Of corruption in government, viz-a-viz, Ph military... by Gen. Jose T. Almonte The Military in a Mismanaged Society Speech of General Jose T. Almonte The AFP: In Urgent Need of Reform Foundation for Economic Freedom 11 March 2005 Retired General Jose Almonte Retired General Jose Almonte I. A SURVEY OF CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND IN REPRESENTATIVE MILITARIES Corruption a tragedy of the commons CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT is the saddest example of the well-known “tragedy of the commons”—the despoiling of a collectively-owned natural resource or institution that provides public goods. Like the proverbial village pasture, the state is owned by everyone—and, hence, by no one. So that, just as the local shepherds will tend to over-graze the public pasture, so will officials tend to dip into the public treasury—confident that no one really cares deeply enough about public funds which are wasted or stolen. Just as ironically, because everyone would benefit if government were better run, nothing much is done about poorly-run governments—most people choosing (reasonably) to “free-ride” on the civic efforts of the more militant citizens, who must bear the private costs of political and bureaucratic reform. But most societies try to insulate their military guardians from corruption Corruption is therefore common to both mature and developing states. But, because a corrupt military would present a mortal danger to the State (and to themselves even more), political authorities throughout history have strived to insulate the military institution from temptation by “professionalizing” the officer corps. Democracies in particular try to instill in their military officers the sense that they have a “higher calling” in the service of society. The professional training that officers receive conditions them—as experts in the management of violence—to regard themselves (the “officer corps”) as being a caste set apart from ordinary people. This corporate feeling is induced by the lengthy and intense specialist training that officers must undergo, and the rigor of the discipline to which they must submit themselves throughout their careers. When this kind of socialization is successful, the military (as the historian Alfred W. McCoy has observed) is “subordinated to politicians, yet apolitical; armed yet nonviolent; all-powerful yet powerless.” Militaries in the new countries are privileged In the new countries, however, most militaries become unavoidably politicized. In Indonesia, Vietnam, China, and Korea, national armies started out as nationalist militas fighting wars of independence and popular liberation. In Burma and in Thailand, generals have ruled their countries for the better part of the last 70 years. In the Philippines, as we know, both the Aquino and the Arroyo administrations rose to power on the back of military and national police support. In all these places, the officer corps are privileged even when they do not monopolize state power. In Indonesia, in Thailand, and in China (until fairly recently), the armed forces are authorized to run businesses, as part of the practice of “off-budget financing.” The proceeds from these businesses go (theoretically) to military expenditures the government cannot provide. In practice, a great deal ends up in private pockets. (The Indonesian Government contributes only between 25-30% of the TNI’s total budget.) II. THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION IN THE AFP DEMORALIZATION IN THE AFP seems part and parcel of our cultural pessimism. In this setting, moral failure becomes common-place—because of the weakening—if not death—of the civic culture. Then also, the problem of corruption in our armed forces is yet another replay of the tragedy of the commons. Poorly-paid military officers have virtually absolute authority over a great deal of public money. The national defense budget—of some P50 billion—is the second biggest Cabinet-department allocation. The AFP comptroller who, in practice, disposes of this money—typically he is a major general—draws a salary of P37,000 a month. Customarily this deputy chief of staff for comptrollership (J6) also enjoys much leeway in internal auditing. “Conversion” turns allocated funds into cash Meanwhile the practice of “conversion” allows the transformation of allocated AFP funds into cash for ad hoc expenditures. According to the Feliciano Commission, conversion is often done in “collusion with suppliers and some of the officers involved in the procurement process in an AFP unit. And “it appears . . . that the practice ... is extensive and deep-seated in the AFP. “Funds allocated for a particular use or acquisition of particular equipment . . . wind up being used for other purposes—or wind up in the personal bank account of the commander of an AFP unit resorting to conversion.” These powers of conversion are customarily justified by the urgent—and often unexpected—needs of the military service. But it also seems the proceeds from conversion are all too often also informally and illegally shared by ranking officers in some kind of hierarchical arrangement—as “unrecorded allowances” to top off their salaries. A “comptroller family” of some 50 officers—made up of experts in conversion—prepares, and then handles, programs, and also internally audits the military budget. The system of conversion gives this comptroller family a great deal of slack in allocating funds. In keeping with the fraternal spirit instilled in the officer corps, these comptrollers apparently look after high-ranking officers. For instance, retiring Chiefs of Staff apparently receive parting presents of quite large sums. So do officers going abroad for training, and field units celebrating milestones in their corporate lives. In the course of these philanthropic activities, the comptroller family apparently never forget the axiom about charity beginning at home. Major General Carlos Garcia—who was deputy chief of staff for comptrollership—is accused of diverting at least P71 million in AFP funds into his private account. And his predecessor— Newsbreak Magazine discovered—seems to have feathered his own retirement nest with at least P60 million worth of property here and abroad. Corruption victimizes field officers and their men The comptroller family may ensure that everybody who counts in the military hierarchy is reasonably happy. But conversion inflicts heavy collateral damage on the field officers and foot-soldiers who are the AFP’s point men in its mission to damp down the country’s separatist and communist rebellions. For decades, the bulk of all the funds for maintenance and other operating expenses (MOOE)—the traditional raw material for conversion—has apparently been retained at headquarters, and only a fraction distributed among the field commands. This practice has starved fighting units of logistical support. Field officers speak of substandard helmets and armored vests; of plastic ammunition clips that jam; and of the lack of field medical facilities and transport to evacuate their wounded. They also speak of corruption in logistics units which in effect arms the Abu Sayyaf bandits and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) separatists from the AFP’s own armories. The unequal ratio in MOOE fund allocations between headquarters and field units is being gradually reversed. Army headquarters, for instance, keeps back only 20% of its MOOE; the rest goes straight to the field. The military culture inhibits the investigation of corrupt activities Ironically, the fraternal loyalties fostered by the socialization of the officer corps has inhibited the investigation of corrupt activities in the AFP. Military leaders seem to have closed ranks after they learned of the dollar shipments General Garcia’s family had been making to the United States. Apart from shunting Garcia to a less visible staff position, the then-Chief of Staff did little more. What was worse, the General Staff apparently refused to hand over General Garcia’s records, until the Ombudsman—who had by then started his own inquiries—issued the AFP a subpoena. Newsbreak says that no senior officer has been punished— either for corruption or for battlefield incompetence—“in recent history.” III. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO REFORM THE MILITARY? WHAT CAN BE DONE TO REFORM THE ARMED FORCES? Some suggest a reform of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) curriculum, or the abolition of the PMA altogether. This is a dubious idea. A school cannot be held responsible for the moral failures of some of its graduates decades after their graduation. I think it more reasonable to say that the frictions of real life desensitizes even PMA graduates ethically—particularly as they grow older. How long do you imagine youthful ideals of “courage, integrity, and loyalty” will last when confronted with the harsh realities of the dog-eat-dog world into which cadets are plunged after leaving the Military Academy? A fixed and secure tenure for the Chief of Staff In my view, the first—and the easiest—reform should be to establish a fixed and secure tenure for the Chief of Staff. Already bills have been filed in Congress proposing that the Chief of Staff be given a three-year term—which may extend beyond the fixed retirement date for military and national police officers (their 56th birthday). Some legalists think such a law unnecessary. They say the President can carry out this reform through a simple Executive Order. If this is so, then President Macapagal-Arroyo should do it—now. After all, it is her revolving-door appointments to the office—in her efforts to pay off EDSA 2 debts to key officers—that have, in effect, allowed the comptroller family free range of AFP finances in recent years. Between May 2002 and November 2004—a period of 30 months—General Garcia was J6 for five different Chiefs of Staff. Because most of these officers served only for months before their retirement, none of them bothered to reform the General Staff. Even the new Chief of Staff, General Efren Abu, will serve for only eight months. Fortunately, he seems made of sterner metal. On his first day, he abolished the 50-odd comptrollership staff positions in the whole of the AFP—retaining a senior comptroller as a desk officer directly under his office. This change means the Chief of Staff will now be assuming personal responsibility for the AFP’s finances. A new office in the civilian Department of Defense, headed by an Undersecretary for Internal Control, is envisaged to eventually become responsible for all AFP auditing. The internal auditing units attached to the comptrollers’ offices will eventually be replaced by an all-civilian set of auditors. ‘Civilianizing’ the AFP comptrollership seems a good idea. But the scourge of corruption respects neither civilian nor military. It exempts no one—regardless of social status, gender, color, creed, ideology, or religion. No one anywhere can cast the first stone. People engage in corruption because they could. Carrying out the Feliciano Commission reforms That is why the remedies must deal directly with: (1) the conditions that make corruption possible and (2) why individuals engage in corrupt practices. Initially, the AFP must reexamine how it manages and allocates its funds; how it buys its logistics; how it disciplines its men and women; and how it reduces—if not eliminates—the conditions that provide reasons for conversion. I expect General Abu, who is here with us, to bring us up to date on how the General Staff is carrying out the Feliciano Commission’s detailed recommendations on AFP reform. Another source of ideas is the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR), which is a broad-range program to carry out long-term, systemic changes in both the AFP and the Defense Department. PDR is the product of a continuing Joint Defense Assessment by the Philippines and its American strategic partner. The State needs to focus the AFP on planning—which must look beyond yearly Budget allocations to a coherent and achievable longer-term defense strategy. The policy ends to which the Philippine State might commit the AFP should shape our military’s policy means. IV. OUR MILITARY DILEMMA OF ALL THE INSTITUTIONS in the new countries, the military is commonly the best-organized—the most nearly equal—the most disciplined—and the most closely-knit. Hence it becomes—in most cases, unavoidably—a major player in post-independence politics. In our country, the military—abetted by the Opposition, the Americans, and the Church—was venturing into national politics as early as the 1950s, when it planned to intervene in the election between an unpopular President Quirino and his populist ex-Defense Secretary, Magsaysay. But it was President Marcos who thoroughly politicized the officer corps. After having subverted the general staff and the regional commanders, he in late 1972 shut down Congress and the media—arrested all his political enemies—and ruled as strongman. Over the next decade, Marcos rode the tiger of authoritarianism by corrupting key military commanders with unprecedented privileges and perquisites. But, of course, even Marcos found it impossible to get every officer in the military on his side—and it was a few of these dissidents who eventually set off a “People Power” revolution that drove him into inglorious exile. A reforming AFP will present a grave danger to a mismanaged Philippine State The AFP in our time has entered a dark period. But the institution is stronger than the fallible individuals who compose it—and I have no doubt it will redeem itself. So potentially powerful is the military, in relation to the larger civilian society, that the quality of its socialization must concern us all. And a mismanaged society like ours faces a dilemma in dealing with its armed and violent guardian institution. The dilemma for our mismanaged society is plain and simple. If the military should reflect the corruption and incompetence in national society, then the military will aggravate this corruption and incompetence beyond the tolerance of ordinary people. iBut if, on the other hand, the military should remain professional in a state run by corrupt and incompetent politicians, then this professional military will—sooner or later—be moved by popular demand to take over such a mismanaged society. Ironically, a reforming AFP could present a mortal danger to a Philippine State which is unable—or unwilling—to reform itself. The AFP reform movement should inspire a wider reform movement in the Philippine State To say we cannot cure the part without curing the whole may be a logical fallacy. Or an excuse in advance of failure. But it is what we need to try and do, if we are to get through our national malaise—and make this nation worthy of the blood that generations of our young people have, in their innocence, shed for it. The duty of the soldier is to follow the orders of the civilian authority at all times. But when the political leaders fail—as in 1986—or the national leadership collapses—as in 2001—then it becomes the soldier’s obligation directly to serve the people. Twice in the last 20 years, our military and national police—in fulfillment of this obligation—placed themselves on the side of the people. But states cannot always be resolving their problems with "people power." We must break this unsustainable political cycle before it gets out of control and causes national society to implode. This is why you and I must ensure the reform movement in the armed forces inspires a similar—and wider—movement in the whole of the Philippine State. This is why we must level the playing field of enterprise—so that a free national market can begin to reform our politics. This is why we must level the playing field of our politics—so that it can begin reforming our democracy of stalemate. Because only a reformed, democratic politics can give direction—and civic discipline—to the market, the military, and the whole of national society. We must ensure the martial will to reform is matched by political will on the part of those who govern us. Nothing less will do.
Posted on: Tue, 16 Jul 2013 04:17:23 +0000
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