al Nasser greets a crowd in 1960 (Creative Commons) When Hoda al-Nasser, the daughter of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel al-Nasser, recently deemed the country’s current strongman, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the rightful heir to her father’s political legacy, it was worth taking her at her word. Just like Nasser, Sisi unapologetically seized power in a coup d’état. Also like Nasser, Sisi has followed a path in higher politics that began with a collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood -- he seems to have conspired with President Mohamed Morsi in the removal of Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi in the summer of 2012 -- before changing course and doing everything in his power to crush the Islamist organization. Sisi’s crackdown has already resulted in the deaths and incarceration of thousands of Brotherhood activists, including Morsi, his erstwhile patron. This historical parallel might seem to bode ill for the relationship between Egypt and the United States. After all, Nasser is remembered today for his unabashed, even chauvinistic patriotism, and most policymakers in Washington are taught that the close relationship that the United States currently enjoys with Egypt traces back to the Camp David accords signed by Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat. But Washington’s history with Nasser is more auspicious than is generally remembered. Indeed, with some minor adjustments, Washington’s establishment of relations with Nasser’s government can serve as the most promising template for a stable and productive relationship between the United States and Egypt today. Sisi is no less nationalistic than his predecessor. Nasser spoke of a “role” in the Arab world “in search of a hero” -- a role that Egypt was destined to fulfill -- and Sisi makes essentially the same point in less poetic language. He asserts that Egypt must regain its position as a leader of the Arabs, and by so doing restore Arab power more generally. Its true that Sisis rhetoric is more pious than Nassers avowedly secular pan-Arabism. But that is more a sign of the times than an indicator of a profound difference between the two. Indeed, the foundation for Sisis indictment against the Brotherhood is that it offers a transnational, rather than a distinctly Egyptian, version of Islamism. A proper Islamism would be based on Egyptian traditions and institutions (including the state-supported Al-Azhar University), and thus be supportive of the countrys interests -- and by extension Arab interests as a whole. Anything less would be traitorous, in Sisis view. At the core of both mens vision lies the projection of strong personal, national, and Arab power. But Sisi would do well to notice that Nasser, in his early years, at least, was intent on reconciling appeals to Egyptian nationalism with backing from the United States. Nasser knew that he needed American support as a counterbalance to the possibility of British intervention, following the coup, in support of their ally, the deposed King Farouk. He was equally aware that American support would be useful in projecting Egyptian power, both militarily and diplomatically, in the years ahead. Of course, Nasser was careful not to appear to be Washingtons puppet. He preferred to give the impression that he was using the Americans without giving anything in return. In one widely circulated (though possibly apocryphal) tale about his dealings with the CIA, Nasser was said to have built the Cairo Tower, which transmitted the Voice of the Arabs radio station, with cash bribes from an American agent that were intended to buy his loyalty. The tall, lean tower was said to represent the young leader “saluting” the United States with his middle finger. Equally instructive is the fact that the United States tolerated this arrangement. Then, as now, Washingtons primary goal in the region was to find a strong leader in Cairo willing to work with the United States. By 1949, U.S. intelligence had deemed that Nasser was such a figure, so Washington threw its weight behind him. It stood in the way of British attempts to roll the 1952 coup back and then, more germane to the contemporary situation, it supported Nasser against democratic opposition forces whose power rose in 1953 and early 1954 in reaction to Nasser’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies. In October 1954, Nasser moved to brutally subdue the final remaining element of the opposition, which was the Brotherhood. Washington had originally supported the Brothers in preference to the liberal, secular opposition, which it deemed too weak to govern, but it stood by as thousands of them were killed, imprisoned, or chased into exile.
Posted on: Fri, 08 Nov 2013 10:37:58 +0000
Trending Topics
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015