stunted, undeveloped but also more real, more authentic. The visible or public self is closer to the second or third person than to the first, i.e. the true self (Harvey, 1965: 556). This suggests an existentialist view of an inner, creative self which is frustrated in language, although Becketts exact conception of the true self is unclear from this statement. One problem is that Cartesian man is too insubstantial to be certain. In Becketts works, Cartesian man without bodily prostheses such as a bicycle is simply an intelligence fastened to a dying animal (Kenner, 1973: 124). For Beckett, contra Descartes, even ones own existence is open to doubt (Fahrenbach and Fletcher, 1976). This is because of the awkward relationship of the subject to language. Descartes “I” thinks itself in a language which exists in excess over it, rather than as an outgrowth of its self-identity, and this excessive field potentially excludes the I both before and after (Migernier, 2006: 25). Becketts larger version of meaning includes non-sense at the very core of its formation and thus eludes the simple grasp of rational understanding (2006: 28). Another aspect of the critique is that a literary I is never really self-present, but rather, is a representational creation of the author. Beckett is also said to reject the subordination of thought to knowledge (Cousineau, 1979). Further, the cogito may be haunted by the unconscious. Katz (1999: 123) suggests that Beckett saw Descartes as a neurotic, and interpreted him using Freudian concepts. However, the rejection of rationalism is partial and incomplete. According to some authors, rationalism seems both necessary and impossible in Beckett. The poet seeks to escape himself, but this is futile; the rational self can only watch and become alienated from his other half, the poet (Fahrenbach and Fletcher, 1976). Taking a different position, Ackerley (2010: 148) suggests that Beckett breaks up the unified Cartesian self to reveal multiple particles inside it, without any final understanding of these particles. This is reminiscent of the Irish author Flann OBriens character De Selby, in the novel The Third Policeman. De Selby does not appear in the novel, but his unorthodox theories are frequently referenced, usually in voluminous and doubtfully relevant footnotes – a strategy of parody of academia and literary critique reminiscent of Beckett (Gonzalez, 1997: 292-4). M. Alo
Posted on: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 21:57:27 +0000