From time to time I run across something that really intrigues me. While I had heard about the Battle of Pea Ridge & read brief accounts of it, I was pleasantly surprised with the book Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West (Shea & Hess). More than anything else, I came away from this book with a genuine affection for a man I had only heard about in passing. What Curtis manages to accomplish in his career, his personal loss, his reluctance to toot his own horn, & his early death following the war helped to ensure that his place is history is little known. Here are a few links to his biography: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_Curtis encyclopediaofarkansas.ne...x?entryID=2365 No less a figure than Phil Sheridan (who usually was in the business of promoting only himself) has this to say about Curtis in his memoirs: Quote: Just after my return to Springfield the battle of Pea Ridge was fought. The success of the Union troops in this battle was considerable, and while not of sufficient magnitude to affect the general cause materially, it was decisive as to that particular campaign, and resulted in driving all organized Confederate forces out of the State of Missouri. After Pea Ridge was won, certain efforts were made to deprive Curtis of the credit due him for the victory; but, no matter what merit belonged to individual commanders, I was always convinced that Curtis was deserving of the highest commendation, not only for the skill displayed on the field, but for a zeal and daring in campaign which was not often exhibited at that early period of the war. Especially should this credit be awarded him, when we consider the difficulties under which he labored, how he was hampered in having to depend on a sparsely settled country for the subsistence of his troops. In the reports of the battle that came to Springfield, much glory was claimed for some other general officers, but as I had control of the telegraph line from Springfield east, I detained all despatches until General Curtis had sent in his official report. He thus had the opportunity of communicating with his superior in advance of some of his vain subordinates, who would have laid claim to the credit of the battle had I not thwarted them by this summary means. This in spite of the fact that Curtis had Sheridan cashiered as quartermaster general from his army for insubordination. Another officer who was destined for greatness, Grenville Dodge, also had high praise for Curtis. From his book The Battle of Atlanta & other campaigns he said: Quote: I have never thought that General Curtis has received the credit he was entitled to for this campaign and battle. With 12,000 men he traversed Missouri into Arkansas, living off the country, and showing good judgment in concentrating to meet Van Dorn and refusing to retreat when urged to do so at the conference at the log schoolhouse on the morning of the 7th. While his pre-Civil War days are interesting, it is his Civil War days that we will look at here. For a good synopsis of the battle of Pea Ridge, Ill post this from The Encyclopedia of Arkansas History & Culture Quote: The Battle of Pea Ridge played a pivotal role in securing Missouri for the Union and opened Arkansas to Union occupation. It played a large role in preserving Missouri’s tenuous loyal-state status. After the Battle of Wilson’s Creek in Missouri, August 10, 1861, the command structure on both sides in Missouri underwent major overhauls. Union Major General Henry W. Halleck chose Brigadier General Samuel Ryan Curtis to command the force that fought at Wilson’s Creek, the newly christened Army of the Southwest. The Confederates also had command issues. Major General Sterling Price and Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch feuded bitterly, and President Jefferson Davis chose Major General Earl Van Dorn to revive the Confederacy’s fortunes in the new Military District of the Trans-Mississippi. Van Dorn’s plan to reinvigorate the Rebel cause west of the Mississippi River exhibited his reputation as an aggressive fighter. He planned to attack Curtis’s troops in northwest Arkansas and to capture St. Louis, Missouri. The Rebel Army of the West had about 16,000 men available for the upcoming struggle, while the Federal Army of the Southwest had about 10,250. The Confederates had advantages in men and artillery relative to their opponents, greater than any other Confederate force in a single campaign during the entire Civil War. Van Dorn ordered the Army of the West north toward Fayetteville (Washington County), hoping to destroy the scattered Union detachments that Curtis dispersed around his central position near Little Sugar Creek. The plan failed as Union Brigadier General Franz Sigel’s forces in Bentonville (Benton County) escaped to Union lines around Little Sugar Creek. The Confederate men and animals were worn out from the march over the Boston Mountains, had had little sleep, and brought few supplies. Despite this, Van Dorn formed an even more ambitious plan. He decided to attack from the rear. He split the Army of the West into two forces, separated by Pea Ridge, one under McCulloch to skirt the western edge of the ridge and come in behind the Federal troops, while the other wing under Price would take the Bentonville Detour around the ridge, then take Telegraph Road south and link with McCulloch at Elkhorn Tavern to attack in the rear. While Curtis did not anticipate such a wide-ranging envelopment, he took precautions by felling trees and making obstructions to delay any Rebel moves around Pea Ridge via the Bentonville Detour. The Confederate attack began the morning of March 7. Curtis initially believed that the Rebels were trying to slip part of their force around his right flank but that most of the force was in front of him. He dispatched troops under Colonel Peter J. Osterhaus from the Second Division to determine the strength of the Confederates to the west of his army. This sparked the first shots of the battle. After initial success, the Rebel attack at Leetown (Benton County) met disaster as McCulloch decided to reconnoiter the Federal position and was killed by Union troops. Yankee soldiers also gunned down the second-in-command, Brigadier General James McIntosh. The Confederates had huge advantages in numbers and men, but no leaders. All was not lost for the Rebels. Colonel Louis Hébert led a large force east of Leetown in an attack on still-outnumbered forces. Hebert did not know about McCulloch and McIntosh’s deaths and that he was the highest-ranking Confederate officer on this part of the field. He led his force of about 2,000 in an uncoordinated and unsupported attack. His attack ran into dense woods and seemed to make progress. Yankee reinforcements led by Colonel Jefferson Columbus Davis of the Third Division blunted the assault; Hebert got lost in the woods and was captured. Thus the Confederates were down to the fourth-ranking officer on the battlefield, Brigadier General Albert Pike. Pike did nothing to keep the Rebel effort going. Price’s force was late in starting its attack, but once in action the Confederates made great progress. About 10:30 a.m., Curtis became aware of large numbers of Rebels on Telegraph Road, behind him. Colonel Eugene Carr’s Fourth Division gave ground grudgingly before Price’s superior numbers. In the late afternoon, the Confederates pushed Carr’s battered Fourth Division back from the area around Elkhorn Tavern. Missouri rebels led by Colonel Henry Little forced the Federal troops around Elkhorn Tavern south to Ruddick’s cornfield. A flank movement by Price’s forces against the Fourth Iowa under Colonel Grenville Dodge failed, but Little’s men moving east on Huntsville Road dislodged the Iowans as nightfall ended the fighting. The Battle of Pea Ridge would be decided the next day. Curtis spent most of the night of March 7 preparing. He rearranged the Army of the Southwest and made sure the men were fed, rested, and supplied with ammunition. The next morning, Union troops were ready to resume combat, but the Confederates were not. Van Dorn needed to reconcentrate the army. In the process, he forgot to bring up the supply trains. Most of the Rebels did not get food or new ammunition. The mistake proved fatal. The fighting on March 8 was decisive. Federal cannoneers quickly silenced, destroyed, or forced their Rebel counterparts to retreat. As Curtis prepared to attack with the entire Army of the Southwest, Van Dorn realized his supply trains were still in Bentonville. Comprehending he had lost and was in danger of being trapped and destroyed, Van Dorn sent the exhausted army east toward Huntsville (Madison County). The Battle of Pea Ridge was over, and it was a resounding Union victory. The battle was one of the bloodiest west of the Mississippi. The Confederates suffered about 2,000 casualties. The Union had 1,384 casualties. Pea Ridge changed the strategic outlook of the Civil War in the trans-Mississippi west. Van Dorn was so demoralized that he took the Army of the West to the east bank of the Mississippi, leaving Arkansas defenseless. This, combined with the Union victory at Pea Ridge, secured Missouri for the Union. Although Confederates made other attempts to take Missouri, the Pea Ridge Campaign proved to be the best opportunity for the Rebels. With Missouri and St. Louis secure, the Union emphasis switched to capturing the rest of the Mississippi River Valley. Here is Curtiss official report on the battle here: civilwararchive/RESEA...862/peausa.htm What is fascinating to me from the battle is the cool & steady way that Curtis led troops. Logistically, Curtiss Army of the Southwest achieved mobility the likes of which Stonewall Jackson would have been proud of in the Valley a few months later. Faced with an incursion of pro-Southern Missouri troops (under Price), Curtis embarks upon a Winter Campaign that drives an army comparable in size to his own completely out of Missouri. He then pushes into Northwestern Arkansas at the very end of his supply line. The Rebs retreat back to combine with the Confederate troops from Arkansas, Louisiana, & Texas troops (under McCulloch) & turned to face Curtis under the combined leadership of Earl Van Dorn. Due to having to leave troops behind to guard his supply line, Curtis faces Van Dorn with about 10,500 troops to 16,000. Never were the odds so well stacked in the Confederacys favor for a major battle (Grant, at Shiloh on the first day, was outnumbered 40,000 to 45,000; At Chickamauga, Old Rosey had around 60,000 to Braggs 65,000; at Franklin, Tn the numbers were about even that actually participated). With his men dug in solidly at Little Sugar Creek, Curtis awaited the Confederate onslaught. Van Dorn tried to work his way around the Federal rear & establish himself between Curtis & his supply line, but Curtis detected the movement & began to shift his forces to face the oncoming Rebs. What makes this so remarkable is the fact that Curtis is able to shift his entire army 180 degrees in one day & fight on a completely different front-something I dont believe we see again until Patton is able to turn 3rd Army 90 degrees & attack a completely different front during the Battle of the Bulge. During the battle, Curtis handles his army like a prize fighter.....knowing where & when to punch & keeping Van Dorn completely off-balance. The Confederate officer corps went through a rough time, especially against McCullochs division. In rapid succession, the Federals kill or capture the 3 heads of the division-McCulloch (KIA), McIntosh (KIA), & Hébert (Captured). While Curtis has some fantastic subdordinates, he also has some bad eggs as well-Sigel being the standout. Despite this, he is able to reign in the troublesome men in order to win the battle. During the night of the 7th of March, Curtis gets his men feed & resupplied with plenty of ammunition, showing again that his grasp of logistics is sound. On the other side of the fence, Van Dorn completely ignores his own logistics & doesnt even have a clue that they are stuck back hours away. The next day, the Federals sweep the field clear of the Confederates. His success against the Confederates allows Halleck & Grant to breath a major sigh of relief & it frees up thousands of Federal troops & supplies to flow, whereas before they were held up waiting to see what Prices & McCullochs armies would do. The success at Pea Ridge is a resounding strategic win in that it frees Missouri & Northern Arkansas of Rebs & allows for the Federals to concentrate for further actions against the Rebs down river instead of having thousands of troops tied up in defense of Missouri. What is fascinating in the aftermath here is that Van Dorn is so soundly whipped that he takes Beauregards advice & shifts his entire remaining army across the Mississippi River to help against Grant at Shiloh. Unfortunately, the vast majority of these men do not arrive in time to help. What it does is strip the state of Arkansas of virtually all defenders. Curtis takes advantage of this. Prior to this campaign, Curtis learns he is promoted, but also learns of the death of his 20 year old daughter Sadie. Utterly heartbroken, Curtis is able to grieve for his daughter before the Confederates completely leave the state wide open for him. At the end of April & beginning of May, Curtis embarks upon a campaign through Northern Arkansas that is the precursor to Shermans Meridian campaign of 63. By June 17th, Curtis pulls another first by completely cutting himself from his supply line & living off the land-preceding Grants similiar move against Vicksburg in April 63 by nearly a year. During his campaign across Arkansas, the abolitionist Curtis frees thousands of slaves & carries them with him-preceding the Emancipation Proclamation by several months, but landing him in trouble. In October of 63, tragedy strikes again as his son is shot after surrendering by Quantrills Raiders. Reassigned to head the Department of Kansas, he does his best to stop Price during another invasion attempt of Missouri in 1864. This culmilated in the Battle of Westport: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Westport In the end, Curtis dies in 1866, a year after the Civil War has ended. He has no time to write memoirs or write articles for veterans magazines & such. Despite winning several battles & having several very successful campaigns, Curtis is regulated to the back of the history books. His name rarely comes up at all in any discussion of Civil War generals, let alone as successful ones. The tragedy of losing his daughter & son during the war really brings home the meaning of the war-although successful, the casualties that went along with it were always painful. A modest officer, Curtis had little or no desire to tout his successes-he only weighed in on the battles & campaigns when men such as Sigel tried to claim the lions share from him. It was because of such men as Curtis that the Union was able to win & keep this nation together.
Posted on: Thu, 06 Mar 2014 12:44:20 +0000
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