It takes two to make a provocation, writes Roger Scruton, and while it is right to be provoked by some things, it is wrong to be provoked by others. If I am so constituted that any criticism in my presence of the philosophy of Hegel causes me to boil over with anger and assault the speaker, does this make criticism of Hegel into a threat to the civil peace? Surely not: it is I who am a threat to the civil peace, and a true defender of free speech would have me locked up, rather than the anti-Hegelians who so enrage me. It seems to me that in this quotation (taken from a different but relevantly similar context) Roger Scruton puts his finger on whats wrong with the Popes argument about the normality of receiving a punch in response to a family insult. Insults against religion are unacceptable, the Pope argued, because they are taken personally and provoke violence. But do we really want to leave it up to the supposedly offended party to decide what counts as an offence? Do we agree that the degree of anger and violence shown by the offended should be the proper measure of the seriousness of the offence and the indicator of what should or should not be allowed? Supposing someone calls me a bourgeois (or a pleb or a Lazio supporter) or accuses my mother of having been a Hegelian (or a smoker or a Catholic), and receives a punch which I claim was a normal response. The seriousness of the insult and the appropriateness of my response might be questioned. It might be suggested that no verbal (or pictorial or gestural) insult justifies a physical attack. On the other hand, some might say that a physical attack would be normal in response to some kinds of insult, perhaps on the basis that there is a degree of social consensus on these matters. It might be possible to agree with the Pope that a punch would be in order in response to an insult directed quite literally at a member of his family, but we may still reject the suggestion that physical attacks are by extension justified in response to insults to religious authority figures or beliefs. If people find the Popes argument against religious insults persuasive, that may be because of the simplicity of considering those who give offence to be the perpetrators and those who claim to feel offended the victims. Scrutons argument about the possibility of taking offence at criticism of Hegels philosophy suggests that not everyone who gets offended deserves much sympathy. I may present myself as a victim but not be taken seriously. We find the idea of hurt Hegelian feelings stranger than that of hurt religious feelings, no doubt because a philosophy is supposed to be a set of rationally held beliefs whereas its normal for a religion to have more of an emotional hold. Precisely for that reason, if we are to be able to challenge religious beliefs, suitable forms of communication need to be those that make an emotional impact instead of only questioning doctrine through abstract reasoning. If I am inclined to feel no greater sympathy for offended Muslims than for offended Hegelians, I suppose I may be accused of social insensitivity. The point of Scrutons argument was that it may be possible to dismiss the complaints of the aggrieved as unreasonable. An obvious temptation is to say that there is no objective or impartial standpoint from which to judge what counts as a reasonable feeling of hurt and what doesnt. Who are we, we may be asked, to assume we have the right to invalidate what other people are feeling or to judge whether or not theyre justified in feeling the way they do? Not wanting to seem arrogant and judgemental, we may feel under pressure to grant that everyone who feels like a victim is a victim, or that those who belong to a community that has somehow acquired a consolidated claim to victimhood have grievances that need to be taken seriously. By accepting anger and violence as the measure of victimhood, we excuse our own cowardice as cultural sensitivity. If we want to live in a society in which violence is rewarded as little as possible and freedom of thought flourishes, different belief systems must be allowed to compete for our acceptance and no authority figures should command unconditional respect. To the extent that beliefs are founded not only on reason but also on emotion, our freedom depends on defending our right not only to question but also to scoff.
Posted on: Sun, 18 Jan 2015 22:54:49 +0000
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