SECRET TALKS ON THE PARTITION OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES. While the Arab insurgents fought for recognition of their right to form an independent Arab state, secret talks were going on in the cool comfort of the Entente’s ministerial offices on partition of the Arab countries. There was nothing very new about the claims made by the Great Powers, the only difference being that with the outbreak of the war they felt the need to come to an agreement between themselves on these claims and on concrete commitments between the Allies. From the very outset of the war, the British Government had deemed it necessary to inform the Russians of its readiness to solve the Straits question in Russia’s favour. Upon receiving this statement on March 4, 1915, the tsarist Minister of Foreign Affairs, S. D. Sazonov, wrote a letter to the British and French ambassadors in St. Petersburg suggesting that they give their written approval on the handing over of the Straits to Russia. This suggestion was gladly taken up by the Allies, especially by the French. On March 8, the French Ambassador, Paleologue, announced the French Government’s consent to Russia’s claims on the condition that France’s rights to Syria, the Lebanon and Cilicia be recognised by Russia. Russia was ready to accept this compromise, but made a reservation about the Armenians’ claims on Cilicia and also raised the question of the “holy places” in Palestine. Britain acted more warily, demanding that provisions be made in the future for the formation of an Arab state, the borders of which were to be determined at some later period. On April 10, 1915, an agreement was concluded between Britain, France and Russia giving the Straits to Russia and providing for the formation of an independent Moslem state in Arabia. But the question of Syria’s and Palestine’s fate was not solved. At the end of 1915 and the beginning of 1916; additional talks were held between Britain and France on the subject. At the outset of 1916, the talks were speeded up in view of the Russian offensive in the Caucasus. Britain agreed to concede to France the territory west of the line Aleppo-Hama-Homs-Damascus. The French insisted that this region be regarded as a future French colony and eastern Syria as a sphere of French influence. By this time Russia, who had received information about conflicts between Jemal Pasha and the central government in Istanbul, proposed a new plan for the solution of the Arab question, which boiled down to the following: to demand that Jemal Pasha should break completely with the Porte and open the front to the Allies. In exchange for this it was proposed to place Jemal Pasha at the head of an independent sultanate of six autonomous provinces (including four Arab ones). This was the basis S. D. Sazonov suggested for holding secret talks with Jemal Pasha, but the Western Powers had absolutely no intention of handing over the Arab countries to Jemal Pasha. France, therefore, declared that the plan should be carried out only on the condition that the regions meant for France were not given to Jemal Pasha. Britain stated a similar reservation with regard to Mesopotamia and Arabia. Objections by the Western Powers made the plan unworkable. In March 1916, special British and French representatives (Sykes and Picot) arrived in Petrograd for talks that resulted in the famous Sykes-Picot Agreement, which was expressed in notes exchanged between France and Russia (May 9, 1916) and France and Britain (May 15, 1916). The agreement envisaged the seizure by France of western Syria, the Lebanon and Cilicia together with a portion of south-east Anatolia (the so-called Blue Zone), and the seizure by Britain of southern and central Iraq plus the Palestinian ports of Haifa and Akka (the Red Zone), The remaining area (the rest of Palestine) (the Brown Zone) was reserved for a spe- cial international regime of its own in agreement with Russia and the other countries. Eastern Syria and the district of Mosul came under the French sphere of influence (Zone A) and Transjordan and the northern part of the Baghdad vilayet, under the British sphere of influence (Zone B). The agreement gave France and Britain in these zones priority rights in trade, railway construction. and arms export and the exclusive right to supply the future Arab administration with whatever foreign officials, advisers and the like it might need. Although Russia, who exchanged notes with Britain only in the autumn of 1916, had no claims on the Arab countries, the Allies promised her Turkey’s Armenian vilayets and northern Kurdistan in exchange for her adherence to the agreement, and also confirmed her “rights” to Constantinople and to defend the interests of the Orthodox in Pales-tine. Accordingly a Yellow Zone, Lake Van, appeared on the map. Somewhat later, Italy learned of the agreement and this led to the appearance of the Green Zone (south-western Anatolia) and Zone C (a portion of western and central Anatolia). On April 20, 1917, notes were exchanged between France and Italy. Britain stipulated that Italy’s adherence to the agreement must first be ratified by Russia. One of the sayings of British diplomacy is that you can promise anything you like because the situation is bound to change. Britain’s generous concessions in the partition of the Porte’s Arab provinces may be taken as an example of adherence to this ru
Posted on: Sat, 22 Jun 2013 23:01:41 +0000